218. Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting, White House, Washington, October 7, 1960, 8:35–10:10 a.m.1
The following were present:
[Here follows a list of attendees. The President presided at the meeting.]
(Just before this meeting of the Cabinet adjourned, the President said: “I must tell you that, coming into this meeting with Khrushchev on my mind, I did not ask for our usual moment of silent prayer. But this has been a custom in the Cabinet, and I should not like to see us give it up. So I ask you now to join me in a moment of silent prayer.”)
[Here follow an announcement that the first item, a presentation by the President’s Special Assistant, George B. Kistiakowsky, would be omitted, and discussion of the second item, “Report on the International Atomic Energy Agency.”]
Developments at the United Nations—Mr. Dillon told the President that Mr. Wadsworth would make this presentation and also a forecast. Accordingly, Amb. Wadsworth reported as follows.
[Page 402]In general, the news media have given a fairly accurate picture of what has been going on at the UN. But there has been some biased reporting by the New York Times and the Washington Post. This is too bad, because the delegates read the Times to determine, as they suppose, United States policy and government thinking. They forget that we have a free press.
The President’s speech was very well received, many delegates feeling that it was the only speech that contained constructive suggestions.
When Khrushchev spoke, he “made a mess of himself”. He attacked the structure of the United Nations and the Secretary General.
Amb. Wadsworth could find no real support for Khrushchev’s attitudes. The delegates realize that he would destroy the UN, although Sukarno feels that its headquarters should be removed from the United States.
There was a mixed reaction to Khrushchev. Some feel that he has overplayed his hand, others that he has frightened some of the delegates—not that he was rattling rockets, but simply by raising in people’s minds the question of what would happen to the UN if the Soviet were to walk out? There was a good deal of talk about the effect on this and future meetings.
Castro’s four-hour harangue was simply too much.2 He would have done well to cut it to two hours, either the first two or the last two. It may have had some effect on some of the Africans, but this is probably transitory. And he did offend some of the delegates.
The proposal by the five neutrals that the President and Khrushchev meet did not get much support. Most delegates recognized that it was impossible. So it became a matter of personal prestige for Nehru and Nkrumah.
Finally, Nehru, in a pique, withdrew the resolution, so the resolution is no longer before the UN. The Africans supported Nehru partly because they do not understand the situation and also because to many of them Nehru is a demi-god. Herter is talking with Nehru today.3 The probability is that Nehru realizes he made a tactical mistake in naming the parties to meet rather than the more moderate proposal, which would have widespread support, to the effect simply that the United States and the Soviet Union should continue to negotiate on problems of world peace.
[Page 403]Next after the President came Macmillan and Diefen-baker. Diefenbaker was very hard indeed on the Communists. Macmillan no less hard, but very deft and artful. Many of the delegates were offended by Khrushchev’s behavior during Macmillan’s speech.
Then a number of UN housekeeping items were taken up.
On the vote to consider the admission of Red China, we expect about a 50–30 vote against, with 19 abstentions. We very nearly lost Tunisia for our side; this was avoided only by fast action by the State Department. Indonesia and others argue that we must have Red China. We can keep China out this time, but we must face the prospect that we may one day have her in the UN.
The President interjected to ask whether there are any members of the UN that we do not recognize.
The answer was no, but there are some which some South American countries do not recognize.
Amb. Wadsworth continued. There is much sentiment at the UN favorable to the proposition that Lumumba is the legal head of state of the Congo. They realize he is an unstable, undependable character, but think nevertheless that Kasavubu had no authority to fire him.
In summary, the Ambassador felt that we are finishing much the most difficult period the United Nations has experienced. The picture is not all dark: the delegates are getting to see for themselves some of the Soviet antics. But nothing actually will get done until all the bigwigs leave. The best guess is that Khrushchev will probably not stay beyond the 14th. The big trouble is: Algeria. The Africans and some others will simply never be able to understand how the United States, with its Declaration of Independence and so on, can support France on this issue.
The President commented that he had had Sukarno come to see him4 for just one reason—to ask him what his thinking was in the five neutral power resolution. The President had, he said, pressed Sukarno hard on this—what did he hope to accomplish? While they were talking the resolution was withdrawn, and the President said he could get nowhere with his questions. Many of these people, the President felt, pretend to think we are as evil as the Soviets. They don’t really believe this, but . . . .5 this one “wouldn’t tell you anything”.
Sec. Dillon stated his belief that, regarding the neutral question, all spokesmen ought to follow the line of our reply to the five: it was a well-intentioned but naive proposal. On China—the less said the better.
[Page 404]Amb. Wadsworth then addressed the President on the question of receiving representatives of the African nations, saying that the entire U.S. delegation feels strongly that anything the President can do to see the delegates from the new countries the better. It’s a matter of face and prestige with them. Here they have been to the United Nations meeting in the United States, and when they get back they will be asked if they met the President.
The President said it would be fine if they will come to his office, but that he couldn’t have a lunch or dinner for each of them—it takes too much out of the day. He suggested that if a whole group of them were to come down at once, he might give them a luncheon or something.
Amb. Wadsworth told the President that wasn’t really necessary—that all they need to do really is come to the White House and shake hands with him. Most of them don’t speak English anyway. It’s just a matter of going through that motion so that they will have met the President of the United States.
The President said that was fine with him and would Mr. Wadsworth please tell the Secretary of State to send as many of them down as he wants, and he would see them. Inasmuch as he was seeing the representative of Nigeria the following day, he wondered if some of the others couldn’t come along too.6
The President went on to say that he had an agreement to make one more speech before the session closes7—on implementation of our proposals. The difficulty, as he saw it, on Red China’s admission is that too many people say never, never. He remarked that never is an awfully long time. And he himself is always very careful: he says that if these people correct three or four of the worst things they are guilty of, we’d have a tough problem keeping them out. He agreed, however, that the less said the better; as of now, certainly, we just can’t accept the admission of Red China.
[Page 405][Here follow discussion of “Report on Statements and Discussions Regarding the Economy Before the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund” and “Department of Defense Consultation with Labor Leaders” and comments by Secretary Gates.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cabinet Papers. Confidential. Drafted by James M. Lambie, Jr., Special Assistant in the White House Office.↩
- Regarding Castro’s September 26 statement before the U.N. General Assembly, see footnote 3, Document 194.↩
- A memorandum of this conversation is in Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83–0068, CF 1767.↩
- Regarding Eisenhower’s October 6 meeting with Sukarno, see footnote 2, supra.↩
- Ellipsis in the source text.↩
- A memorandum of Eisenhower’s meeting with the Nigerian Prime Minister, who headed the Nigerian U.N. Delegation, is in Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Eisenhower met briefly with representatives from the following countries on October 14: Republic of Cameroun, Central African Republic, Republic of Chad, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Republic of Cyprus, Republic of Dahomey, Gabonese Republic, Republic of the Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Republic of Mali, Republic of Niger, Federation of Nigeria, Republic of Senegal, Republic of Togo, Somali Republic, and Republic of Upper Volta. For text of the President’s remarks at this gathering, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–1961, pp. 760–763.↩
- Eisenhower did not address the 15th General Assembly a second time.↩