108. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations1
Gadel 95. Re: SC Election. View background Turkish candidacy, Dept believes US must remain firm in support Turkey so long as Turkey remains candidate and must be guided far as possible by Turkish wishes with respect any compromise. Of three alternatives suggested Delga 313,2Dept believes (A) would raise awkward and unnecessary constitutional questions under Charter that could present us with serious problems. Moreover, Dept believes even as tactic as suggested numbered paragraph 5 urtel alternative (A) would create impression of US-Turkish intransigence which could be counter-productive. Dept therefore considers this least desirable alternative. As between (B) and (C) Dept prefers (C) for following reasons:
1) It impossible project with any accuracy overall composition SC in 1962–63 or international climate so far in advance. It therefore impossible forecast implications for US position of Poland’s election [Page 200] SC two years from now should Turkey be chosen for next two years. Situation could be equally bad (or, conceivably, worse) in 1962–63 as in 1961.
2) Not only US but other Member States cannot reasonably be expected make firm commitments two years in advance and even if such commitments given now, we could not anticipate with any assurance they would stick.
3) Poland’s election for two years, whether for 1960–61 or 1962–63, would tend to freeze SC seat in question as bloc rather than floating seat to greater extent than in case split-term solution.
4) View precedent 1955 election, Dept does not believe split-term solution would be serious blow US prestige, even if seat went to Poland for first year as it did to Yugoslavia and, in Dept’s view, any added loss prestige in latter event more than compensated for by concrete advantages from our standpoint of having Turkey on SC in 1961.
USGADel in any consultations UK and Turks should be guided by above evaluation and considerations, making clear, however, we prepared maintain our support Turkey so long as Turkey desires and to take into full account Turkish views with respect any compromise.
FYI. Dept sees possible additional alternative i.e., maintenance support Turkish candidacy so long as practical and Turks desire and then if Turks not able win election, agreement to settle matter by lot. This procedure would involve no greater innovation than 1955 split-term solution. It would avoid any long-term commitments. It would clearly demonstrate inability Soviet-bloc candidate win seat through election, thus mitigating implications for geographic allocation seat in question. It would place US and Turkey in reasonable light, and we would have even chance getting seat for Turkey and disposing of Polish candidacy. While this solution does have obvious disadvantage of possibly giving Poland seat for two years, it might have advantages from face-saving standpoint. USGADel’s comments requested prior any discussion this alternative with UK or Turkish Dels.
Dept, moreover, does not wish preclude possibility of compromise candidate should one be put forward though it clear US should take no initiative this regard unless Turks request.
Furthermore, Dept convinced neither US, UK nor any other Turkish supporters should at this juncture be discussing with other compromise of any nature. End FYI.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/11–359. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Hartley and Ludlow on November 4; initialed by Sisco; cleared by Nunley, Day, Ludlow, Bacon, Wilcox, AF, and NEA, and in substance with Monsma and Meeker; and approved by Herter.↩
- Delga 313, November 3, stated there was no acceptable Eastern European candidate available to run for the Security Council, nor any candidate from outside Eastern Europe who could win the seat, and listed the alternatives Lodge perceived as a result of this situation. (Ibid.)↩