Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

55. Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

Saigon, February 16, 1959.

Dear Walter: We are working up a rather extensive report on the Anderson Committee² visit to Viet-Nam which will be sent by despatch.³ I thought it might be worthwhile, however, for you and anybody else who you might think would be interested, to give you a personalized account of certain aspects of the visit, particularly the rather long informal talks I had with Mr. Anderson and General Collins, who were my houseguests.

In general, Mr. Anderson and General Collins expressed appreciation of the way we handled the visit, our briefings, and the not too loaded schedule we laid out for them. They both seemed to be impressed by their visit to the Ban Me Thuot area, the obvious progress shown in the two resettlement villages we visited, the efforts being made at the nursery run by the International Voluntary Services group, where these young men are testing various types of new crops which they hope can be grown extensively in the High Plateau. They were also impressed by the road to the coast (Route 21) from Ban Me Thuot to Nha Trang, being built by Johnson, Drake and Pipers.

On the military side they both were impressed by what little they saw in the Saigon area and General Collins, who at first questioned whether it would be worthwhile for him to visit these military installations, told me that he was not only pleased that he had made the visit, but was very much impressed by what he saw.

The principal concern of Mr. Anderson, which he expressed on many occasions, was the need to scrutinize all aid very carefully in view of the twelve billion dollar U.S. deficit predicted for FY’59. He stated that many taxpayers are showing more and more concern at continued high taxes, are questioning the efficacy of our aid, and wondering whether the United States economy can continue for long to stand the heavy drains upon it for military costs at home, as well as abroad, and the comparative high costs of economic aid. Based partly on questions raised by General Collins, Mr. Anderson questioned seriously whether we should maintain a force level of 150,000 in Viet-Nam. We had made it clear in our briefings that for the foreseeable future Viet-Nam could not be economically independent if it remained necessary to maintain such a high force level. In my last talk with Mr. Anderson the night before his departure, he stated that his preliminary thinking led him to believe that military aid to Viet-Nam should be substantially cut in FY ‘60. I argued that from a psychological-United States interest point of view, I felt that any serious cut in FY’60 would have very adverse effects for the position of the United States, not only in Viet-Nam but in all Southeast Asia. I pointed out that with the Cambodian recognition of Communist China and the Viet Cong incursions into Laos, the GVN now had a more serious problem in preventing infiltration and subversion along its long western frontier. We had pointed out in the discussions previously that we had received final concurrence from Washington only a few weeks ago to proceed with the project to build up the Civil Guard into an effective internal security force. I therefore argued that we should be granted at least one year’s time to make the Civil Guard a more effective organization before we cut force levels. I also pointed out that we had already told the GVN in categoric terms that we would expect them to pay a considerably larger share for military expenses in FY ‘60 than in the past. I re-emphasized that one of the reasons why we had pled so seriously for assistance to the Civil Guard is that once it is effectively organized, we could then, without too much danger to the United States position in Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia, reduce the military force levels. General Collins agreed basically with my arguments along these lines. Nevertheless, Mr. Anderson argued if we put off a serious reduction in military aid in FY ‘60, experience showed that we would probably find other “valid” reasons why we should not reduce military aid in FY ‘61. I admitted that there is often a tendency to operate along those lines, but reiterated that we definitely planned to cut military aid as soon as the Civil Guard became a more effective organization, and reassured him that we would insist that the GVN share a greater burden of the military expenses. I feel, however, that my arguments did not convince Mr. Anderson, since he kept referring to the need to cut down the twelve billion dollar United States deficit.

On the general political situation, Mr. Anderson agreed that, given the circumstances in Viet-Nam, with the high rate of illiteracy, little or no experience in government and no previous democratic traditions, that we could not expect the GVN to put into practice overnight all the basic tenets of democracy as we see them. He seemed to be impressed with the sincerity and dedication of Diem, whom he saw on three occasions—once for a two and one-half hour “briefing” of the entire group by Diem, the second time at a private talk he had with Diem before dinner at the Palace, and finally at a discussion which took place after the dinner. Mr. Anderson reported to me that the private talk before dinner went over a good part of the ground covered earlier that afternoon, but Diem made a particular point of emphasizing how slow ICA/USOM procedures are, how these tend to be too inflexible, and their unsuitability to the urgent needs of newly-developing countries. This is an old complaint of Diem’s—too many surveys to check on previous surveys, etc., which he claims, with considerable reason, slows down the attainment of economic independence. The talk with Diem after dinner was more or less in a philosophical vein with Mr. Anderson and Diem agreeing on the need for future cooperation and understanding among newly-developing countries in this part of the world and the necessity for defining and working on common problems, as well as following common ideals, rather than dwelling on differences. Mr. Anderson’s thoughts in this matter coincide with those Diem has been expressing for over a year about melding common Asian traditions with Western technical advances.

At Diem’s request General Collins had an hour’s talk with him alone on February 5. General Collins told me that the principal subjects raised were (1) the need to maintain present force levels because of the increased threat of communist infiltration from Cambodia since the latter’s recognition of Communist China, as well as increased communist pressures in general, and (2) Diem’s concern that the Draper Committee might recommend a drastic shift in emphasis in our aid program from basically military, as at present, to considerably more economic aid. Diem has made it clear for as long as I have been here that he prefers the way we support the military budget as compared with the way USOM handles project aid on the economic side. This needs a bit of explanation. In general, after MAAG and the Country Team have scrutinized and reduced the military budget as submitted by the GVN, the money is turned over to the Ministry of Defense for use as planned in the budget with not too much control over expenditure. As you know, the question as to whether MAAG or USOM should try to make further audits of military expenditures has never been resolved in Washington. Although MAAG is not charged with this duty, MAAG officers do try to run spot checks on payrolls, construction projects, etc., which gives a fairly good but not complete check. On the other hand, USOM control over its projects and over the commercial import program is very tight under current ICA regulations. USOM has to make many surveys before a project is approved, followed by various end-use checks. As I have indicated above, these rather slow complex “double check” procedures do slow down action and tend to make the whole system somewhat inflexible. In this connection, the President’s brother, Nhu, has said on many occasions that it would be desirable if the GVN were given economic aid in more or less the same way that aid is given for the military budget. In other words, he was inferring, “Give us the money for economic aid and we will know how to spend it best.” For obvious reasons, this cannot be done.

Diem apparently complained of the USOM system to General Collins and, while admitting the GVN could from its own resources contribute more to the military budget and allow the United States to pick up the tab on additional economic projects which the GVN was now planning to pay for, Diem complained that if this were done, the efficacy of aid in general would be reduced. He therefore asked General Collins to recommend that more or less the same division between military and economic aid be maintained as in the past. I explained the significance of Diem’s request in more detail to General Collins and why in particular Diem did not want any change. Nevertheless, my feeling is, as I explained to the General, that as a lesson in self-discipline, if for no other reason, it would be worthwhile to make the GVN pay more out of their own funds for military expenditures. In the long run, of course, assuming that over-all aid levels next year remain approximately as they are this year, this would not save the United States Government any money since it would be merely changing expenditures from one pot to the other. Nevertheless, I believe it essential that the GVN be forced to become more directly aware of the military burden by having to carry an increasingly greater proportion of their military expenditures out of their own resources. General Collins did not commit himself on this question to me but said he would think it over.

The entire Anderson Committee, including the economist, Mr. Wolf, showed serious concern about a problem which we exposed at some length—the expected shortage of generated counterpart funds, coupled with the increasing foreign exchange holdings of the GVN, which now amount to about $125,000,000. This is a most complex and paradoxical question, which we have pointed out to, and discussed at long length with, all appropriate GVN officials. For convenient reference, I am enclosing a copy of the short paper Arthur Gardiner, the USOM Director here, read to outline this problem.⁴ The matter was discussed again at some length in the second-day meeting with the group. In view of the importance of this question, I have asked Arthur Gardiner to prepare a detailed report on it with recommendations. His report will be sent in shortly by despatch.⁵

I will not go into detail about Diem’s “briefing”, which boiled down to a strong plea to maintain force levels and economic aid at present levels. The official report on the visit will cover this matter in some detail.

It is interesting to report one development which is somewhat unique. For the first time in the almost two years I have been here Diem asked an important visiting American group to set aside time, which had not been planned, in order that the Vice-President and his economic advisors could explain economic developments and future prospects. As you know, Diem has tended to “run the show” completely himself without delegating any authority to his Ministers. In the past with other important visitors he has tried to outline the economic problems himself. I thought it was significant, therefore, that he made it a point to delegate this part of the briefing to the Vice-President, and particularly to Vu van Thai, who acted as spokesman for the Vice-President at that meeting. I hope that this indicates that the President has finally come around to the realization that he has to delegate more authority and depend upon his Ministers to a greater extent.

As I indicated above, General Collins expressed considerable concern about the size of the Vietnamese military forces. Both during the general discussions and in private talks at my house he stated that he was seriously thinking of recommending a complete restudy of our strategic concept in regard to Southeast Asia in order to determine whether it is in basic United States interests to maintain the current force levels in this part of the world. The General talked in terms of reorganizing the GVN military forces into five, instead of seven, active divisions, with an appropriate build-up in reserves, and toning over to the Civil Guard of the internal security responsibilities now resting partially on the Vietnamese military forces. In General Collins’ opinion, if there were an all-out war, it is quite probable that there would be little, if any, action in Southeast Asia, and if there were any action in this area, a Vietnamese military force of 150,000 would have little or no effect on the outcome of a global war. On the other hand, if there were a brush-fire war, well-trained armies in friendly Southeast Asian countries would be of some help, provided we were prepared to come in almost immediately to assist them in their defensive efforts. Nevertheless, he questioned whether it was necessary to have such a highly trained, highly organized force in Viet-Nam. He questioned, for instance, whether it is necessary to organize the ground force into three corps, as now planned, and whether it is essential to have a field headquarters command in a small country like Viet-Nam. General Collins was open-minded about this, but asked many penetrating questions. He, as well as Mr. Anderson, are seriously concerned about the fact that it will be almost impossible for Viet-Nam to become economically independent as long as they have to maintain a force level of 150,000. (Incidentally, Diem mentioned in passing to the group without pressing the point that all his generals urged him to raise all his force level to 170,000.) As I indicated above, General Collins did not agree with Mr. Anderson on a drastic reduction in military aid in FY ‘60, but indicated that he was thinking of recommending a rather drastic reorganization of the armed forces into five active divisions, plus reserves and civil guards as outlined above.

General Collins expressed to me some concern about Diem’s refusal to permit the development of a “loyal opposition”. He pointed out that his instructions when he was here were to do all in his power to bring many varied elements into the government, whether they were in agreement with Diem, or not. I argued that as necessary as it is to have a “loyal opposition”, I frankly did not believe that in a country like Viet-Nam with no democratic traditions, etc., it would be in the interests of the free world to insist upon trying to put into effect all the trimmings of democracy in too much of a hurry. I expressed my conviction that unfortunate experiences in many countries, particularly Laos, show that the people in newly independent countries are not ready for the luxury of full-blown parliamentary government. I pointed out that unfortunately the communists have had extensive experience over many years on how to use the freedoms of democracy to kill it. General Collins somewhat reluctantly accepted most of my arguments.

In general, the Committee was very objective and open-minded, asked sound and penetrating questions, and seemed to be impressed with the progress Viet-Nam has made considering the initial difficulties and the short period of time since independence. My own feeling is that they will make a very objective report. In all probability they will recommend an over-all reduction in aid, particularly military aid, and recommend that the GVN be compelled to spend a considerable amount of their foreign exchange for military and economic purposes and, if necessary, go in for some borrowing or deficit financing, as well as devalue the currency. Many of these are valid comments but if we are instructed to do all of them in too much of a hurry, basic United States objectives and interests will not be served. There are too many psychological factors involved to treat matters in this part of the world in a purely American, business-like way. We have made considerable progress here and will continue to, but in my estimation it must be on a “little steps for little feet” basis. The steps they are taking here are approaching the “teen-age stride” but it will be some time before they will have developed the experience and know-how to walk as grown-ups by themselves.

Sincerely yours,

P.S. If the Committee discusses its recommendations with you upon their return, it would be helpful to us if you could let us know whether or not our “hunches” on what the Committee recommends are fairly accurate. I realize that the Committee is only making recommendations, some of which may be accepted and others not, but because of the psychological factors involved it would be helpful if we could have some indications of their basic thinking to permit us to discreetly lay the groundwork on any anticipated changes in the procedures and/or levels.

Elbridge Durbrow⁶

1. Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 61 D 6, Durbrow. Secret; Official–Informal; Limit Distribution.
2. The Anderson Subcommittee of the Draper Committee was in Vietnam, February 3–6, for discussions with the Country Team and Vietnamese officials including President Diem. The subcommittee was headed by Dillon Anderson, and its members included General J. Lawton Collins, Colonel Edward Lansdale, and Charles Wolf, Jr. The subcommittee operated under the authority of the Draper Committee, appointed by Eisenhower on November 24, 1958, to undertake a “completely independent, objective, and non-partisan analysis” of the military assistance aspects of the U.S. Mutual Security Program. In addition to William H. Draper, full committee members were Dillon Anderson, General Alfred M. Gruenther, Marx Leva, John J. McCloy, George C. McGhee, Joseph T. McNarney, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, James S. Webb, and Joseph M. Dodge. The President specifically charged the committee with evaluating the future of military assistance, considering the impact of the programs on the economic betterment and growth of the “free world,” appraising the relative emphasis on economic and military programs in less developed areas, and assessing the impact of present and anticipated weapons on mutual security programs. (Letter from Eisenhower to Draper, November 24, 1958; Department of State Bulletin, December 15, 1958, p. 954)
3. Despatch 268 from Saigon, February 17. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5–MSP/2–1759)
4. Attached, but not printed.
5. Despatch 299 from Saigon, March 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5–MSP/3–1659)
6. Printed from a copy which bears this typed signature.