Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

127. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations¹

Washington, January 26, 1960—5:49 p.m.

644. Re 15th GA Presidency. In view my conversation with French Ambassador January 22 (Deptel 637²) Dept called in French Minister to inquire whether he had received report from Rome concerning approach to Pella.³ He replied in negative and was informed our present plan to have you hand Boland Wednesday reply Aiken letter, stating our intention support Boland for Presidency 15th GA, adding that you had discussed this Monday with Ortona. French Minister said his government did not wish provoke Italian candidacy and that it was for purpose of smoothly removing this candidacy that Couve’s démarche was to be or had been framed. He asked whether Wednesday was irrevocable date for replying to Aiken letter and Department replied that that was our present intention. He said he would immediately ascertain whether Couve had made his démarche since reply might have bearing on our action.

As agreed in our recent discussions this matter (urtel 654) you are authorized barring unforeseen developments to reply Aiken letter as proposed urtel 634.⁴ However, in order give French time inform us result Couve démarche,⁵ suggest you defer giving Boland reply Aiken letter until Thursday. You should stress orally to Boland that our support of course based on assumption his candidacy will attract general support of Western Europe.

I also agree it desirable make our position this matter generally and promptly known both to other delegations in New York and through our Missions abroad as you suggest urtel 634. I have however reservations re making your reply Aiken available as press release at this time in absence any WE consensus his favor. Apart from possible Italian sensitivity, press release in support Boland could arouse WE resentment on grounds US taking lead in matter essentially WE concern in first instance i.e. choice of WE candidate. Moreover Boland’s strength as candidate among some members due in part fact Ireland’s posture UN not closely identified that US, and US public support Boland ahead WE’s could serve undermine this aspect his strength, particularly as it would be contrary normal US practice in case elections involving secret ballot. I fully appreciate desirability letting our support Boland be generally known but believe this can best be accomplished at this time through normal diplomatic channels, thereby minimizing risks of unfavorable reactions and erroneous interpretations in certain quarters.⁶

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/1–2160. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Wallner and Hartley, cleared by Calhoun and White, and approved by Herter.
2. See footnote 5, supra.
3. A memorandum of Lebel’s January 26 conversation with White, Wallner, Nunley, and Valdes is in Department of State, Central Files, 320/1–2660.
4. Regarding telegrams 654 and 634, see supra, footnotes 6 and 2, respectively.
5. A memorandum of Lebel’s and Counselor of the French Embassy Winckler’s conversation on the evening of January 26 with McBride, Brown, and Valdes is in Department of State, Central Files, 320/1–2660.
6. In telegram 659, January 26, sent niact to the Secretary, Lodge urged that the United States delay no longer than Thursday in making a decision regarding the presidency of the 15th U.N. General Assembly. (Ibid.)