174. Editorial Note
At 9 a.m. September 19, President Eisenhower met with British Foreign Secretary Home, British Ambassador Caccia, Secretary of State Herter, U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain Whitney, Assistant Secretary of State Kohler, and Colonel John Eisenhower. Among the items discussed was the upcoming U.N. General Assembly session.
The President explained why he had decided to speak at the beginning of the session and noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff objected to portions of his address. A brief discussion on disarmament, Soviet secrecy, and the openness of Western society ensued. The conversation returned to the United Nations when Home asked the President to inform the British of the contents of his speech in advance. Eisenhower agreed.
A discussion of the closing of nuclear plants, possible construction of Soviet plants in the People’s Republic of China, and the strain in Soviet-Chinese relations led Ambassador Whitney to observe “that the present sanctuary status of Communist China, in which the U.N. would have no inspection rights within her borders, would present a strong argument for bringing the Chinese Communists into the U.N. The President replied rather sharply that if the Chinese Communists are admitted, the U.S. will leave. Opinion is strong on this line and will remain so, barring a change in deportment on the part of the Chinese Communists. As evidence, the President noted that both Presidential candidates are strongly advocating nonadmittance of the Red Chinese to the U.N.” (Memorandum of conference with the President; Eisenhower Library, Whitman Files, DDE Diary, Staff Notes—September 1960 (3))
In answer to a question from the President, Herter and Home stated that they doubted that French President de Gaulle would attend the General Assembly. Home then “said he thought it would be well for Prime Minister Macmillan to wait a while to see how things shape up at the U.N., and then come over, preferably after the Khrushchev group departs, to help pull things together and restore the atmosphere which the President had initiated. A possible target date would be October 1st.” (Ibid.)
[Page 339]Following discussion of Eisenhower’s schedule, “Lord Home commented that Khrushchev may conceivably stay around for some time in an attempt to foul up the procedures of the U.N. with various kinds of tricks,” making “definite planning impossible at this time.” (Ibid.)
The President noted that many people had recommended that he “pressure our American press to play down Khrushchev’s activities.” Such an effort “would be fruitless,” as “the competitive spirit of the American press makes this impossible.” After another brief comment on his schedule, Eisenhower “philosophized a little on Khrushchev’s visit to the U.N. Perhaps the purpose of his visit is to steal the headlines and belittle our free election system. The President feels it necessary that we present a good face to the newly independent nations. Since there is no hope of slowing down the trend of newly independent countries, we must make a virtue of necessity.” (Ibid.)
He then offered to telegraph the text of his speech to Home the following day, if it were ready in time.
Following discussion of Berlin and former British Foreign Secretary Lloyd, now Chancellor of the Exchequer, the conversation turned to the General Assembly schedule. The meeting ended with brief comments on the situation in the Congo.