1. Circular Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions 1
SUBJECT
- The Question of Chinese Representation
At a recent meeting in London of the North European Chiefs of Mission (September 19–21, 1957),2 some of the participants stationed in countries recognizing the Chinese Communists questioned the desirability of making approaches to the Foreign Offices in such countries on matters involving the Chinese representation issue in the various organs of the United Nations system, particularly when the respective Government is publicly known to have a traditional and unalterable position on this question.
The following comments may assist officers in the field better to understand the reasons behind the Department’s repeated instructions to posts to seek support for the Government of the Republic of China and Chinese candidacies in the international arena, both within and outside the UN system.
There are cases in the UN and in other organizations in which the voting situation on a Chinese representation resolution or an election affecting China is so close that one vote, or even an abstention or a blank ballot, may make the difference between success or failure or may prevent the development of a prolonged deadlock. For example, election forecasts had indicated a very close vote at the Twelfth General Assembly in the case of: (1) China for reelection to ECOSOC, and (2) Judge V.K. Wellington Koo for reelection to the International Court of Justice. As the five permanent members of the Security Council [Page 2] have traditionally been represented in both of these UN organs, success of the Chinese candidacies was of direct importance in maintaining China’s international status.
As another example, it is clear from the votes cast that, with a secret ballot and an understanding that in the opinion of the United States a particular vote is crucial, states which are publicly known to have a position of non-support for the Government of the Republic of China have, in fact, supported it. China thus obtained 61 votes (out of 82) in the election on September 18, 1957, for one of the Vice Presidencies of the Twelfth General Assembly. A vote of this size can be explained only by assuming that several states who usually do not support the GRC, did so in this particular instance. It would seem inescapable that some of the Scandinavian countries must have been included in this group.
Approaches in the past, even to Norway and Sweden, have been of demonstrated usefulness. Even though they may not have resulted in promises of support, they have in several cases led to commitments to “abstain” or cast blank ballots. In a tight situation, an abstention or an “accidental absence” on the part of a delegate can be most helpful in cases in which positive support cannot be given. It was reported, for example, that Sweden would abstain on China’s reelection to ECOSOC and that Norway, while most likely unable to support Judge Koo for reelection to the ICJ, might cast a blank ballot were a protracted deadlock to develop.
In most cases it is possible to find a basis for asking support which does not directly involve the issue of recognition. Thus, in asking support for the Chinese candidacies for ECOSOC and the ICJ, the Department could stress Europe’s interest in maintaining representation of the five permanent members of the Security Council on UN organs generally, and on these two particularly.
In some cases a new aspect of the Chinese representation problem may be involved. A recent case in point was provided by the International Red Cross Conference at New Delhi (October 28 to November 7, 1957). There the issue was an offensively addressed invitation to the Republic of China (which was called the “Republic of Formosa”), while invitations to the Chinese Communists and other Communist regimes had been addressed by the titles chosen by those regimes. When the matter was discussed with the Swedish Ambassador in Washington, it was pointed out to him that the situation involved not recognition, but a matter of international usage and propriety. He responded that the United States position appeared perfectly reasonable to him and that he would recommend to his Government that it support our position. At New Delhi, after the Conference adopted, by a vote of 62 in favor, 44 against, with 16 absentions, the United States resolution that “all parties invited to attend the Conference be addressed [Page 3] according to their own official titles”, the representative of the Government of the Republic of China took his seat. An attempt, on a point of order, to prevent the seating of the Chinese representative was denied by the Acting Chairman of the Conference and his ruling was upheld by a vote of 51 in favor, 3 against, with 18 abstentions.
The Department hopes that addressee posts will find the above information helpful when discussing this question with officials of the Government to which accredited, as well as with friendly diplomatic colleagues.
The Department also believes that it is desirable that our Embassies in friendly countries, regardless of the attitude of the country concerned toward the Republic of China, keep the Foreign Offices informed of our thinking on the China situation through discussions from time to time. Our policy with respect to China has a direct bearing on the security interests of the countries of the Free World. Speeches by the Secretary of State and other high officials provide a basis for such discussions and should be utilized as occasion offers.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/1–258. Confidential. Drafted by Bacon and Bock on December 19; cleared by CA, EUR/BNA, and Ludlow; and initialed for the Acting Secretary by Walmsley. Sent to 29 missions in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa; and repeated to Taipei and USUN.↩
- Regarding this meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. iv, pp. 608–641.↩