277. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 13, 19581

SUBJECT

  • Antarctica

PARTICIPANTS

  • Mr. R.G. Casey, Minister for External Affairs of Australia2
  • Mr. J. Plimsoll, Assistant Secretary for External Affairs of Australia
  • Mr. Howard Beale, Australian Ambassador
  • Mr. Malcolm Booker, Counselor, Australian Embassy
  • Mr. Lewis Border, First Secretary, Australian Embassy
  • Ambassador Paul C. Daniels

At Mr. Casey’s suggestion, Ambassador Daniels enumerated the points that they might jointly examine as follows:

1.
Whether to include high seas in the zone of application of the proposed treaty, a matter on which there is no general agreement, as yet.
2.
Whether the provision regarding “peaceful uses” should expressly be made to apply also in “time of war”, as proposed by the Australians;
3.
The question of the use of military personnel and equipment for logistic purposes, a practice which it was impossible for the United States to change at the present time.
4.
The question of what the other eleven countries should do if the U.S.S.R. refuses to join in the treaty. Like Australia, the United States, at present, reserves its position on this question.
5.
The question of whether the proposed treaty should include a provision for accession by other countries.

As to the applicability of the treaty to areas of the high seas, Mr. Casey said that a delimitation which would include all land and sea south of 60° had the advantage of simplicity. He inquired whether the United States favored including only the land surface and that portion of sea regarded as territorial waters. Ambassador Daniels said that for the time being we favored a delimitation at the 60th parallel with the simple proviso of “excluding the high seas.” He mentioned that a reference to “territorial waters” might be inappropriate because of the jurisdictional question in Antarctica, namely, that in unclaimed sectors, and even throughout Antarctica as far as the United States was concerned, there was no territorial sovereignty to which territorial waters could be attributed. There was a further question as to whether ice areas would be included as land, but this was a point we did not [Page 508] propose to settle at this time. The principal reasons for objection to inclusion of the high seas in the zone of application were: (1) The treaty would thereby restrict the activities of signatories also in certain areas of the high seas, without restricting any non-signatories; (2) The problem of inspection measures to ensure peaceful uses would be complicated by inclusion of the high seas. Ambassador Daniels also said that the United States Department of Defense was also opposed to the inclusion of high seas in the zone of application.

Mr. Casey asked if Ambassador Daniels knew why the Russians advocated the “Antarctic Convergence” as the limit of the zone of application. Ambassador Daniels said that he did not know the Russians’ motives. Apparently they want to apply to the treaty the definition of Antarctica agreed upon by scientists and that he questioned whether it was logical to use the scientific criterion for a treaty of this character. Mr. Casey stressed the need for precision in delimiting the zone, such as a line at 60° would provide. Ambassador Daniels said that all except the U.S.S.R. agreed to 60° as the outside limit, but that as to the exclusion of the high seas within the area there was difference of opinion among the other countries and that we did not know the Soviet view clearly on that precise question.

At this point, Mr. Casey asked whether Ambassador Daniels believed that the U.S.S.R. really wants to conclude a treaty. Ambassador Daniels replied that the regular attendance of the Russians at every meeting of the preparatory group, despite their reluctance to discuss substantive questions, and the careful attention they have given to such questions as the proposed rules of procedure and other matters discussed seem to indicate that they are very interested in these negotiations.

Mr. Casey then raised the question of making the provision for peaceful uses expressly applicable in wartime. He pointed out that if the Soviets were to use naval vessels for support operations such as the United States does, there would be great concern in Australia. Ambassador Daniels pointed out that a distinction should be made between combat vessels and naval ships of the supply type. If the Russians use the type of vessels the United States does, he could see no reason for concern. Mr. Casey wondered whether such vessels were armed and indicated concern as to the use of aircraft carriers for support operations. Mr. Casey stressed the importance of this question for Australia. He said that expressly extending the application of the provision for non-military use of Antarctica to time of war should not create difficulties for the United States. If the Russians violated it, so could we. He also referred to the possibility of Soviet use of Antarctica for missile bases.

[Page 509]

Ambassador Daniels pointed out that the phrase “for peaceful purposes only” without reference to war, would not be the same as saying “only in time of peace.” Rather, it would be unusual to add a reference to “war”. This might provoke speculation concerning the purposes of the treaty. Ambassador Daniels called on Mr. Neidle to mention some of the legal difficulties in this connection. Mr. Neidle pointed to the difficulty of whether “war” would include “political actions”, and whether it was intended to cover war between the parties or wars with non-signatory states.

Ambassador Daniels emphasized that, for practical purposes, the inspection measures to be applied under the treaty would be equally effective whether or not the treaty was made expressly applicable to time of war. Mr. Casey then inquired whether the inspection measures to ensure peaceful uses could not be left to scientists rather than a military inspection system. He said he expected the Russians to oppose an inspection system, but that if it were left to be performed by the scientific observers, this might provide a face-saving solution for the Russians. Ambassador Daniels said that this was a question which required further study and discussion. It might be possible to combine scientific work with inspection procedures. This might even be done in provisions for overflight for observation purposes. As to whether the Russians would accept an inspection system, Ambassador Daniels pointed out that he had not discussed this in any detail with the Russians, but he had mentioned several times in general discussion the need for administrative measures to ensure the successful accomplishment of the principle of peaceful uses, and the Russians had not raised any objections thereto.

Mr. Casey at this point inquired what, in view of the Russian reluctance to discuss substance during the preparatory talks, was the probable date of the conference. Ambassador Daniels recalled that he had recently raised the question of the necessity of a time lag of about eight weeks between agreement on the date and the date the conference would begin. He did not foresee a conference possible before the end of the year. Mr Casey inquired at what “level” the conference was likely to be held. Ambassador Daniels said that there had been no discussion of this but that in any event he expected parity of treatment among the chiefs of delegations. He doubted whether countries like Belgium or Norway would take as important an interest in their representation at the conference as, for instance, Argentina or Chile.

Mr. Casey asked which of the twelve countries appear to have the most active interest in the matter and Ambassador Daniels replied that after Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Argentina and Chile, appear to be the most actively interested.

[Page 510]

Mr. Casey referred to the French objections to the proposed clause regarding rights and claims. Ambassador Daniels indicated he did not regard this as too serious, that he had spoken to the French Ambassador about it and had pointed out that the French draft or counterproposal on this point appeared to be meaningless and would not prevent the U.S.S.R. from making a claim.3 At this point Mr. Booker said that the Australian Embassy in Paris had approached the French Government on this point.

Ambassador Daniels said he saw no reason for difficult problems arising with Belgium, Norway, South Africa, or even France, for that matter. The other countries had more special views to be taken into account. It had been gratifying to see how the United Kingdom, Argentina, and Chile had avoided questions of their local rivalry in one sector.

Mr. Booker remarked that Japan had been an “interesting” member of the group especially in dealing with the Russians. Mr. Casey recalled that in a recent foreign policy speech, the Japanese Premier had emphasized close ties with the West and the United States. Ambassador Daniels said the Japanese had been very cooperative in the preparatory talks and, since their inclusion in the negotiations, they had dropped their earlier advocacy of United Nations consideration of the matter.

Mr. Casey referred to the question of what should be done by the eleven other countries if the U.S.S.R. does not go along with the treaty. He said that this was a question on which we did not need to make our minds up at present. Ambassador Daniels pointed out that talking about this problem might detract from the success of the twelve-power treaty, but that obviously we should be giving thought to the possibility. Presumably, such an eventual situation would not preclude an eleven-power treaty or any other combination of the countries concerned.

Mr. Casey then asked Ambassador Daniels his views on an accession clause in the treaty. Ambassador Daniels said he hoped to have a more complete draft of the treaty prepared soon and examine whether an accession clause was desirable. There were several strong objectives to such a clause: The Chileans, for instance, objected to it because it would tend to create a further dilution of claims of sovereignty; the United States recognizes the need to reach an agreement, and with such a clause agreement would seem to be more difficult; also, the contemplated procedure for administrative measures, especially as regards an inspection system, would become unwieldy with too many [Page 511] contracting parties; moreover, in the event of any revision of the treaty, it would be hazardous to include many other countries; finally, the question of accession raised the difficult problem of the criterion on which accession would be permitted. Would it be for all countries or only those who send expeditions to Antarctica? Such questions might lead to controversy among the twelve. Ambassador Daniels said that in preference to an accession clause he still favored, on balance, the provision that would assure freedom of scientific investigation for all countries, but conditioned on observance of the rules established by the treaty.

Mr. Casey pointed out that except for Iron Curtain countries, he could think of no country whose accession would cause trouble. Yet, even in the case of Iron Curtain countries which might be brought into Antarctica by the Russians, it would be well to assure, by an accession clause, that they would be bound by the obligations of the treaty. Ambassador Daniels agreed, but pointed out that there were other considerations. To leave the treaty open for other Iron Curtain countries to accede might create the possibility of increasing the representation of Communist countries among the participants and force the Free World countries to invite other Free World countries to join. This type of political competition would be undesirable.

Ambassador Daniels then said that on this question of whether an accession clause should be included he hoped to have joint discussion with several of the countries in the near future. This would make it easier to determine the advantages and disadvantages of such a clause.

Mr. Casey said he expected the Russians to make a great play on the question of freezing the status quo as to claims. Ambassador Daniels said that in the Russian reply to the U.S. note of invitation, the Russians had referred to the question of claims.4 They were obviously afraid that there was something unfavorable to them in the contemplated provision. Indeed, the proposed provision would prevent them from making a claim. Whether or not they would accept this was not yet known.

Ambassador Daniels then mentioned another point: The need of exploring the relationship of scientific activities such as that of SCAR to international scientific cooperation among governments. He pointed to the need for properly defining governmental authority in international scientific arrangements and said that the treaty should anticipate this problem in connection with the role of governments in scientific cooperation. Mr. Casey asked whether SCAR should be referred to in the treaty. Ambassador Daniels said that the treaty should not mention SCAR but that he had been thinking of a seperate resolution concerning SCAR. Regarding this need for defining governmental participation [Page 512] in international scientific activities, Mr. Casey inquired whether he should mention it to Dr. Killian with whom he had an appointment tomorrow. Ambassador Daniels thought this might be useful.

Mr. Booker also raised another matter, namely, he inquired how rigid we should be in limiting the conference to the twelve countries invited. He said that if prior agreement were reached with the Russians there might be no objection to admitting a few more countries to the conference. Ambassador Daniels said that he had definately opposed broadening participation in the conference since this would open the door to further controversies, make the conference unwieldy, and thereby affect its efficiency. Since the treaty would give nondiscriminatory treatment to all countries, there was little reason to acceed to proposals to broaden participation in the conference.

No definite agreements were sought or reached in the course of this conversation, but a better understanding of existing problems was undoubtedly achieved.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/10–1358. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Owen.
  2. Casey was in the United States for an ANZUS Council meeting at Washington and for the 13th session of the U.N. General Assembly.
  3. A memorandum of Daniels’ conversation with Alphand on September 23 is in Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/9–1358. No copy of the French draft has been found.
  4. A translation of the Soviet reply, dated June 2, is ibid., 399.829/6–258.