136. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Norway1
952. Re Deptel Copenhagen [Oslo] 944, Copenhagen 803, rptd info Stockholm 937, Helsinki 554, Reykjavik 277, USUNUnn.2 In discussing US opposition Nosek for 15th GA presidency, you may wish stress as appropriate following additional points:
1. Soviets basing campaign to large extent on contention Soviet bloc is “entitled” to seat because failure Soviet bloc candidate be elected in past years. US sees no validity this argument. Past refusal UNGA elect Soviet candidates to top UN offices has resulted largely from unwillingness Soviet bloc to cooperate sincerely in UN policies and programs. (May cite Korea, Hungary, Tibet, refusal pay UNEF assessments, etc., as well as prodigal use of veto in Security Council.) US believes Soviet bloc should not be given major office such as GA presidency until there is substantial evidence inprovement basic Soviet attitude toward UN. Otherwise, election Soviet candidate might be misinterpreted as meaning free nations willing reward Soviet bloc for long record of intransigence.
(2) 15th GA may be especially important session. Conceivable agenda may be affected by outcome Summit talks and other negotiations currently being conducted with USSR. Believe would be especially unfortunate have Soviet bloc president in chair during session when GA may be required take decisions on issues of vital concern to free world.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/4–1960. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Nunley; initialed by Cargo; cleared by Hartley; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Herter. Also sent priority to Copenhagen and repeated to Stockholm, Helsinki, Reykjavik, and by pouch to USUN.↩
- Dated April 18, this telegram instructed the Embassies in Oslo and Copenhagen to approach the Norwegian and Danish Foreign Ministers prior to the Nordic Foreign Ministers’ meeting to reemphasize U.S. support for Boland and opposition to Nosek. (Ibid., 320/4–1360)↩
- Willis reported in telegram 863 from Oslo, April 20, that she had discussed the points outlined in this telegram with the Norwegian Foreign Minister, who had not responded to them specifically. He had noted that the Nordic Foreign Ministers would discuss it at their April 25 meeting, but probably would not decide on it then. (Ibid., 320/4–2060)↩