Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

112. Telegram From Department of State to the Embassy in Canada¹

Washington, November 20, 1959—7:35 p.m.

299. Canadian UNGA delegation has informed USUN of its intention maintain same position as last year—i.e., to abstain—in event of proposals inviting North Korea as well as ROK to GA discussion Korea. Pol Committee scheduled take up Korean item November 23 or 24 and it is virtually certain such proposals be introduced again this year, probably by USSR and/or India. USUN calls attention fact Canadian abstention is only instance of split in Korean-question voting record among 16 members who contributed forces UN command, and suggests we take up matter in Ottawa.

Dept has reviewed results Embassy’s earlier representations at External Affairs (Embtel 205²) and believes new approach worthwhile. (FYI: USUN was unable act on your suggestion take matter up with Green while he was in New York. End FYI) Accordingly, unless serious objections perceived by Embassy, you should at earliest opportunity call on Green or Robertson and, drawing also on arguments set forth Deptel 170, 172,³ make following points:

1. In September conversation at division-chief level, Embassy was given some insight into Canadian thinking on Korean question in UNGA. We appreciate that sincere desire Korean solution lies behind this thinking.

2. US views on Communist intransigence are well known. We believe that erosion of position in UN, especially as exemplified by attitude of 16-nation group, is more likely to reinforce than to reduce that intransigence. When question of inviting North Koreans come to vote, we strongly believe 16 should vote together.

3. US is mindful of attitude some neutralist nations that US views invitation North Koreans in purely cold-war context. In fact, we believe that proposals to invite North Korea involve other and more important factors. First, UN recognizes ROK as only lawful government in Korea. Idea of inviting North Korea, with new status such action would confer on Communist regime, has major political implications. Secondly, Communists have consistently claimed UN lacks competence in Korean question. Thirdly, we are dealing with consequences of aggression in decidedly hot war, to which UN responded in terms of deepest possible commitment.

4. US hopes Canadian Government, in light these considerations, will reconsider its position on this point and join with other members of sixteen in voting against any proposals inviting North Korean regime to UN.⁴

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–2259. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by O’Sheel (IO/UNP); cleared by Bane, McNutt, Hawley, Rewinkel, and Lane; and approved by Wallner who signed for Herter. Repeated to USUN.
2. Dated September 22. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 170, September 18, instructed the Embassy in Ottawa to urge the Canadian Government to reconsider its decision to abstain on the question of the North Korean representation at the General Assembly. (ibid., 320/9–859) Telegram 172, September 19, instructed the Embassy to ignore the first item in telegram 170 and instead to avoid referring to Canada’s previous vote on the issue. (Ibid., 320/9–1959)
4. Telegram 320 from Ottawa, November 23, reported that Green had agreed Canada would vote against any proposal to invite North Korean representatives to the General Assembly. (ibid., 320/11–2359) Delga 510, November 23, reported that Canada had voted against the Soviet resolution on Korea, but had not been required to state its position on North Korean representation, since the First Committee voted on the resolution as a whole. (ibid., 310.2/11–2359)