Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

385. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, November 20, 1959—6 p.m.

2686. From Dean.

(1) Met with Drew, Canadian High Commissioner, former chairman Canadian Delegation at Geneva, this morning. He most cordial and very pleased I called.

(2) Explained we had made commitment at Ottawa conference to present their case for maximum six-mile territorial sea and adjacent six-mile fishing zone with no traditional rights in fishing zone but with obligation on side coastal state to negotiate reasonable period for termination all fishing rights. Stated we had vigorously presented this view for two days but neither UK nor any of countries represented would accept.

(3) Explained Canadian proposal based on premise bilateral agreements would be worked out before Geneva but that all present insisted no opportunity to do so before March 17 and no chance to do so with other coastal states. Informed him all agreed they could not vote for a formula which deprived them of fishing rights as matter of international law and then if no agreement in bilateral negotiations their rights would cease.

(4) Said we had urged on meeting here that with UK, Western Europe and our support hoped to make their formula one which would get two-thirds at conference but without UK and Western Europe support and with solid Soviet and Arab blocs against anything less than straight twelve-mile territorial sea did not see how he could get more than approximately forty-four votes plus or minus one or two for new Canadian formula.

(5) He evidenced disappointment but not I think surprise. He insisted main key to success at Geneva conference was first working out formula acceptable to Iceland and was strongly critical of British use of warships and insisted this had united small nations almost solidly against any proposal UK might make. Also said was afraid Soviets would support Icelandic position at conference and therefore Canada felt it had to place itself in the lead for smaller nations with formula providing for definitive ending so-called historic fishing rights.

(6) Pointed out as neighbors we had pooled naval, air force and early warning defense, that our joint security could not survive territorial sea beyond maximum six miles and that if UK and Western Europe would go to modified UK proposal plus reasonable phase-out Canada would get everything in substance it wanted, although procedure for obtaining quite different.

(7) [1 sentence (18 words) not declassified] Told him thought importance of problem transcended personal considerations, was essential we and Canada, UK and Western Europe should work together to get realistic formula acceptable to Asian and African coastal nations, and that he had great opportunity to bring his unity about and to prevent dissension and possibly bitter litigation with Western Europe. He stated UK had recently rejected his formula and had merely offered to keep problem in status quo and then to negotiate and if no agreement status quo ante would be restored, and that he did not believe UK was prepared to negotiate realistically and that any formula which was presented to conference as preserving UK’s rights against smaller nations, and in particular UK’s rights against Iceland, could not get two-thirds. Told him present meeting was exploratory with no one committed and consequently could make no prediction, but that if UK and Western Europe could accept reasonable phase-out we would think would have a workable formula which Canada could accept and explained special situations formula we had handed to UK. [1 sentence (34 words) not declassified]

(8) While not committing himself in any way he was quite obviously interested and said he would report in full to his Minister and wanted to know if I would be available to come to Ottawa if his Minister requested it and I said yes. He suggested technical conference scheduled for November 24 be postponed until we have further word to report as to UK and Western Europe attitude toward phase-out.

(9) Said he would like to correspond with me personally about situation and asked me to keep him in touch, which I agreed to do.

(10) This afternoon called on Hare, UK Minister Agriculture and Fisheries.

(11) While he in no way committed his government to phase-out, he was obviously interested but said effect on fishing industry in UK might impel them to put forward their modified UK formula only for the present and assuming ultimate Cabinet approval of phase-out to accept addition of phase-out with reluctance at Geneva and wanted to know my reaction.

(12) Again said we were concerned about shortness next conference, possible bloc decisions before Geneva and inability of delegations to get instructions on fall-back brought forward, and that we preferred present realistic formula on which we could immediately get no work and line up votes.

(13) He argued on other hand we would be free to argue we favored UK modified formula plus phase-out with Asian and African nations and could promise to try to bring UK to this position at Geneva and formula which presently did not have UK and Western European support at beginning of conference might be more palatable to Asian and African nations.

(14) Said he would consider matter carefully and asked us to do the same and indicated that at Cabinet meeting present opinion of fishing industry might require him to argue against present approval of phase-out theory even though it might be subsequently approved.

(15) Expressed desire to work closely with us at all stages.

Whitney

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/11–2059. Confidential. Repeated to Ottawa.