Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

159. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, September 12, 1960—4 p.m.

734. Khrushchev will have ample time on ship fully coordinate Commie bloc policy at GA. In my opinion this likely be most important GA yet held and trust we are making strong efforts achieve coordinated position with our allies. Following comments and suggestions are necessarily based on limited outlook from Moscow but hope will be helpful in Dept’s preparation.

Re overall strategy, while normally best take initiative and not always be in position responding to Soviet moves, there would seem to me to be advantage this year in letting Khrushchev lead. Suggest we should have flexible policy designed to meet either attitude sweet reasonableness on his part or strong propaganda attack which seems more likely. Wish repeat suggestion that while we should take strong position we should endeavor avoid giving ammunition to those Communists who argue that West is so irreconcilably opposed to communism that attempt resolve problems by negotiation is futile Soviet emphasis on US “aggression” in U–2 and RB–47 cases is certain. Appears from here that on balance our position in world opinion has been seriously injured by U–2 case. Judging from Khrushchev’s remarks to me he will make much of alleged “calculated policy” of overflights and will continue interpret Secretary’s statement² as meaning we intended continue them. Will also connect RB–47 with overflights. I believe we will lose in world opinion if we attempt base our defense on justification overflights by Soviet secrecy unless we are prepared to produce startling evidence of Soviet preparation for aggression revealed by early U–2 flights such as wide-scale preparation for example in field of bacteriological warfare. Also think attempt on our part to put overflights on same level as other intelligence activities will be ineffective. Would appear to me that greatest Soviet weakness is in their over-exploitation of U–2 and our major emphasis should be on this aspect on RB–47 we have choice of exploiting Soviet refusal of impartial investigation or of considering assembly itself as investigating body and producing our evidence that overflight did not occur. On first point Soviet contention that this matter of national sovereignty is weak. How far out does plane have to be when shot down to become international affair? Second point dependent upon nature our evidence about which I am uninformed. Soviets apparently intend shoot down planes even “approaching” Soviet border and we could make much of this including previous attack on American plane far from Soviet frontier. Suggest we also produce or simultaneously release to press photographs of electronic gear on Soviet trawlers.

If Khrushchev takes hard line suggest we should be prepared with historic survey of events since war putting recent developments into proper perspective and highlighting question of confidence which must be built up gradually through honoring commitments. Soviets still owe world demonstration to “peaceful coexistence” is not continuation cold war by new tactics and burden is on them to prove that collective security arrangements no longer necessary. We could also make use of many missile-rattling statements by Khrushchev and other Soviets, especially those relating to Congo and Cuba.

Suggest Soviet secrecy could best be used in general context maintenance peace. Greatest assurance of peace lies in abhorrence of war of all peoples including Soviets and their ability influence govts. In case of Soviets we do not have this assurance since even to limited degree that Soviet people can influence their govt, they are unable judge international problems because of complete absence or distortion of information about them. This argument might be useful in dealing with Commie proposal on education of youth for peace.

In view of importance of Africa in this GA assume our position on Algerian problem will be of particular importance. As seen from Moscow, however, probability that we will face major crisis on Berlin within next six months gives maintenance NATO unity overriding importance. As minimum suggest we should have clear understanding with French in advance.

Clear that major Soviet emphasis will be on disarmament. While Soviets will doubtless raise question broadening membership Disarmament Commission, doubt if they will refuse continue disarmament talks unless this position met. Possible, however, that they will hold this position even until after GA in effort build up bargaining position for eventual summit talks. One line we might use is to stress that each time negotiations have approached showdown on concrete measures, Soviets have walked out thus throwing doubt on their intentions.

We should be able to exploit Soviet by-passing of UN on Congo question effectively, particularly if we could present some concrete proposal along lines Senator Mansfield’s suggestions.

Likely that Soviets will push harder this year on ChiCom representation both to cover up or “ease” their current difficulties with Peiping and to demonstrate erosion of China position in UN. If it should appear that Communist China likely gain membership this year what about tactic of requesting them to send delegation to clarify doubts requalification for membership? Such move would probably embarrass Russians and if adopted and Chinese refused might gain some negative votes. If accepted, questions re commitment against use of force against Nationalist China, acceptance UN resolutions on Korea, et cetera, might also gain votes against admission. Alternatively membership committee might put written questions along these lines to ChiCom [garble].

Since Khrushchev going as head Soviet Delegation doubt that he will agree speak only once. Likely that he will announce startling scientific progress or else time new space achievement with Assembly opening.

As insurance against real possibility of violent demonstrations or incidents suggest appeal by President or at least Secretary to public not to molest UN delegations.

In general believe Khrushchev will follow dual strategy of attempting create image of warlike, provocative, imperialist US while trying create impression of peace-loving Soviet UN.³

Thompson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–1260. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to USUN. Another copy of this telegram was initialed by the President. (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Series)
2. Reference is presumably to a statement by Herter which the Department issued on May 9. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 418–420.

3. On September 20, John Eisenhower sent the following memorandum to Herter:

   “The President read Moscow 734 this morning, which consists of Ambassador Thompson’s views on prospective tactics in the coming UN meeting. He was much impressed with Ambassador Thompson’s lines of reasoning and asked that I call it to your particular attention, even though he knows you are familiar with it.” (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Series, U.N.)