291. Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State1

BASIC U.S. PURPOSES IN SEEKING TREATY

I. The U.S. will be willing to enter into a treaty on Antarctica with the eleven other Governments invited to the conference on Antarctica only if the treaty contains the following provisions in a form satisfactory to the United States:

1.
Provision that Antarctica be used for peaceful purposes only, which does not exclude the peaceful use of military personnel and equipment.
2.
Provision for an effective right of inspection by the U.S. of all activities in Antarctica.
3.
Provision for “freezing” the legal status quo as to rights and claims.
4.
Provision for freedom of scientific research in Antarctica for all who conform to provisions 1, 2, and 3 above, without creating any obligation for the parties to assist non-members in the UN and the Specialized Agencies.
5.
The provisions of the treaty as a whole should be such as to give reasonable expectation that nonparties are not likely to engage in activities contrary to provisions of 1, 2, and 3 above.
6.
Provision for promoting international scientific cooperation in Antarctica.
[7.
Provisions of the treaty should be consonant with U.S. policy in unrecognized Communist regimes.]2

II. In addition to the foregoing essential requirements, the U.S. should strongly support inclusion of the following provisions but, assuming other provisions are satisfactory, the Department will determine, on the basis of circumstances prevailing at the Conference, whether or not to make the inclusion of these provisions a sine qua non of U.S. participation:

1.
Provision expressly permitting the use of military equipment and personnel for peaceful purposes.
2.
Provision delimiting the zone of application of the treaty to the area commonly understood to be part of Antarctica and excluding the high seas.
3.
Provision for periodic meetings of representatives of the parties to the treaty for purpose of formulating and recommending additional measures in furtherance of treaty objectives.
4.
Provision for consultation among the parties to deal with disputes arising under the treaty and, where consultation fails to produce a settlement, for compulsory ICJ jurisdiction over such disputes.
5.
Provision committing the parties to exert efforts to insure that nonparties will not engage in activities contrary to the provisions of the treaty.

III. Essential parties to the treaty to which the foregoing provisions refer are (1) the seven claimant states and (2) the U.S.S.R. The U.S. should not sign the treaty if it is not signed by these countries and the treaty should not come into effect without their ratification.

It is also in the U.S. interest that the treaty be signed by the three other countries invited to the Conference. The treaty should enter into force only upon ratification by all signatories.

As for subsequent accession by other states, it is essential that there be no accession clause which

(1)
permits accession by non-members of the UN and the Specialized Agencies.
(2)
permits accession by countries having a merely political interest in Antarctica.
(3)
could reasonably be expected to prevent ratification by any of the “essential” parties listed above.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/10–1659. Confidential. This position paper is one of 15 attached to the instructions for the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica.
  2. Brackets in the source text.