39. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretaries of State for European Affairs (Elbrick) and International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)1
SUBJECT
- Talking Points for Consultations with the UK and France on Rejection of Hungarian Credentials at the Thirteenth General Assembly
General Political Considerations
We believe Hungary is the major item capable of putting the USSR on the defensive at this current session. However, we are concerned that the worldwide revulsion and indignation which resulted from the secret trials and executions of Nagy, Maleter, and other leaders of the 1956 Hungarian national uprising have been somewhat diminished by events in the Middle and Far East and that there is a real danger that the USSR will escape its due share of the blame and penalization for the continuing repression in Hungary. With these considerations in mind, we have sought to devise a course of action which would not only dramatize conditions in Hungary but which would also exert genuine pressure on the Soviets and the present Hungarian regime to end the armed intervention and repressive measures. We feel that just another condemnatory resolution would have little or no effect on the USSR and the present Hungarian authorities and would tend to advertise UN impotence and frustration concerning Hungary. Our legation in Budapest supports an attempt to reject credentials on the grounds that no action by the General Assembly short of rejection would have a significant impact within Hungary itself. The Hungarian representative in New York has already served notice that his Government would ignore future General Assembly resolutions.
[Page 69]Provided necessary support is forthcoming, we favor rejection of credentials. As our primary motivation is humanitarian, we do not consider rejection of credentials tantamount to expulsion and we would want to make clear our view that Hungarian credentials could be accepted at some future date provided the armed intervention and repression ceases. Secondly, public attention, both in the Free World and behind the Curtain would be focused on the atrocities committed in Hungary. The efforts of the present puppet regime to pass itself off as respectable would be dealt a well-nigh mortal blow and the USSR would suffer a major psychological defeat. Thirdly, we feel that rejection of credentials would not only enhance the prestige of the UN by demonstrating that it refuses to apply a double standard of conduct where Communist and non-Communist nations are concerned, but that it does have certain sanctions at its disposal when its findings and recommendations are willfully ignored.
Action Contemplated
Our preliminary thinking has been along the lines of raising Hungary initially in plenary and, after adequate debate, seeking the adoption of a condemnatory resolution which, among other things, would find the Hungarian authorities incapable of fulfilling their obligations under the Charter to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and which would call upon other UN organs to take account of this finding. Subsequent to the adoption of the resolution the Credentials Committee would meet, note the finding of the General Assembly, and reject the credentials of the Hungarian delegation. We would then seek approval of the Credentials Committee’s report in plenary.
Technical Considerations
The question as to whether a simple or two-thirds majority is required to reject credentials has never arisen. In order to avoid a possibly adverse precedent, we would insist that a two-thirds majority is required and would proceed with our campaign to reject credentials only if our consultations indicated that a two-thirds majority would be assured. At the ILO Conference last June we succeeded in mustering a two-thirds majority which rejected the credentials of the Hungarian government delegation. The vote by UN member governments was 34–15–12. Several negative votes and abstentions were based on the procedural objection that a subsidiary UN body should not reject credentials in the absence of prior action by the General Assembly. Ambassador Lodge seriously doubts that a two-thirds vote could be mustered for rejection at this General Assembly. However, this is such an important matter that we feel we must have a definite expression of [Page 70] views on the part of key friendly governments before we can make a final decision. It is noteworthy that the vote on the Chinese representation resolution at the current session was 44–28–9. A shift of only 4 votes would mean a two-thirds majority should the number of abstentions remain constant.
Reservations have been expressed by Ambassador Lodge concerning the proposed course of action because the United States and certain of its allies face difficult issues at this session such as Taiwan and Middle East. It has been argued that a vigorous initiative on Hungarian credentials would complicate our position on other issues and might necessitate a wasteful expenditure of influence and good will. On balance, we do not believe that rejection of Hungarian credentials would adversely affect our support on other problems. Just because the USSR is trying to place the US and the West on the defensive in regard to certain issues, we should not let this deter us from taking the initiative on action morally and politically desirable.
As to retaliation by the Hungarian authorities, the only significant action available to them would be to initiate a break in diplomatic relations. While we are prepared to accept such an eventuality, we feel it is unlikely, and that the collective character of UN action would render it even less likely.
In the event the UK and France agree that rejection of credentials is desirable and that its feasibility is worthy of exploration, we plan to initiate wider consultations as soon as possible.2
Attachments:
Three copies of draft resolution on Hungary. (Tab A)
Gadel 28 to U.N. (Tab B)3
- Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 60 D 216, 13th GA. Confidential. Drafted by Newlin and Nunley.↩
- Murphy met with Caccia and Hood October 9; a memorandum of their conversation is ibid., Central Files, 320/10–958. He met with Alphand, Leprette, and De la Grandville on October 15; a memorandum of that conversation is ibid., 320/10–1558.↩
- Neither attached. Tab A was not found. Tab B, dated October 2, discussed attempting to reject the Hungarians’ credentials. (ibid., 764.00/9–1258)↩