270. Memorandum of a Conversation, Embassy of New Zealand, Washington, March 10, 1958, 11 a.m.1

PARTICIPANTS

  • Lord Hood, British Embassy
  • Christopher Audland, British Embassy
  • J.R.A. Bottomley, British Embassy
  • Malcolm Booker, Australian Embassy
  • Lewis Border, Australian Embassy
  • Ambassador Daniels
  • G.D.L. White, New Zealand Embassy
  • Alan Neidle, L
  • Peter Jeffery, New Zealand Embassy
  • Earl H. Luboeansky, ARA

Representatives of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, as indicated above, met informally at the New Zealand Embassy to discuss the present status of developments in regard to Antarctica.

Ambassador Daniels stated that the United States had had talks with the Governments of Chile and Argentina and their reaction to proposals for an international solution to the Antarctic problem was as anticipated. Both countries, he stated, though opposed to any solution involving sacrifice of claims, seemed to be interested in the concepts of scientific cooperation and peaceful uses of Antarctica.

Ambassador Daniels also stated that the United States is planning to make an approach soon to all claimant powers in order to determine whether or not there is a generally agreed basis for going ahead with plans for Antarctica. Since an international conference is contemplated, a fact which would be known to the public, it would be desirable to have some assurances of success for that conference before going ahead. He said that greatly increased interest and speculation in the United States on this matter emphasized the need to move ahead rapidly. He had of course always hoped that there would be general agreement among the four powers represented at the meeting today, but this consideration had to be balanced against the equally important need for early action, particularly in view of the possibility of premature leaks.

Mr. White said that the New Zealand Prime Minister had been to Canberra and had exchanged views on Antarctica with the Australian Prime Minister. He regretted that the two countries were no closer together and confessed embarrassment over the difference of opinion with Australia. He hoped however that in relations with others, the points of similarity between the two countries, positions could be emphasized. He was still worried about the whole problem being raised in the UN to the mutual disadvantage of all. For this reason, New Zealand would be interested in finding a basis for an early conference.

Mr. Booker, the Australian representative, stated that his Government would prefer that any approach to other governments await the formulation of an agreed position among the United States and the three Commonwealth powers. He felt that the unilateral approach by the United States would result in a certain degree of confusion. He reiterated his Government’s position that the approach to the whole question should be on the minimum essential basis and that those things most likely to succeed should be taken up first, that is, the matter of scientific cooperation and of use of the Antarctic for peaceful purposes. He asked the question whether the draft declaration prepared [Page 496] by the Australian Government and distributed previously contained the minimum for an international agreement.2 He envisaged that this declaration would be a binding international commitment in the form of a treaty and would compare to the Atlantic or Pacific Charter. Mr. Booker acknowledged the possible need for administrative machinery but felt that this matter should be left until later, after it is known that there is general agreement on the two basic principles. On the matter of inspection and control to guarantee that Antarctica is used only for peaceful purposes, he reiterated that his Government is against such an arrangement and felt that if this idea were carried too far it might endanger even the acceptance by Russia of the basic principles. He felt this consideration could be taken care of by exchange of “scientific” personnel between the various bases and by proper briefing as to what they should be on the look-out for.

Lord Hood stated that the Australian draft declaration had been carefully studied in London. On the surface he said it had the merits of simplicity. His Government felt, however, that there were four serious flaws in the Australian position. First, the privilege of denunciation of the treaty is too broad. Second, the draft does not resolve the matter of conflicting claims, especially in regard to the United Kingdom problem with Argentina and Chile. Third, it does not include the matter of economic exploitation which the British Government feels will come up regardless of efforts to refrain from discussing it at a conference. Fourth, his Government feels that it is essential to have machinery for policing and for insuring effective demilitarization. Otherwise, efforts directed toward demilitarization in other parts of the world would be prejudiced since in these latter cases the free world has consistently insisted upon effective control and inspection. Lord Hood also criticized the membership suggested by the Australians and stated that the United Kingdom favored bringing in the widest range of countries in the general agreement, at the same time was interested in limiting the number of countries involved in the actual administration. He felt that the whole arrangement would be open to less criticism in the UN if we went ahead “full steam” taking into consideration all the factors which might cause question or opposition in the UN. An effective, well-rounded program would impress members of the UN and the UN would then be more likely to leave “hands off”.

Mr. Booker stated that a number of the points mentioned by Lord Hood would be negotiable. He insisted, however, that his country is against inclusion of any provision regarding economic exploitation. This touches upon nationalist objections and would present a considerable [Page 497] internal problem for the Australian Government. If general international recognition of this problem were assured, the situation might be different, but the Australian Government felt this is not possible. Chile and Argentina, for instance, are more nationalistic about their Antarctic claims than Australia.

In this connection, Mr. White said that New Zealand would certainly favor provisions for economic exploitation because New Zealand lacks capital and would see advantages in a joint arrangement.

Ambassador Daniels expressed opposition to the Australian concept that rights might be strengthened by claimant countries in the area claimed by them but at the same time that no country could strengthen its rights in areas not claimed by it. This he said would put the United States at a relative disadvantage and the United States would find it difficult to sign a treaty with such an inequality. He mentioned that there would be opposition in the United States if it appeared that one country were trying to reserve monopolistic rights to any portion of Antarctica.

Ambassador Daniels, before the close of the meeting, again stated that the United States was proposing to send an aide-mémoire to the governments of the claimant powers.3

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/3–1058. Secret. Drafted by Luboeansky.
  2. A copy of the Australian draft declaration, which was received by the Department of State on February 10, is attached to a 2-page paper entitled “Antarctica.” (Ibid., 702.022/2–1058)
  3. Secretary Dulles also discussed Antarctica briefly with the Prime Minister of New Zealand and the Foreign Secretaries of the United Kingdom and Australia on March 11 during the SEATO Council Meeting at Manila. Each took positions similar to those described in this memorandum of conversation. A memorandum of Dulles’ conversation is ibid., 702.022/3–1158.