195. Telegram From the Department of State to the Office of the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization1

Topol 409. Deliver Burgess 8 am September 28.2NAC Agenda Item IIIA.3 Khruschchev’s speech in general debate indicates that Soviets will conduct hard-hitting, three-pronged attack at 15th GA, consisting of (1) major effort to woo support of newly independent countries, particularly of Africa, and to stir up antagonisms among those countries toward West; (2) gambits designed to strengthen Moscow’s pose as champion of disarmament, and to discredit peaceful intentions of US by exploiting aerial reconnaissance issue; (3) drive to stake out Communist bloc claim to larger role in UN administration at a minimum, or prevent effective functioning of UN at maximum.

Motivations for extreme tone of Khrushchev speech, in addition to reaction to Congo defeat, not fully clear. We are inclined to believe first need current Soviet foreign policy is to reassert unquestioned Soviets leadership of bloc and performances at UN should be at least partially viewed as effort to portray Khrushchev as fervent champion of “anti-imperialist” forces.

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We believe Khrushchev has made serious tactical error in pitting himself against widely respected SYG. We plan continue stress confrontation is USSRUN and that Soviet Union seeks destroy what it can not control.

In meantime Pres. Eisenhower’s speech has met with broad support from all quarters except Communist camp and Cuba. You may wish recall number specific positive proposals contained in his speech and indicate US will follow through on number of these proposals in GA in manner deemed most likely assure their implementation.

Dillon
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–2760. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Armitage and Buffum, cleared by Fessenden, and approved by Kohler who signed for Dillon.
  2. W. Randolph Burgess, Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations at Paris.
  3. Not further identified.