Office of the Historian

345. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State1

Geneva, March 17, 1958—noon.

870. Law of Sea.

1.
Carefully canvassed possible voting situation here with Fitzmaurice Saturday and again Sunday morning.2 Fitzmaurice in complete agreement our analysis. States personal opinion only, assumption stated in last message of London to Washington3 was not based on reality or correct analysis conditions here. Only possible difference between his and our analysis is that he believes if Indians did not push actively for Article 3(2) of ILC draft, Soviets were to continue to push for straight 12-mile limit with extremely limited right if any of innocent passage and no right to overfly, and Canadian proposals previously outlined were not made, we might by sticking to 3-mile limit with no compromise possibly marshall 28 votes against other proposals. Fitzmaurice frankly admits problem certain nations abstaining from voting, attitude of west coast Latin Americans, problem of Arabs on Gulf of Aqaba, desire Southeast Asia nations for contiguous fishing zone as protection against Japan and attitude Europeans against fishery Articles 49–59 make voting calculations extremely difficult. On other hand Fitzmaurice personally believes Canadian proposal4 most timely.
2.
Attorney General, Fitzmaurice and Wall of UKDel dined with us last night on Attorney General’s return from week in London. Attorney Gen made UK position crystal clear. Their position based on Cabinet decision that were they to support Canadian position might bring down govt and hence cannot support Canadian proposal for contiguous fishing zone under any circumstances. Attorney Gen agreed he would advise Cabinet his agreement our analysis that Canadian proposal timely and would not presently oppose and would continue support US on 3-mile limit issue alone if voted on separately from Canadian proposal. It is clear their admiralty does not see eye to eye with our Joint Chiefs that maintenance 3-mile limit is absolutely essential. According to UKDel, Mountbatten did not advise Cabinet going to 6-mile limit would be detrimental NATO operations despite previous advice to contrary. Attorney Gen insisted their opinion Canadian [Page 662] proposal for 9-mile contiguous zone would fail and made successive and repeated attempts get our agreement to 6-mile limit as fallback position. We made it clear our instructions were to contrary and that we saw no possibility of 12-mile limit with right of innocent passage and right to overfly outer 3 either winning or being very successful as a tactical move.

Nevertheless Attorney Gen fears if conf fails may be general movement toward straight 12 miles with no right of innocent passage or right overfly, with blame being placed on major powers for intransigence insisting 3-mile limit, and wants to be free to put forward at strategic time 6-mile limit position when clear Canadian proposal has failed.

We urged they at least allow Canadian proposal to be launched with our support and without their active opposition and without their presently campaigning for a 6-mile limit, to which they agreed and said would so advise Cabinet.

Fact UK will keep silent may possibly hurt Canadian proposal’s chances among some Europeans but may possibly help among newly formed nations in African-Asian group, who appear determined change 3-mile largely because British imposed it.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3–1758. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution; Noforn. Repeated to London.↩
  2. Dean reported a similar conversation with Fitzmaurice on March 15 in telegram 864 from Geneva, March 15. (Ibid., 399/731/3–1558)↩
  3. Document 341.↩
  4. For text of the Canadian proposal, which was introduced in the First Committee on March 17, see U.N. doc. ACONF.13/5, sec. 2; for a summary of Drew’s remarks at the time of its introduction, see ibid., pp. 51–53.↩