Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

132. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iceland¹

Washington, March 2, 1960—7 p.m.

229. Thors called Department today to announce to Wilcox his candidacy for presidency 15th UNGA,² asserting firm support Icelandic Government, including personal urging by Prime Minister. Explained prevented from earlier announcement by internal political situation in Iceland. In support of candidacy, cited long tenure as UN representative, various offices held, close friendship for US and repeated support US positions under difficult circumstances. Said he understood US inclined toward Boland of Ireland but wished know whether Boland had been given firm commitment by US. Pointed out US has normally stressed policy of refraining from commitments to UN candidates far in advance of elections. For this reason assumed he would be able defer announcing candidacy and still receive sympathetic consideration by US.

Wilcox informed Thors US has given Boland firm commitment. Departure from customary practice of avoiding early commitment resulted from unusually early announcement candidacy of Nosek (Czechoslovakia) and determined Soviet bloc campaign in his behalf. US believes election Soviet bloc candidate as president highly undesirable for various reasons, including continued unwillingness Soviet bloc to cooperate with important UN policies and programs. Therefore US favored early selection Western European candidate to oppose Nosek. Boland made definite announcement of candidacy in December and no other announcements were forthcoming. Department heard rumors re possibility Icelandic interest, but received no definite indications Thors candidacy probable. In view need for early agreement on Western candidate to counter Nosek and in view Boland’s strong personal qualifications, US announced support Boland in early February.

Wilcox also expressed gratitude for Thors’ long-standing friendship and helpfulness in UN matters and highest regard for Thors’ qualifications for presidency.

Thors expressed keen disappointment at foregoing information and seemed inclined regard US commitment to Boland as personal affront. Pointed out his long-standing friendship for US has often subjected him at home to criticism for being “too pro-American”. Also stressed Iceland’s alliance with US in NATO and asked somewhat bitterly whether NATO membership is meaningful. Expressed hope US would not feel obliged conduct active campaign for Boland. However, indicated his own firm determination remain “in fight” regardless of US position. Also expressed conviction he could obtain enough votes to win and hoped US would “congratulate him on his victory”.

Believe Ambassador should seek earliest suitable occasion discuss situation with Foreign Minister, sounding out strength of Icelandic feeling on matter and stressing following points as appropriate:

(1) US commitment to Boland in no way reflects on US friendship for Iceland or personal regard for Thors. US has high opinion Thors’ abilities and appreciates his steady support of principles and programs of importance to free world interests.

(2) US had no knowledge Thors’ candidacy until Thors himself approached Wilcox on March 1. Knew Iceland had expressed some interest in GA presidency at one stage of 1958 campaign and also that Thors had mentioned possibility of candidacy to Ambassador Lodge on January 28, 1960,³ subsequent to definite announcement by Boland. On basis Embassy’s G–49,⁴ Foreign Office apparently failed make any mention possibility Thors’ candidacy when US informed Iceland of our support for Boland on Feb. 8.

(3) Because of close friendship with Iceland, US finds present situation very painful. Nosek began campaign for 15th GA presidency during 14th GA and seemed to be attracting considerable sympathy. Since there was general consensus that 1960 was Europe’s “term”, seemed evident Nosek could be defeated only by early campaign for strong Western European candidate. Boland made early announcement candidacy, had outstanding personal qualifications, and seemed likely attract substantial support both from Western Europe and other regions. Therefore US departed from normal policy of delaying commitment and announced support Boland. Since that time a number of other governments have given similar commitments to Boland.

(4) In addition embarrassment to US itself, US disturbed by prospect of two strong Western candidates competing against each other. In view Thors’ long experience and known abilities, will undoubtedly attract support from various quarters, thus splitting free world vote. Result might be prolonged deadlock or even Nosek victory. For this reason US hopes Iceland willing reconsider plans press Thors candidacy.

(5) If Thors remains candidate, US sees no alternative but to continue support of Boland. US certainly would not feel its interests impaired by election Thors and would be pleased support Thors under different circumstances. Nevertheless US is committed to Boland and continues believe Boland has best chance defeating Nosek. In view probable strength of Nosek candidacy, US may be required give fairly active support to Boland, but in any case will avoid any unfavorable comment re Thors. Hope both Icelandic Government and Thors himself will understand difficulty US position.⁵

Merchant

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/2–860. Confidential. Drafted by Nunley, initialed by Cargo, cleared by Hartley and in draft with Rewinkel, and approved by Wilcox who signed for Merchant. Repeated to Dublin and USUN.
2. A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., 320/3–160.
3. Lodge reported on his conversation with Thors in telegram 678 from USUN. (Ibid., 320/1–2860)
4. Dated February 8, it reported that the Icelandic Foreign Ministry had been informed of U.S. support for Boland. (Ibid., 320/2–860)
5. Telegram 247 from Reykjavik, March 4, reported that the Icelandic Foreign Minister understood the U.S. need to honor its commitment to Boland, but stated that the decision on whether or not to maintain his candidacy rested with Thors. (ibid., 320/3–460) On March 4, Wilcox met again with Thors and outlined for him the contents of telegram 229 to Reykjavik. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid.)