Office of the Historian

54. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Kocher) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1

Washington, February 2, 1959.

SUBJECT

  • U.S. Policy Toward ICC Viet-Nam

Problem:

Should we adopt a policy of trying to eliminate the obstacle imposed by ICC to our military program operations in Viet-Nam? If so, how should we proceed to achieve this end?

Discussion:

In reply to the Department’s cable (Tab A2) expressing the tentative view that the termination of ICC Viet-Nam might be a desirable U.S. objective, Embassy Saigon and CINCPAC PolAd have agreed this would be desirable (Tab B3). Saigon has pointed out this would eliminate the TERM problem, remove the MAAG ceiling, enable the introduction of jets into Viet-Nam and facilitate the strengthening of the Lao Army.

Embassy London has learned that the British Government is trying to obtain agreement on reduction of the ICC to three teams, but is opposed (at least at the working level) to termination of the ICC or any change in its terms of reference. The probable position of [Page 137] other interested governments, according to estimates furnished by our posts, would be as follows:

1.
Paris—French would probably also support reduction of ICC, but core should remain to supervise political aspects of Geneva Accords.
2.
Ottawa—Canadians would probably be amenable to termination, but uncertain whether they would take any initiative to that end.
3.
New Delhi—Indians would be willing to reduce in size, but opposed to termination.
4.
Saigon—Vietnamese position uncertain and should be explored.

It appears that the next step in determining our policy toward the future of the ICC should be consultation with the GVN since any actions we might take on this matter should be consonant with GVN views. We also believe it important to consult the GVN before word reaches it that we have discussed this question in the tripartite talks with the British and French.

We believe that, in our approach to the GVN, we should express a preference for seeing ICC Viet-Nam terminated, but, in view of the recognized difficulty of obtaining the agreement thereto of all governments concerned, the two alternatives suggested by Embassy Saigon could be explored:

1.
Agreement of appropriate governments to reduction in size of ICC and limitation of its functions to a) border incidents between North and South Viet-Nam and b) periodic reports to Geneva Co-Chairmen on whether conditions favorable for elections to re-unite Viet-Nam.
2.
Agreement of appropriate governments to reduction in size of ICC and subsequent unilateral declaration by GVN that it would no longer consider Geneva Accord clauses on military personnel and matériel as applicable.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached cable to Saigon (Tab C4) requesting an approach to the GVN along the lines indicated above.

Approve:5

  1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, ICC Vietnam. Secret. Drafted by Mendenhall with clearances from SEA, FE, L/FE, BNA, WE, and SOA.↩
  2. Reference to telegram 1062 to Saigon, January 16. (Ibid., 751G.00/12–2958)↩
  3. Apparent reference to telegram 1519 from Saigon, January 28. (Ibid., 751G.00/1–2859)↩
  4. Reference to telegram 1211 to Saigon, February 3, not attached. (Ibid., 751G.00/1–2859)↩
  5. A check on the source text indicates that this memorandum was approved.↩