Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

138. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs¹

Washington, May 1960.

THE FOURTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND FUTURE UNITED NATIONS PROSPECTS

This memoradum seeks to evaluate the present and future usefulness of the United Nations in terms of the achievement of United States objectives. The bases for this examination are (1) an analysis of the extent to which United States objectives were achieved at the Fourteenth General Assembly; and (2) the anticipated impact on the United Nations of a large number of new members over the next few years and the growth of Soviet power. Finally, specific measures are suggested whereby we can, to a significant extent, adjust the modifications now taking place in a direction favorable to us.

Since this study is oriented toward the present and the future, it does not seek to assess in detail the value of the United Nations to the United States during the fourteen years of its existence. However, certain major objectives achieved through the United Nations should be recalled briefly. By arranging for or assisting in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, the cessation of Communist guerilla attacks on Greece, and the repelling of Communist aggression in Korea, the United Nations proved itself a valuable instrument for rallying the Free World against the Communist threat.

The United Nations has also provided a point of contact between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. where it is sometimes possible to meet quietly and resolve disputes without any loss of prestige for either side (e.g., the settlement of the Berlin blockade).

The United Nations has provided us and other free nations with a unique instrument to influence world opinion by upholding the Charter’s code of international conduct, which is consonant with U.S. objectives, and by countering Communist propaganda.

The case of Laos has demonstrated that the United Nations is capable of protecting one of its smallest and weakest members from indirect Communist aggression. In the area of the Middle East alone, the United Nations achieved and maintains the 1949 armistice agreement between Israel and her Arab neighbors, prevented the 1956 Suez conflict from becoming a major war, and frustrated the subversion of Lebanon and Jordan after the Iraq revolution in 1958.

The UN is now facing its most crucial test in trying to bring order out of chaos in the Congo. In essence, the UN operation is designed to administer the affairs of a country which has no experience in self-government and to prevent the area from becoming the arena of cold war conflict. With a force of 18,000 men now operating in the area and with a vast economic program required, the UN is called upon to finance and carry out the most costly and complex operation of any in its history. It cannot now be predicted with certainty that the UN operation will be a complete success, but it clearly offers the best hope of all the available alternatives. The Congo operation also offers an example of the vital role which the Organization can play in dealing with the myriad problems which may attend the attainment of independence by the large number of African states.

The above crises, it should be noted, have tended to overshadow the great influence for peaceful change exerted by the United Nations during the past fourteeen years through its peaceful settlement processes, its efforts to foster economic and social advancement, and its role in promoting or guiding the peaceful attainment of independence in many formerly dependent areas of the world.

As we look to the future, the relative power positions of the United States and the U.S.S.R. can be expected to manifest themselves in the United Nations. The measure of our influence in the United Nations is likely to reflect reasonably accurately our relative political influence in the world. Therefore, U.S. policy in the United Nations is not and cannot be something apart and separate from our total diplomacy everywhere.

Moreover, the United Nations is a permanently established instrumentality which we cannot disregard. To the extent to which we do not exercise leadership either to advance positive proposals in our own national interest, or to neutralize or prevent proposals contrary to our interests, the U.S.S.R. and others will be afforded, by default, the opportunity to use the instrumentality for their own purposes contrary to our and Free World interests.

I. Evaluation of the Fourteenth General Assembly

General Approach

An analysis of the results of the recent General Assembly session shows that satisfactory results were achieved on all major issues except the Sahara testing item which was unique. In appraising in concrete terms the Assembly’s results, we have examined the extent to which the United States succeeded in achieving its objectives on key issues on the agenda. We would define the key issues as those problems in which the United States has either a direct interest of its own or on which a particular course of action would be prejudicial to eventual solution of a problem or the sound development of the United Nations. (A list of twenty-five key issues of the Fourteenth General Assembly is appended as Annex A, and the voting results are tabulated as Annex B.² However, as indicated below, no statistical tabulation can be reliably employed to assess the results of the session. Therefore, there has also been included a narrative summary of the results on these key issues in terms of United States objectives.)

Political Climate

The Fourteenth General Assembly met in what many delegations regarded as a changed international atmosphere marked by an apparent relaxation of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. Soviet Premier Khrushchev’s visit to the United States was widely regarded as tangible evidence of this. Agreement to resume negotiations on disarmament in the new 10-nation group was felt to be another promising development.

Character of the Agenda and Principal Results

For the most part the agenda of the Fourteenth Session was routine. The Lao crisis having just subsided, no sense of urgency or crisis attached to the political aspects of the Assembly’s agenda. The sharpest conflicts of the session arose on two issues involving France: the prospective French nuclear weapons tests in the Sahara, and Algeria, on both of which the United States found itself with the minority.

In the political field five items involving the Soviet Union directly were Tibet, Hungary, Korea, Chinese representation and the Security Council election. In the first four the United States position was supported by decisive majorities. However, some Afro-Asians abstained in their desire to remain disassociated from such issues. We did not succeed in electing Turkey to a two-year Security Council term, although we did block the Polish candidacy and the term was eventually split.

US-Soviet agreement was reached on resolutions on the peaceful uses of outer space and disarmament. The agreement on the composition of the outer space committee, while satisfactory to us, involved mutual concessions.

The questions of Sahara testing and Algeria were particularly difficult. While the United States was able to deal reasonably successfully with the general problem of testing, against the background of the continuing Geneva negotiations and our own moratorium, the French intention to test independently ran directly counter to the strong and often emotionally charged conviction of the overwhelming majority of countries, including such allies of the United States as Japan and Thailand, that testing was per se wrong. French, British, and United States assurances regarding technical safeguards were unavailing. Moreover, aside from a general statement on safety, the United States did not actively participate in the debate on this item.

A somewhat comparable situation obtained in respect of Algeria where we largely limited ourselves to making clear our belief that United Nations action could not prove helpful. The absence of France from the debate increased the difficulties. However, no resolution received the required two-thirds majority.

In the colonial field generally we were again confronted with difficult and unpleasant choices. Particular issues do not stand out so much as the “colonial problem” as a whole. With respect to this complex of issues, we continue to be frequently faced with the choice either of abandoning our European allies or of opposing the views of the recently emerged independent states. Frequently, where we are able to take a position on the merits of the issue we can successfully exert a moderating influence.

Three resolutions on economic matters which originated in the Economic Committee at the Fourteenth General Assembly³ are included in the list of key issues. We were generally successful in the Economic Committee in either watering down Communist-inspired propaganda moves or in introducing sound economic principles in measures proposed by some of the non-Communist members. The overwhelming majority of human rights and social issues considered in the Social and Humanitarian Committee were non-controversial and no single resolution can be considered a key issue as defined above.

There follows below a more comprehensive analysis of the results obtained at the Fourteenth General Assembly.

[Here follows discussion of “Possible Methods of Evaluation,” “Invalidity of any Strictly Quantitative Voting Analysis,” and “Qualitative Appraisal of Achievement of United States Objectives on Key Issues.”]

II. United States Position in the Changing United Nations

The Fourteenth General Assembly clearly revealed trends which are likely to be maintained or intensified in the future and which will affect both the character of the United Nations and the relation of the United States to this organization. Two principal elements are involved. One of these is the impact on the United Nations of the relative power position in the world of the United States and the Soviet Union. The general assessment in various countries throughout the world of the relative power balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, even though this assessment may be a subjective one, has a strong influence in the United Nations. It is particularly reflected in the degree to which various member states may seek to avoid taking sides on US-Soviet disputes which do not immediately affect them. We must recognize that this factor will continue to be present in the United Nations and that the assessment of United States-Soviet power relations will be influenced by such matters as the respective achievements of these two countries in economic growth, missilery, outer space exploration, and general scientific advancement.

The second principal element affecting the United Nations and the relation of the United States to it is the rapidly expanding United Nations membership. Some of the consequences of this are now being felt, and they will be more evident in the short-range future. The above-noted inclination to sit on the sidelines may tend to increase with the arrival of new members unversed in the background and history of Soviet-Free World disputes such as Korea and Hungary. Increased efforts on our part will be required to counter this tendency.

At the same time the great power status of the United States and the magnitude of our financial support for the Organization will continue to be positive factors.

The sections that follow contain our best estimate of the admission of new members to the United Nations and the effects of this expanding membership on United States operations in the United Nations.

Admission of New Members to the United Nations

While estimates by various areas of the Department regarding future UN membership differ in some details, they are nevertheless in general agreement. The following tabulation reflects what we consider to be a reasonable projection.

Prospective Candidates—1960

1. Cameroun (Independent, January 1, 1960)

2. Togo (Independent, April 27, 1960)

3. Mali Federation (Independent, June 20, 1960)

4. Malagasy Republic (Independent, June 25, 1960)

5. Republic of the Congo (Independent, June 30, 1960)

6. Somali Republic (Independent, July 1, 1960)

7. Dahomey Republic (Independent, August 1, 1960)

8. Niger Republic (Independent, August 3, 1960)

9. Republic of Upper Volta (Independent, August 5, 1960)

10. Ivory Coast Republic (Independent, August 7, 1960)

11. Chad Republic (Independent, August 11, 1960)

12. Central African Republic (Independent, August 13, 1960)

13. Congo Republic (Independent, August 15, 1960)

14. Gabon Republic (Independent, August 17, 1960)

15. Cyprus (Independent, August 16, 1960)

16. Nigeria (Independent, October 1, 1960)

Likely or Possible 1960–65

17. Mauritania—November 28, 1960

18. Sierra Leone—1961

19. Tanganyika—1961–1962

20. Zanzibar—1962–1963

21. Uganda—1963

22. Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (in whole or in part) 1962–1963

23. Kenya—1963–1965

24. Ruanda-Urundi—1961

25. The West Indies (Federation)—1961–1962

26. Western Samoa (foreign relations may be handled by New Zealand)—1962

27. British Guiana

28. British Honduras

Unpredictable

29. Algeria

30. Aden

31. Angola

32. Mozambique

Effects of Expanding U.N. Membership

On the basis of the above projection, the anticipated breakdown of United Nations Membership by area over the next five-year period would be as follows:

UN of 82 Members (end of 1959)	UN of 98—99 Members (end of 1960)	UN of 108—109 Members (1965)
Western hemisphere (including US but excluding Canada)	21	21	24
Old Commonwealth	4	4	4
Non-Communist Europe	16	16	16
Africa (excluding Union of South Africa)	9	24–25	30–31
Middle East	13	14	14
Far East and Pacific	9	9	10
Communist Europe	10	10	10

At the Fifteenth General Assembly, with the addition of sixteen or seventeen prospective new members, all but one of which will be from Africa, the number of African members excluding the Union of South Africa will be twenty-four or twenty-five. The African states will consistute the largest geographic grouping in the United Nations (24–25), a position heretofore held by the Latin Americans (20). From 1961–1965, a conservative estimate indicates there will be at least 10 additional new members, at least six of which will be from Africa, and the number may well be larger, depending primarily on developments in Africa.

Members from the Western Hemisphere, non-Communist Europe, and the Old Commonwealth now constitute exactly half of the total United Nations membership. At the Fifteenth General Assembly this will no longer be true, and by 1965 the Africans and Asians will in all likelihood constitute about half the total United Nations membership.

In the United Nations of 98–99 members, which is likely to be reached this year, it would be theoretically possible for the African and Asian members, along with the Communist bloc states, to command a simple majority. On this same hypothetical assumption of near bloc unanimity, the Afro-Asian-Communist strength would increase, but this group would lack the two-thirds majority for decisions on important questions, even in a United Nations which exceeds 100 members.

However, among these various groupings only the Soviet bloc consistently votes as such. The Africans and Asians come closest to voting together on “colonial” and economic and social development issues but definitely split on East-West issues. Some are aligned with or oriented toward the West. Others lean toward the USSR, and there exists a very substantial group of “neutralists”. It is this latter group that appears likely in present circumstances to derive the major increment from the new membership. The geographic location of the possible new members, their past experience and the prejudices deriving therefrom, and their state of political and economic development may be expected to predispose them toward non-alignment. This predisposition is likely to be encouraged by Soviet efforts to appear as a sympathic and generous friend in those matters of most direct and immediate concern to the new members, and by the present Soviet posture of appearing actively to seek a relaxation of tensions. Non-alignment, moreover, affords the new membership a vehicle for attempting to play the USSR off against the West in an effort to further their own more immediate ends.

Just how extensive the above tendencies will be among the new members and whether they will be oriented toward the West or toward the USSR will depend largely on future developments which cannot now be forecast with any accuracy, and principally on 1) whether the African states succeed in their present efforts to develop an “African voice” (as distinct from Indian or UAR spokesmanship) in the United Nations and which African influences are predominant in such a “voice”; 2) the extent to which the influence of the metropolitan powers can be projected into the new independent regimes; 3) the extent to which the United States both inside and outside the United Nations can be responsive to the primary concerns of the new African states; 4) the United States political posture vis-à-vis that of the USSR in their eyes; 5) the future posture of the USSR toward Africa; and 6) the relative power position of the United States and the USSR, as this is assessed by the new states.

It is clear that substantial efforts will be required on our part or by others with the newly emerging states on many issues involving a direct conflict between the Soviet Union on the one hand and the Unites States and its allies on the other if the effects of the anticipated non-alignment tendencies are to be mitigated. We would expect this problem to be much less serious in cases involving some flagrant Communist aggression. In general, the emerging and newly-emerged states will wish to see the attention of the United Nations focused on their own needs and desires.

Outside the area of East-West issues and regardless of whether the African United Nations members succeed in developing a distinctively “African voice”, the Africans can be expected to continue to find many points of common interest and common emotional reaction with the Asians and therefore to continue by and large to vote with them on “colonial” and economic and social development issues. At the same time it is significant to note that “colonial” questions may diminish in number with the widespread attainment of independence, but difficult issues like Algeria, South West Africa, and issues with “colonial” overtones will not be readily resolved. The new states will also probably place increasing emphasis on economic and social questions in the United Nations. In addition to their almost certain desires for United Nations technical assistance, the new states are also likely to look to the United Nations for assistance in resolving territorial and other disputes among them.

Effects on United States Operations in the UN

As the United Nations grows, and with it the number of “uncommitted” members, the United States will increasingly have to ensure that the votes from this latter group are either affirmative or abstentions in order to obtain the necessary two-thirds vote of the General Assembly to carry any proposal on an “important question”. In general, we may expect that the attainment of two-thirds votes in the General Assembly will be more difficult, and this may present us increasingly with the choice (a) of accepting a resolution that falls short of our objectives; or (b) of being satisfied with no resolution at all. We will also continue to be under increasing pressure in areas such as disarmament, nuclear testing, and outer space to compromise in order to reach agreement with the USSR on the text of a resolution, which will then probably receive the unanimous endorsement of the General Assembly.

On the other hand, in the event of cases of aggression or threats to the peace, including those from Communist sources, United States initiatives can be expected to receive broad support in an expanded United Nations in circumstances where the objective is to prevent such breaches of, or threats to the peace from spreading into a broader conflict. There will also be broad support in the United Nations for action in disputes involving smaller powers which do not necessarily involve the direct interests of the Great Powers.

In the absence of new Soviet bellicosity, an increasing number of abstentions must be anticipated on future East-West issues. This tendency may extend to items like Hungary and Korea, as those members that participated in the United Nations handling of the orginal situations become a smaller proportion of the total membership. This tendency, to some extent, will be amenable to United States counter-measures. While, in certain circumstances, our previous flexibility in taking initiatives on East-West issues may be reduced in the expanded United Nations, we foresee no serious threat to our capacity to block unacceptable proposals in this field requiring a two-thirds vote. In economic and social questions, and in connection with “colonial” problems, where the Africans and Asians may act with substantial unity and receive the support of the Communist bloc and some Latin American states and others, we may expect increasing difficulties though it should be possible to continue to muster a blocking one-third. In this connection, it should be noted that the Soviet Union shows no signs of supporting items in these categories which involve substantial finanical contributions.

As the numerical balance in the United Nations shifts from the West to the Africans and Asians, the United States will encounter greater difficulty in preventing undesired action where only a simple majority vote is required. In particular, we will face an increased likelihood of special sessions of the General Assembly being called on matters which we might prefer not to have raised in this fashion (e.g. the Afro-Asians fell only six votes short of a majority needed to convene a special session on French nuclear tests in the Sahara). Our ability to obtain the most advantageous slates for General Assembly committees and vice presidencies from our point of view may decrease. (It is already hampered by the 12th General Assembly resolution allocating geographically the seats on the General Committee.⁴) It seems unlikely, for example, that we can continue to avoid indefinitely a General Assembly president from Eastern Europe or East European chairmen of committees where we do not want them. Similarly, the frequency with which General Assembly officers are chosen from among our supporters in Asia and Africa (allocated six places—more than any other region—by the Twelfth General Assembly resolution) is likely to decrease as the membership increases.

In connection with the Chinese representation issue, the advent of new members unfamiliar with Chinese Communist actions in Korea, the Off-Shore Islands, South East Asia and Tibet, will probably require greater emphasis on current factors in the presentation of United States views, than on historical factors. The task of arguing our viewpoint persuasively will become more difficult if Peking succeeds in befriending new members and convincing them that it poses no threat to peace. If new members oppose our position it could have serious consequences and might cause defections from other areas, particularly Latin America. In the short range, however, the admissions of eight new states this year should not materially affect the outcome at the Fifteenth General Assembly, though it may narrow our margin and increase the number of abstentions. We and the Chinese are currently engaged in seeking the support of the potential new members on this issue.

Finally, it seems likely that in the United Nations of the future, the United States may have to operate with a less favorable composition of the Security Council because it will be more difficult to obtain the two-thirds vote to elect our friends. Furthermore, for obvious reasons the new membership may be expected to place major emphasis on equitable geographic distribution rather than on qualification. In this connection it should also be noted that an increased number of “uncommitted” states will be eligible for election. This problem will be magnified for the United States if the Council is enlarged and will also exist, though perhaps without as many implications, in the case of other United Nations organs and agencies.

The estimates contained above are largely in general terms. This is necessarily the case because the actual course of events in the future United Nations will depend upon the inter-action of many diverse elements, including the direct U.S.-Soviet power relationship, which is outside the United Nations but is clearly reflected in it. Some of these elements are within our capacity to influence.

Implications for United States Policy

Although it is not possible to state in detail all the things that may be required in order to assure, to the maximum extent feasible, the achievement of United States objectives in the future United Nations, a number of the implications for United States policy over the next few years can be identified. Moreover, on some points specific steps can be recommended. Other matters will need further study.

Set forth below are certain implications and conclusions for United States policy that can now be foreseen, as well as some suggestions with respect to other areas that require further exploration.

1. UN Membership for the Emerging States

Despite the difficulties for the United States in an expanding United Nations, it is not practicable or desirable for the United States to seek to prevent or impede the admissions of newly independent states to the United Nations. Such an effort would seriously prejudice our relations with the newly independent states and it would put us directly at odds with the anti-colonial majority in the United Nations. United Nations members generally are inclined to favor universality so that any such effort is unlikely to be successful without resort to the veto in Security Council. It would also put us at a disadvantage with the emerging states vis-à-vis the USSR, which can be expected to support their admission to the United Nations as part of its effort to extend Communist influence. Moreover, since United Nations membership is a badge of independence for the new states, “associate membership” is not a feasible possibility since it would be viewed by them as second class status.

Furthermore, the problems raised for us by the rapidly increasing number of African states, i.e., of potential “neutralism”, of pressure for economic and technical assistance, of political instability, and of emotional and irresponsible attitudes, will exist whether these states are in or out of the United Nations. In these circumstances, the United Nations could provide a valuable safety valve and could assist the new states in ways that will also advance United States interests.

We should seek through informal consultations and in other feasible ways to encourage the new members to take a responsible attitude toward the United Nations and to emphasize that the Organization should not be viewed only as a source of assistance without regard for the positive obligations of membership.

To the extent feasible, we should encourage moves toward a consolidation of the new states in order to reduce the number which will become United Nations members.

It will be clearly in our interest to avert the development of a solid Afro-Asian bloc. There are already tendencies within this bloc which should encourage to emphasize primarily the African group, the Arab group, and the Asian group. (UN Secretary General Hammerskjöld believes that these three groups do have distinctly separate interests and that the African group is divided within itself.) In addition, we should lay stress on approaches to individual countries within the Afro-Asian group, particularly on important issues, in order to maximize our influence with them and cut into the “bloc” approach which is likely to operate against us. We should seek the help of our European friends in these efforts.

2. Guiding Principles for the United States in the Future United Nations

A. In a situation offering no “built-in” majority for the United States position, the United States must be prepared to take the initiative on matters of direct and major interest to it and play an active part in the consideration of items where an unsatisfactory result could be prejudicial to United States over-all objectives.

B. In general, a policy of abstention not only prevents our being able to influence the outcome on a given question but discourages other moderating influences from being exercised. At the same time, the achievement of our basic objectives in the General Assembly will be facilitated by concentrating our efforts on issues of major importance to us and not expending them across the board.

C. A relaxed posture on matters of minor concern to the United States or essentially of “appearance” will avoid wasting our reservoir of good will and so involving our national prestige as to make failure of our view to prevail appear as a defeat of the United States.

D. Past experience indicates that our ability to attract support where we wish to assure a given outcome can be adversely affected by our disinterest in other issues. The United States should therefore give careful consideration to the Assembly’s agenda as a whole in order to develop the most coordinated approach possible, taking into account the inter-action of different problems and the probable reactions of other members.

E. In some situations United States objectives are more likely to be achieved through the medium of friendly “middle” countries than by direct United States efforts. This will require advance selective consultations, while the necessity of maintaining unimpaired our normal support and at the same time of attracting support from the “uncommitted” members underscores the increasing importance of early and systematic consultations on a wide geographic basis.

F. In the enlarging General Assembly, the United States could occasionally find itself in a minority position on certain issues. To minimize the number of such occasions and to assure support on matters of vital concern to it, the United States will need to be as responsive to the desires of the “uncommitted” as over-all policy considerations permit. On East-West issues, an appearance of inflexibility toward the USSR may alienate rather than arouse sympathy. Where basic United States principles and objectives are at stake, however, the United States should make clear that it is prepared to see the Assembly fail to take any action rather than to compromise essential principles and objectives.

G. The support of the “uncommitted” on matters of vital interest to the United States may become increasingly conditional, as they learn their own capabilities, on receiving our support on matters of primary concern to them. Since their desires on such matters may sometimes be unrealistic the United States will face the difficult problem of determining how far it is desirable and feasible to go in meeting them. This will require casting a balance in terms of the long-range interests of the states whose political and economic development is involved, the impact on our relations with the states already committed to us and whose support is essential to the maintenance of the United States power position, and the costs to us in money and manpower.

3. Colonial Questions in the Future United Nations

The number of territories under colonial administration will sharply decline in the short-range future. As this occurs, the need for our European allies to defend “colonialism” in the United Nations should be accordingly reduced. We should continue to re-examine our approach to colonial questions in the United Nations and attempt to take as affirmative a position within the United Nations as we have elsewhere on the movement toward self-government or independence. If we do this systematically, we can hope that the anti-colonial countries in time will become more conscious and critical of Soviet colonialism than they are today.

4. Activities to Influence Emerging African States

The United States position in the United Nations will be greatly affected by steps which we take outside the United Nations. Our goal should be, through carefully selected programs such as exchange of leaders, public information programs, and other types of assistance, to promote a Western orientation on the part of new members. This will require a careful evaluation of what types of activities will be most productive if carried out on a bilateral basis and which could be more profitable if channelled through the United Nations.

5. Composition of the United Nations Bodies

As our problem of control in the General Assembly increases, we may find it advantageous to seek to emphasize the role of the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and other smaller bodies.

We should be prepared to see the complexion of the United Nations as a whole, including the Soviet bloc, reasonably accurately reflected in such organs, agencies and sub-bodies. This means we should not agree to hard parity for the Soviet bloc. We should at the same time give careful consideration to the posts which can least easily be exploited to our disadvantage if filled by bloc nationals.

The United States may also be required to take greater initiative, on a selective basis, in trying to encourage particular candidates for election in order to assure a favorable overall composition of United Nations organs and agencies rather than to leave the choice to a particular geographic bloc as a matter of normal practice.

6. Future Role of the United Nations Secretariat

A number of newly emerging states are anxious to have the active assistance of the United Nations. This will take a variety of forms, including financial assistance and technical and administrative advice. It will doubtless result in the presence of United Nations personnel in many of the newly emerging countries. As suggested earlier, this is a desirable development in helping fill the vacuum caused by the departure, abrupt in some cases, of the previous authorities.

The Secretary General will have an increasingly important role and we will need to exercise the greatest care in choosing future incumbents. The United States should also intensify efforts to place qualified Americans in key positions in the Secretariat and to encourage the choice of qualified nations from other countries.

7. Status of Assembly Resolutions

We should gradually begin to stress the recommendatory character of Assembly resolutions rather than their morally binding force, against the time when we may find ourselves increasingly in a minority position. There may be an increased number of occasions on which we may find it preferable to have no resolution at all, relying instead upon the effects of public discussion of the particular subject. The qualitative character of votes, i.e., who voted which way, rather than the absolute numerical results, may gain increasing significance.

8. Improvement of United Nations Through Charter Review

We are committed publicly to a Charter Review Conference at such time as circumstances are considered propitious. However, it is very unlikely that either with the present or anticipated future membership of the United Nations, revision of the Charter would work to United States advantage. The present Charter, conceived primarily in political terms, has provided a flexible framework within which pragmatic adjustments have been readily made in light of changing international circumstances. While maintaining our present public posture, we should refrain from pressing for an early conference. While some enlargement of the Council appears inevitable eventually, there is no comparable consensus in favor of more far-reaching changes.

9. Improved Techniques of United States Participation

We need to give serious thought as to ways in which we can maximize the effectiveness of our participation in the United Nations. With the enlarged membership and the consequently increased operating difficulties for the United States, we must ensure that our staffing arrangements, both in the Department and in the field, and our operating techniques are adequate to the increased demands. For example, our Missions in New York and Geneva must be adequately staffed for effective liaison on a continuous basis with other members, many of whom will require considerable individual attention. Close continuing relationships between United States officials and the representatives of the newly independent countries are imperative, and much may be won or lost in the first few months after the arrival of a new delegation at the seat of the United Nations. The increase from nine to twenty-five members from “black” Africa gives added importance, if any were needed, for efforts to improve the reception of non-white visitors to the United States, most immediately in the vicinity of New York. High-level stimulation of civic officials, public and private groups, seems necessary to remove barriers to appropriate housing, schools, athletic facilities, clubs, etc., for non-white officials who, if treated inhospitably by private Americans, can be expected to receive official American diplomatic approaches and persuasions with reserve. The United States Delegation to the General Assembly must be carefully selected, giving primary emphasis to qualifications and experience, and using experienced representatives for more than one session. In this connection, consideration should be given to changing the present basis on which delegates are chosen, possibly selecting delegates who have professional diplomatic experience. Means to assure continuity of staff operations in IO and USUN must also be devised.

10. Public Attitudes

Public opinion in the United States, guided both by official policy and by private organs of public opinion, now accepts the concept of the United Nations as “a cornerstone of United States foreign policy”. In the light of the anticipated future development of the Organization, it may become necessary to introduce a sense of caution in certain of the views now held. We must be sure that public opinion has a proper understanding of our capability at any time to implement United States foreign policy objectives through the United Nations. Moreover, on the basis of our past record, public opinion is not now prepared for the prospect that we may be on the losing end of votes in the United Nations. While we must be careful to avoid in any way undermining the position and prestige of the Organization, we ought to consider how we can begin to make the leaders of the organs of public opinion more fully aware of what we may face in the future if future public support for the United Nations is not to be jeopardized.

11. United Nations and Pacific Settlement

In the absence of substantial progress on disarmament or other major contentious issues, the United Nations is unlikely to become an effective collective security instrument, but we will be able to continue to use the United Nations in a major way in the field of pacific settlement. We foresee a continued active role for the UN in connection with the maintenance of peace in the Middle East. As new states emerge in Africa, there are likely to be numerous disputes, particularly over such matters as borders, where we can utilize the pacific settlement functions of the United Nations to achieve constructive results.

Even in areas where great power interests conflict more directly—as in Laos—U.S. interests may be served by utilizing the UN on a selective basis.

12. Prevention of Bloc Voting

We should increase our efforts to prevent the Afro-Asians from voting as bloc by: (1) expanding UN activities in newly independent and emerging states; (2) intensifying our bilateral diplomatic and economic efforts; (3) expanding multilateral aid programs where such activities can be more effective or economic than bilateral assistance; (4) utilizing friendly non-colonial powers (e.g., Canada, Japan, Norway and the Latin Americans) to foster stable, pro-Western governments; and (5) encouraging former metropoles to extend bilateral assistance to their former dependencies as a means of maintaining a degree of influence. We should encourage the Latin Americans and other Free World states to vote with us on issues important to us; at the same time we should realize that some of our friends will occasionally not be willing to do so primarily in order to demonstrate their independence.

13. The Role of the Security Council

As the number of UN members continues to increase, it may be advantageous for the United States to encourage greater use of the Security Council. In general, our voting position in the Security Council is likely to be better than it will be in the expanded General Assembly. Moreover, the size of the Security Council will make it more manageable than the enlarged General Assembly. Greater use of and reliance on the Security Council could also assist in keeping certain issues from being exploited in the General Assembly by members not parties to the dispute for their own purposes. In disputes between smaller powers where the United States and USSR may have parallel interests in keeping such disputes circumscribed and localized, the Security Council should continue to be particularly useful. The Security Council can also continue to be useful where United States and USSR interests are opposed. For example, the Laotian case provided an extremely useful precedent whereby an investigating subcommittee can be established through a veto-proof procedure under Article 29 of the Charter.

14. Future Development of the United Nations

The United Nations constitutes a continuing factor in international polices. The United Nations Charter is a better charter than any which could be expected to result from any new effort today.

The influx of new members more interested in economic and social problems than in the East-West struggle or other matters of primary interest to us will, to some extent, diminish the usefulness of the United Nations to the United States. However, a dilution of United States hegemony need not mean a corresponding growth of Soviet power in the United Nations. This will depend in large measure on our continued willingness to play an active role in the United Nations. Adoption by us of a negative attitude toward the expanded Organization would result in the United Nations becoming by default an instrumentality of anti-U.S. forces. There is no realistic alternative to an active U.S. role in the United Nations if proposals serving our interest to be adopted or bad proposals neutralized or defeated. To adopt a policy of progressive U.S. disengagement from the United Nations would, at a minimum, be handing the USSR an effective instrumentality through which it could seek to organize the international community in its own image. The United Nations is here to stay. This is a fact which cannot be wished away by the U.S. simply because the enlargement of the United Nations will make our own operations more difficult. On the contrary, a more active role will be necessary, particularly on carefully selected issues seriously affecting our interests.

If, in fact, we are ever confronted with a situation in the United Nations where the U.S. is consistently in the minority, then a reappraisal of U.S. policy would have been long overdue. It is impossible to separate U.S. policy in the United Nations from U.S. policy outside the Organization. The United Nations will continue to mirror the extent of our international influence and the reactions of other governments to our over-all policy. If the mirror should ever reflect an unfortunate image, it would be folly to imagine that the image could be changed simply by smashing the mirror. Our hope for an eventual peaceful world depends simply in no small degree on the extent of our success in the building on the framework of the United Nations to develop genuinely effective international law and peace-keeping machinery.

[Here follow Annex A, “Results at Fourteenth General Assembly on Key Issues,” and Annex B, “Extent to Which Members Voted the Same Way as the United States on 25 Key Issues at the 14th General Assembly.”]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 301/12–160. Confidential. Attached to an undated memorandum from Wilcox to Merchant, which notes that the paper was sent to the heads of 19 other bureaus in the Department of State.
2. Neither printed.
3. Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 1427 (XIV) on industrial development banks and development corporations, 1420 (XIV) on the International Development Association, and 1424 (XIV) on a U.N. capital development fund. For texts, see U.N. doc. A4354.
4. Regarding this resolution, see footnote 2, Document 84.