Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

149. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, August 29, 1960.

TRANSFER OF UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS TO BERLIN

Problem: Can a key to the solution of the Berlin problem be found in the transfer of the United Nations headquarters to Berlin?

I. Advantages of transfer.

a. The presence in Berlin of the headquarters of as august an international body as the United Nations might act as a deterrent to any harassment of Berlin involving the use of force and might discourage other kinds of aggressive Soviet initiatives against the city.

b. The presence in Berlin of United Nations delegates from countries all over the world could lead to improved international understanding of the Berlin question, notably on the part of representatives of neutral nations who now show no particular sympathy for the Western position on Berlin.

II. Disadvantages.

a. It seems clear from earlier Soviet statements and actions that the Soviets would not consider agreeing to a transfer of United Nations headquarters, if only because of the advantages it might create for the West.

b. Moreover, and more importantly, the transfer would undoubtedly be opposed by most of the United Nations members and staff. Leaving New York would mean leaving behind a huge investment; more than that, it would involve giving up a place where very suitable working and living facilities exist in favor of a less desirable location for the work of the United Nations.

c. An important disadvantage is presented by the problem of access to Berlin. The United Nations staff and delegates would find it necessary to submit to “German Democratic Republic” controls to enter and leave the city. There is little doubt that the “German Democratic Republic” would seize every opportunity to enhance its status and demand recognition as a sovereign country in the form in which it applied these controls. It would find the United Nations necessity for crossing its territory an invaluable asset in its drive to be recognized as the “second” German state. It would be in a position to apply subtle but gradually increasing pressures to United Nations communications.

d. It thus appears that while moving the United Nations headquarters to Berlin would have some positive advantages, they hardly are worth the difficulties they would create, quite apart from the question of the acceptability of the proposal to the Soviets.

III. What are the merits of not only moving the United Nations headquarters to Berlin but making all of Berlin United Nations territory?

a. Obviously, it would be more desirable in stating this proposal to include all of Berlin rather than just West Berlin, for it would end the present division of the city, a real source of conflict. Since Soviet rejection of this aspect seems certain, the proposal should be regarded as one to convert West Berlin into a United Nations trusteeship.

b. Soviet acceptance of this proposal seems excluded so long as the Soviets can hope to gain ground under the present arrangements. Once West Berlin became a ward of the United Nations, Soviet aggressive initiatives against the city would be initiatives against the United Nations. If a situation ever developed crucial enough to make the Soviets wish to remove Berlin from the area of political conflict they might accept this solution.

c. Putting to one side Soviet acceptance, if the Western powers concluded that they ought to divest themselves of the responsibilities in Berlin (as the alternative to carrying out their commitment to defend the city at the risk of general war) the acceptance of a United Nations trusteeship would be the most plausible and honorable way of doing so.

d. A proposal to turn over Western responsibility for Berlin to the United Nations would under most circumstances be regarded as a proposal by the Western powers to withdraw from their often-reiterated “guarantee” of Berlin’s security. This would cast doubt on our strength and our determination and involve serious repercussions in NATO and our other alliances. The Soviets might step up their pressures elsewhere. These considerations, however, would not apply with the same force if the proposal were to come from the Germans or from the United Nations itself at a point at which it appeared the only alternative to general war.

e. United Nations administration of Berlin was discussed with the Secretary General of the United Nations in April 1959,² who considered it an unacceptable solution. It has been assumed among the Western allies, after study, that the United Nations should not be called on to exercise any real political, executive or police responsibility. The judgment is that the organization is not capable of doing so considering the strains which would be imposed on its management by the conflicting groups which would purport to give it instruction and advice. Its present difficulties in Africa are not encouraging in this regard. The administration of the city under the United Nations—the settlement of practical day-to-day questions—would be the concern ultimately of a group of sharply contending nations and a neutral group who might well be ready to accept solutions for solution’s sake.

IV Other aspects of United Nations involvement in the Berlin problem.

a. The United Nations, it has been generally agreed, should not be looked to as a forum for settling the Berlin problem. It would impose an intolerable strain on the organization to do so. By tacit agreement, the problem of Berlin has been left to be settled among the four powers it concerns. Nevertheless, the United Nations has been thought of as an appropriate agency to monitor agreements already reached between the Soviets and the Western Powers.

b. Finally, the contingency planning for Berlin envisages a role for the United Nations under certain circumstances. The Three Powers have agreed (although French support is somewhat equivocal) that it would be desirable, when a withdrawal of the Soviet Union from its functions with respect to Allied access seems imminent but before it has actually occurred, to attempt to freeze the status quo through a Security Council resolution calling on the Four Powers not to violate existing agreements, to negotiate their differences, and to report the results of their negotiations to the Security Council. No agreement has ever been reached on the possibility of other subsequent action in the United Nations, for example in the General Assembly, principally because it has been believed unwise to undertake any commitment which would have the effect of precluding the possible use of force to maintain Allied rights. Of course, the possibility cannot be overlooked that the Berlin question might eventually be raised in the General Assembly by others if not by the Three Powers.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Series. Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text. Attached to an August 29 memorandum from Dillon to the President.
2. Hammarskjöld discussed Berlin with Khrushchev in Moscow March 25–26. On March 31 Lodge reported that Hammarskjöld had briefed him onthe discussion and had stated that Khrushchev had assured him that there would be no unilateral action on Berlin until the possibilities of negotiations had been fully explored. (Telegram 840 from USUN; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–3159)