Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

250. Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, November 28, 1960—9:15 p.m.

G–209

Reur 1736, G–503, G–414, Deptel 2750.²

Department continues to be concerned at UK Foreign Office attitude re question of Chinese representation at GA. We believe that recent approaches (particularly Tenison’s³ as reported G–414) are in nature of probes to test the strength of U.S. reaction. As such, we believe they should be countered at every appropriate opportunity. In this respect, the Department commends the Embassy’s efforts with De La Mare (G–503).

In light of the recent U.S. elections, as well as the voting situation existing throughout the UN system, it is not surprising that there is considerable speculation about future U.S. policy toward Communist China and perhaps some hesitation on the part of the UK and other allied nations to continue firm and active support of the U.S. position on Chinese representation. Therefore, it is desirable that Embassy officials seek opportunities to emphasize the following points to appropriate officials of the Foreign Office:

1. It is clear that the policies of Communist China remain fundamentally antagonistic to the interests of the U.S. and UK. Moreover, Communist China remains anxious to expand its power and influence, and the U.S. and UK have a common interest in resisting this expansion.

2. The problem of Chinese representation in international bodies will be the subject of comprehensive study by U.S. authorities over the next few months. It is important that this study be conducted in an atmosphere free from crises associated with this problem and in the assurance that the status quo is not being subjected to unexpected strains. There is every indication that the British have full intention of maintaining the moratorium and ancillary working arrangements in the Specialized Agencies, demonstrated by their recent most welcome actions in WHO and UNESCO. However, it is felt useful to emphasize in discussions with the Foreign Office the importance which we attach to the maintenance of this position in the Specialized Agencies, and our hope that other friendly nations will join in this effort.

3. After its study of the problem of Chinese representation, it is to be expected the U.S. will wish to discuss its conclusions and its plans for future handling of this problem at the highest political level and will presumably wish to renew the existing understanding for a common U.S.-UK approach to this issue in the UNGA and SC as well as in the Specialized Agencies and subordinate organs of the UN system.

4. The key to the present situation is, of course, the attitude of the African states. In order to hold the line in the subordinate agencies and organs of the UN system, utmost efforts will be required to make the new African states more aware of their own interest in preventing the seating of Communist China in the United Nations.

5. We realize, of course, that the question of Africa and Chinese representation has been raised repeatedly with the UK. (We recall especially Parsons’ talks in London in January of this year and in Washington with Caccia in April, and the Secretary’s conversation with Foreign Secretary Lloyd on April 12.⁴) In this connection we have kept in mind the British contention that they are faced with a number of problems on this matter, such as the fact they themselves recognize the Chinese Communists. They have also asserted that their influence in the African continent is dwindling.

6. The Department, despite these demurrers, continues to believe that the UK does wield considerable and significant influence in the area and that, indeed, their long presence on the continent gives them in certain areas a better entree than that which we currently possess.

We, therefore, hope that the UK will continue to assist in helping these nations to understand the real character of the Chinese Communist threat, as well as the continuing desirability of preventing Communist China from gaining representation in the Specialized Agencies and subordinate bodies of the UN.

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/10–1460. Confidential. Drafted by McNutt and Nunley; cleared by Sullivan, Martin, Herz, Cargo, and Cutler; and approved by Parsons who signed for the Acting Secretary.
2. Telegram 1736, October 11, reported that Home felt the moratorium on considering Chinese U.N. representation could not be sustained until the 16th U.N. General Assembly. (Ibid., 303/10–1160) Airgram G–503, October 29, reported on a conversation between Arthur De La Mare, head of the Foreign Office’s Far East Department, and two officers from the London Embassy about the moratorium vote at the 15th General Assembly. (Ibid., 303.10–2960) Airgram G–414, October 14, transmitted the Foreign Office’s preliminary assessment of the moratorium vote. (Ibid., 303/10–1460) Telegram 2750, November 2, instructed the Embassy to tell Home that the United States counted on U.K. support for the moratorium in other U.N. organs, regardless of how the issue would be handled at the 16th General Assembly. (Ibid., 303/11–1160)
3. Richard Tenison, Chinese Desk Officer in the Foreign Office.
4. No record of Parsons’ conversations in London or Washington has been found; a memorandum of Herter’s conversation with Lloyd is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1624.