105. Letter From Secretary of State Herter to Secretary of State for External Affairs Green1
Dear Mr. Green: Bob Murphy has told me of his recent conversation with you on the Security Council election issue.2 I gather that you believe either a split term similar to the arrangement made between Yugoslavia and the Philippines in 1955 or a compromise candidate [Page 194] offers the best solution to the present impasse in the General Assembly. As you know, the United States is strongly supporting the Turkish candidacy. Turkey has now taken the lead in the balloting and we believe that Turkey can be elected. Our respective appraisals of the present situation would therefore appear to differ. This causes us serious concern and I would like to set forth for your consideration our reasons for attaching such importance to the election of Turkey.
Whatever may have been the original issues in this election, we believe the course of events has given it great significance. It is apparent that Turkey’s difficulty must be attributed in large part to the lateness of its candidacy. It is also apparent that a number of members of the Western world are inclined to be more generous to Poland than to other members of the Soviet bloc, perhaps in recognition of Poland’s efforts to attain a greater degree of independence. In this instance, however, it seems evident that the Soviet Union is capitalizing on Poland’s relative attractiveness to the non-Communist world. We have noted that the USSR is usually rather meticulous about distributing important U.N. offices among the various satellites, and there is certainly unusual significance in the fact that Poland was chosen this year to campaign both for the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council.
We believe that Soviet motives in this situation are based on several factors. As you know, the USSR claims that the seat currently occupied by Japan “rightly” belongs to Eastern Europe, despite the fact that no member of the bloc has held the seat since 1949. The USSR, therefore, seeks to take advantage of the currently hopeful international atmosphere to re-establish a permanent claim to this seat, which it would most certainly assert if Poland were actually elected. We believe it is important to maintain the concept of the seat as “floating”, in order to meet the minimum requirements for West European, Asian, and African representation.
We believe the Soviet bloc is also attempting to demonstrate, at a critical psychological moment, its ability to exercise a de facto veto within the General Assembly, through a process of splitting the Western states. The achievement of a split on an important issue, in itself, is probably a matter of considerable importance to the USSR. It is inevitable, of course, that the sovereign nations of the West will tend to take somewhat different attitudes toward Soviet policies and tactics, since none of us would ever wish to achieve the monolithic unity that is imposed upon the members of the Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, I am disturbed whenever the Soviet Union finds evidence that its tactics of dividing the Western nations seem to be succeeding, since any evidence of success is likely to encourage the USSR to step up such tactics in preference to engaging in serious negotiations. In this instance, failure to elect Turkey would generally be regarded as a rebuff to the [Page 195] West. It would be attributed to a split in Western solidarity and regarded as an indication of declining influence just when the West is about to undertake important negotiations with the Soviet Union. All of us would be put at a psychological disadvantage in our negotiations, and the Soviet Union can be counted upon to take full advantage of such a situation. These repercussions, in our view, may be expected if the future course of the balloting at the General Assembly leads to anything short of the outright election of Turkey.
Turkey, in view of its record of cooperation in the United Nations and as a fellow member of the free world’s collective security system, can be expected to add dependable strength to the Security Council. The election of any Soviet bloc member, including Poland, would add a government that will do nothing except parrot the Soviet line. Moreover, while I agree with you that there is no vast difference between a 10 to 1 as against a 9 to 2 vote in the Security Council, there is a very great difference between a 10 to 1 as against a 7 to 4 or a 7–2–2 vote in the Council. With Ceylon coming on the Council, the latter situation is one we might face if Poland were to be elected and if a confirmed neutralist is elected next year to succeed Tunisia, which is likely. In the event there should be any increased recourse to the Security Council, we cannot believe it would be consonant with free world interests to have the voting indicate a substantial growth in international support for Soviet positions.
We are also disturbed by the prospect that the return at this time to the Soviet bloc of a seat that it has not held since 1949 will be misinterpreted as a reward for Soviet intransigence. It is the Soviet Union, after all, that has consistently prevented what both you and we have felt to be of real importance in view of the constantly growing membership of the United Nations, namely,3 any enlargement of either the Economic and Social Council or the Security Council. To permit the Soviet bloc to improve its voting position on either Council while this condition prevails would be most undesirable in our view.
It would be equally undesirable, we believe, to have the Soviet leaders or the world in general interpret the election of Poland as a result of the preliminary efforts that the West has undertaken to reach a closer understanding with the Soviet Union on important international issues. If the Soviet Union is encouraged to believe that the mere hope of a détente is sufficient to obtain concessions from the West, we can hardly expect it to take concrete steps to give substance to this hope. Real progress toward disarmament, significant political settlements and lasting peace will be a matter of hard bargaining at [Page 196] best, and there is no reason to believe that we will improve our position in this bargaining process through gestures of unrequited generosity. The United States certainly has no desire to intensify the “cold war” on any front, major or minor, but we are painfully aware that the “cold war” is the result of Soviet initiatives, and we fervently hope that our friends and allies will stand firmly with us in refusing to abandon our resistance to basic Soviet ambitions. In brief, I am convinced that premature and unilateral concessions to the Soviet Union at this time could gravely damage our prospects for achieving a genuine and mutually satisfactory settlement of important issues at a later date.
The fact that Turkey is now in the lead indicates that a number of countries have already shifted their vote from Poland. I would hope that you might find the considerations I have outlined above sufficiently compelling to warrant a similar shift on the part of Canada.
With warmest personal regards,
Most sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/10–2959. Confidential. Transmitted in priority telegram 1807 to Paris and telegram 252 to Ottawa, October 29, which is the source text. The telegram was repeated to USUN.↩
- Murphy reported on his October 23 conversations with Canadian Under Secretary for External Affairs Robertson, External Affairs Secretary Green, and U.S. Ambassador Wigglesworth in telegram 274 from Ottawa, October 23. (Ibid., 330/10–2359)↩
- The phrase, “what both you and we have felt to be of real importance in view of the constantly growing membership of the United Nations, namely,” was added by Herter. (Note from Krebs to S/S, October 29; Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers)↩
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The telegram bears this typed signature. The telegrams transmitting the text of the letter contained the following statements after the complimentary close:
“FYI. Dept is at present concentrating its efforts on election of Turkey and therefore avoiding, as counterproductive these efforts, any discussion of alternatives. We have, moreover, taken no firm position internally as among possible alternatives, such as a split term or a compromise candidate. End FYI.
“For Amembassy, Ottawa:
“You should deliver copy above message to Under Secretary External Affairs Norman Robertson.”
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