Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

134. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, March 22, 1960—5 p.m.

935. Re: 15th GA slates. In absence Dept instructions in response ourtels 924 of Mar 18 and 920 of Mar 17,² request authority proceed as fols:

1. Of all unsolved slates questions (assuming presidency solved), believe most important is preventing Communists from getting chairmanship Comite I. Word likely get around very soon Nosek (Czechoslovakia) will withdraw as candidate for presidency to stand instead for Comite I. Such move will be supported by many dels as praiseworthy Communist effort achieve “harmony”.

2. Possibility Nosek getting chairmanship Comite I disturbing for several reasons: (a) it could serve to build him up for GA presidency one or two years hence; (b) this kind of “harmony” maneuver by Communist bloc (i.e. backing off from presidency) will further enhance Communist prestige among many dels especially Afro-Asians; (c) Communist chairman in Comite I where major political issues debated will prevent US from working, as we have always done in past, with chairman on such matters on scheduling comite meetings and other tactical arrangements which help US keep initiative and provide leadership in debates.

3. Only way avert this is stimulate strongest possible candidate to announce candidacy for Comite I chairmanship before Communists take any further steps to launch Nosek. We see no prospects of anyone coming forward soon unless US takes hand in problem.

4. We cannot count on help from Cordier or Hammarskjold. Both of whom, as we have reported before, feel “Communists too should have their turn at prominent GA positions.”

5. We anxious be authorized make arrangements quickly checkmate possible Nosek move because we convinced if Communists move first, subsequent effort on our part to defeat them will not only fail but decrease our own standing in eyes many dels who will charge US with poor sportsmanship, with engaging in unjustified “cold war maneuvers”, and with trying “have everthing our own way”.

6. Believe Slim (Tunisia) has by far best chance and that we should attempt quickly determine if Slim available.

7. Recommend we be authorized urge Slim run. If Slim decides do so we certain he will not announce we have given him commitment, since this would weaken his chances among neutralists. In some quarters, of course, he might make it clear he can count on our support and we should be prepared confirm this if asked. We do not believe such commitment on our part could do US any damage with LA’s or anyone else since 1960 is clearly “turn” of Afro-Asian region have Comite I chairmanship.

8. Less satisfactory alternative would be approach Slim through Rossel (Sweden) by responding to her démarche to US on Feb 9 (ourtel 729³). We could tell Rossel we think she should encourage Slim run and that she thinks he would receive wide support.

9. Slim would be stronger candidate than LA because he Afro-Asian (which makes him difficult for USSR to oppose) and because it is Afro-Asian “turn” have Comite I. (LA’s had chairmanship only two years ago and can hardly claim it this year in opposition to outstandingly well-qualified African.)

10. There is added advantage in Slim as Dept has recognized (Deptel 759⁴): He is only African in position get GA presidency in near future. If he is chairman Comite I this fall our chances having him beat Communists for presidency in 1961 are further enhanced. Furthermore he would undoubtedly stay in race once he entered.

11. We realize Slim’s candidacy might endanger position Lopez (Philippines) to some extent but we continue feel, as we said ourtel 729, most likely result Slim candidacy would be eliminate Pachachi (Iraq). We feel this is risk we must take because risk losing Comite I to Communists is more dangerous for US interests. As for possible French objections, we feel Slim would preside over Algerian debate with studied impartiality and French might well conclude it would be to their advantage remove Slim from traditional position “floor leader” Afro-Asians during Algerian debate. Once he were in race it would be difficult for French oppose him. (For example, French Govt did not want Tunisian sponsorship of Cameroun for UN membership, but when Tunisia asked, French felt compelled, in fact saw advantages in it, to include them as co-sponsor.)

12. Request authority therefore approach Slim as suggested above and press for quick decision. If he decides not run, we would have make new assessment.⁵

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/3–2260. Confidential; Priority.
2. Telegram 924 urged the Department to reconsider its decision not to allow the USUN to take initiative regarding the composition of the General Committee and regarding reports that some Latin American nations at the 15th U.N. General Assembly might not support the U.S. position on Chinese U.N. representation. (Ibid., 320/3–1860) Telegram 920 reported that Nosek might withdraw from the race for President of the 15th General Assembly to seek instead chairmanship of Committee I. (Ibid., 320/3–1760)
3. Telegram 729 reported that Rossel had recommended that Sweden urge Slim to run for chairman of Committee I, and evaluated this suggestion. (Ibid., 320/2–960)
4. Telegram 759, March 17, acknowledged the difficulties in waiting to firm up slates for the 15th General Assembly, but instructed the mission to continue working on this issue. (ibid., 320/2–560)
5. Telegram 777 to USUN, March 23, authorized the mission to approach Slim regarding the chairmanship of Committee I after ascertaining the Latin Americans’ desires for chairmanships. (Ibid., 320/3–2360)