Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

161. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon¹

Washington, September 13, 1960—8:21 p.m.

277. Depcirtel 395.²Leb Embassy here speculates that now that Nasser has announced he coming to UNGALebPriMin Saeb Salaam will be strongly tempted to decide to head Leb Delegation. With view forestalling such possibility, you may in your conversations with Salaam, and perhaps even Chehab, make following points:

1. Through personal letters and otherwise Khrushchev has been seeking press certain heads of state and heads of government to attend UNGA as if some sort of summit parley in New York would occur in interests of world peace. This is such a transparent hoax and Soviet propaganda ploy that few people being taken in. As President has said this is a debasing of UN.

2. Nasser’s motivation in deciding to come not clear, although there some indication that his coming may be connected in part at least with fact that large number of African leaders expect to attend. We have seen no indication he is coming as result of Arab League decision.

3. Arab attendance likely be interpreted in many quarters outside Arab world as heavily influenced by Khrushchev’s pressure. This interpretation will be widely publicized by Arab world’s critics.

4. According to present info, no other Arab head of state or government planning attend. In this connection we gratified by Takla remarks to you (Embtel 237). We also consider Iraqi attitude (Baghdad Embtel 372³) one of common sense. Word has been received that Ceylonese PriMin has decided not to come. In fact, there are no confirmations that any NEA heads of state or government except Nasser and Nepalese PriMin have decided to attend, and Koirala’s intention announced before Khrushchev made decision. Possibility exists that Nehru may come but rumors are that it would in any case be later during UN session.⁴

FYI Only: So far twenty-two heads of state or government planning attend early meetings UNGA. Majority are from new African states. Even this number poses very difficult security and protocol problems for USG since all will wish receive special courtesies and hospitality including visits with President whose schedule for period already very full. While decisions not yet reached re treatment to be accorded visiting leaders, appears impossible accord each one attention and hospitality he will expect and thus many likely be disappointed. Complexity problems make problematical that such visits can be materially expanded beyond UN context. This additional factor in our desire not have VIP attendance at UNGA widened further. In event Salaam announces decision attend, Embassy Beirut should avoid actions or statements which might be construed locally as in any way constituting official US position re Salaam’s trip.⁵

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–1360. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Brewer and NEA; cleared by Armitage and Jones and in draft with Cargo, AF, SOA, and U/PR; and approved by Hare who signed for Herter. Repeated priority to Cairo, Amman, Jidda, Baghdad, Khartoum, Tel Aviv, London, Tripoli, Rabat, Tunis, and Taiz.
2. Supra.
3. Telegram 237, September 8, reported on a conversation with Lebanese Foreign Minister Takla regarding Khrushchev’s visit to the United Nations. Telegram 372, also September 8, reported on a conversation with the Iraqi Foreign Minister regarding Khrushchev’s visit and other U.N. matters. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–860)
4. Telegram 580 from New Delhi, September 13, reported that Nehru had decided to attend the General Assembly and outlined the reasons for this decision. (Ibid., 320/9–1360)
5. Telegram 280 from Beirut, September 15, reported that Salaam, who had decided to attend the General Assembly, understood U.S. concern over Khrushchev’s visit, but felt that heads of independent governments might be able to demonstrate their independence from Soviet influence at the session. (Ibid., 320/9–1560)