Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

207. Telegram From the Delegation at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 4, 1960—2 p.m.

Secto 22. Summary of Secretary’s conversation with Minister Nash (N.Z.).

Mr. Nash said that he too was convinced during his conversation last April that Khrushchev sincerely wanted peace but that since that time “everything he has done has been wrong”. He described all three Khrushchev speeches as “very bad”.

Nash pointed out that the last time he had seen Krushchev was as Khrushchev’s guest and that although he could not call on him he would like to speak to Khrushchev if he met him casually. (It appeared from remarks by Mcintosh that the New Zealand Delegation had restrained Nash from approaching Khrushchev.)

Mr. Nash was fulsome in his praise of Mr. Hammarskjold and thought his reply to Khrushchev was excellent.²

Mr. Nash observed that Mr. Nehru had spoken very well³ “although there are things that you won’t like”. The Secretary said it was his opinion that Nehru was unsure as to what role he should play at this time. Mr. Nash thought that Nehru’s statements re Hammarskjold were wrong.

In answer to a question as to what the Secretary “had to tell him” the Secretary referred to Khrushchev’s proposal to change the organization of the UN and said that the proposal would destroy the entire concept of a Secretariat that worked for the Security Council and the Assembly, the entire idea of an international civil service. Mr. Nash observed that this issue had been fought through at San Francisco with New Zealand opposing the Soviet proposal. Mr. Nash asked what we would do if the Soviets decided to “pull out” of the United Nations. The Secretary replied that we did not think they would but that they might well try to make Hammarskjold’s life so miserable that he would quit. Mr. Nash said he had come to the UN with the idea that he might be able to help devise some formula by which it would be possible to get “you and him” together but that Khrushchev had made this impossible. He felt that he could not now make such a suggestion without inferentially supporting Khrushchev.

The Secretary said that he had had a satisfactory conversation with General Nasution of Indonesia.⁴Nash said that he believed that Nasution and Djuanda were two that could be trusted in Indonesia. The Secretary said that Nasution had assured us that Indonesian troops in the Congo would be under UN command and would be viewed as UN troops.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/10–460. Confidential; Priority. Repeated priority to Wellington. No drafting information appears on the source text. Another copy of Secto 22, however, indicates that Bell drafted it and that it was cleared with Krebs and Seip. (Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83–0068, CF 1769) A memorandum of this conversation shows the meeting took place at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel at 3 p.m., October 3. (Ibid., CF 1767)
2. See supra.
3. For text of Nehru’s October 3 address, see U.N. doc. A/PV.882.
4. No record of this conversation has been found.