Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

222. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 7, 1960—9 p.m.

929. Financial situation at 15th GA.

1. Fol message represents del position agreed to by all reps and alternates.

2. At this GA, UN members being called upon to pay almost $275 million more than last year. This amount made up as fol:

Regular budget $12,000,000

UNEF

UN Congo military operation

1960 (minimum of) 45,000,000

1961 80–90,000,000

Financial aid to Congo (approved by emergency GA with U.S. support) 100,000,000

Additional contributions to ETAP and Special Fund (to reach President’s proposed level of $100,000,000) 30,000,000

3. U.S. Del understands most likely source U.S. monies to meet above-mentioned expenses for Congo and Africa are MSP contingency funds subject to condition U.S. contribution will not exceed 40 percent of total.

4. It is clear from (a) fact that Sov bloc cannot be expected to contribute and (b) consultations with dels such as UK, Australia, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, it impossible raise necessary funds with U.S. contribution at 40 percent level.

5. Impossible say at this date what level of U.S. contribution required to maintain UN operation in Africa and solvency of organization. We will continue make maximum efforts—and assume Dept will do same—assure largest possible contributions from other sources. However, it obvious other members discouraged at magnitude of financial obligation and hopelessness of financing if U.S. maintains 40 percent position.

6. Believe it essential—to preserve UN as organization, to maintain UN operation in Congo, to implement U.S. proposals re Africa, and to support position of SYG—that U.S. not permit failure UN operations, to which we have given full support and which have been crucial element in keeping Sovs out of Congo, and one of best hopes keeping them out of other parts Africa. Such failure would mean that Khrushchev had attained his objective. In all probability, it will be necessary to request supplemental appropriation in January to enable U.S. increase its contribution substantially during fiscal year 1961 if Sov threat to future of UN is to be checked. In addition, congressional consent to elimination of 40 percent limitation will also be essential. Price for success is not too great for U.S. when existence of UN in balance and when we consider what we have paid for other multilateral operations like UNRRA (72 percent), UNKRA (60 percent), UNRWA (70 percent), and particularly the Korean military operation.

7. Also believe that, if U.S. in position to assure sufficient financial support these operations while Sovs refusing do so (both with respect UNEF and ONUC), we can turn this to political advantage over USSR.

8. Suggest consideration be given financing through combination of (a) emergency transfer from MSP funds other than contingency funds, plus (b) pledges here based on commitment to seek supplemental appropriation in January, plus (c) use of contingency funds subject to 40 percent limit.

9. Suggest Department consult urgently with President and congressional leaders in order assure that U.S. Del can take such action re above financial matters at this GA as may be necessary for purpose mentioned above.

10. Would appreciate guidance as to Department’s longer-range thinking re economic devlopment aid and inevitable crisis budgetary aid in Africa.

Wadsworth

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/10–760. Limited Official Use.