Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations¹

Washington, December 9, 1959—7:35 p.m.

Gadel 178. Re: 15th GA Presidency. Dept agrees Boland stronger candidate against Nosek than Italians mentioned for reasons cited Delga 634.² Dept also recognizes factors cited Delga 634 as favorable Nosek and agrees desirability early West European decision on WE candidate if Nosek candidacy is to be prevented from developing dangerous momentum.

However, Dept does not believe situation justifies approaches Lloyd and Segni³ at this time. While it clear from British question to Pella reported Rome’s 2113, rptd USUN 19,⁴UK trying to smoke out Italian intentions, evidence not conclusive in Dept’s view, UK in fact trying encourage Italian candidacy. Furthermore, if UK actually does prefer Italian, US approach behalf Boland likely be resented by British and surely be resented by Italians as gratuitous on our part. Approach to Italians to urge they refrain putting forward candidate on grounds Boland would be better vote-getter obviously presents serious difficulties from standpoint Italian sensibilities.

While Dept would prefer Boland as West European choice to Italians mentioned both from tactical standpoint and in order maintain precedent that GA President should be someone well known at GAand well versed in procedures, his strength in last analysis contingent on his being West European choice. US could hardly urge West European support Boland against Italian if latter actively seeks position. Moreover if West European choice of Italian made sufficiently far in advance Dept would anticipate his election without too great difficulty though admittedly not by as large vote as Boland could be expected receive.

Dept believes all we can do in circumstances is continue press UK for early West European decision this matter and is prepared support your discussion along this line with UK Delegation by similar approaches here and in London. You may inform UK our judgment Boland probably better vote getter than any Italian (and particularly Piccioni) but should avoid impression US exerting pressure against Italian candidacy and should stress principal US interest is early WE agreement on worthy opponent to Nosek.⁵

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/12–559. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley on December 7; initialed by Cargo and Sisco; cleared by Green, Nunley, Bacon, Ludlow, and in substance with Monsma; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Herter.
2. Delga 634, received December 5, reported that the British Delegation appeared to favor an Italian candidacy for President of the 15th U.N. General Assembly. (Ibid.)
3. Antonio Segni, Italian Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior.
4. Telegram 2113 from Rome, December 4, reported that Lloyd had discussed with Pella an Italian candidacy for President of the 15th General Assembly. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/12–459)
5. Telegram 4753, December 16, instructed the Embassy in London to approach the Foreign Office and urge that the Western Europeans choose a candidate for President of the 15th General Assembly, but to avoid giving the impression that the United States was trying to dictate the Western European choice or working against an Italian candidacy. (Ibid., 320/12–1659)