73. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Hemmendinger) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1
Washington, April 19,
1956.
SUBJECT
- United States Ground Forces and Long-Term Base Rights in Japan
- 1.
- Attached for your information are the minutes of a recent Embassy–FEC Consultative Group meeting2 at which General [Page 172] Lemnitzer discussed United States Ground Forces in the FEC and Mr. Parsons commented on long-term United States base rights in Japan.
- 2.
- General Lemnitzer stated that by June 30, 1956, United States Ground Forces in Japan will be reduced to one division (the 1st Cavalry Division), understrength at about 10,000, together with logistical support forces of about 33,000. Two full strength divisions will be stationed in Korea and approximately 7,000 Army combat support and service troops will be stationed in Okinawa, together with elements of the 3rd Marine Division which will assume the security mission in Okinawa. Army forces in the FEC after June 30, 1956 will thus number 95,000: 55,000 combat and combat support troops and 40,000 service troops. Very little change is contemplated for the Air Force and Navy in the FEC and it is expected that the strength of each of the three Services in the Far East as of June 30, 1956 will remain at about that level for some time.
- 3.
- The large number of service troops in Japan operate a vital logistical base which supports all United States forces in Japan, Okinawa and Korea as well as the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the 21 ROK divisions. This logistical base furthermore provides MDAP support to Chinese Nationalist Forces and other MDAP programs in Southeast Asia. Okinawa cannot replace the logistical base in Japan since it lacks the vital industrial base and the tremendous depots existing in Japan. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces do not have their own logistical facilities, nor will they be provided under the Six-Year Plan, and could only operate for about a week in an emergency without the logistical base provided by United States forces.
- 4.
- In summary, General Lemnitzer stressed his opinion that by June 30, 1956, United States ground forces in Japan will be cut to an irreducible minimum and no further reduction can be made in these forces until it is decided to withdraw all United Stated armed forces from Japan. Any further reduction of Army forces will require reducing the support provided the other United States Services in the Far East and making comparable reductions in the vital logistical base which serves and supports many United States and other Free World Forces in the Far East.
- 5.
- In his discussions of long-term United States base rights in Japan, Mr. Parsons pointed out a number of Japanese attitudes that must be taken into account: Unlike the United Kingdom, for example, the Japanese people are not wholly convinced that in any world crisis their basic interests are with the United States; the Japanese are anxious to be independent—of the United States and everybody else; the Japanese tend to look upon present United States base rights as being solely for the defense of Japan; they are disposed to equate the buildup of Japanese forces with the reduction of United States forces; and the [Page 173] force goals in the Six Year Plan, in Japanese eyes at least and despite their inadequacies, have been developed with the idea that United States forces might be removed after these goals are accomplished.
- 6.
- The Japanese are not formally allied with the United States except by the terms of the Security Treaty, which the Japanese consider to be transitional in nature and a pact which they could not negotiate with complete freedom at the time it was signed. The question of long-term base rights seems to be completely unsettled and pressure to force us out may build up. Under these circumstances, although not a matter for immediate action, it is important to face two problems: (1) What the long-term United States base requirements are; and (2) by what strategy they can be secured.
- 7.
- In an ensuing discussion, General Rogers agreed that the Embassy and FEC should consult on this matter and attempt to reach a course of future action. It was agreed that the question of long-term base rights must be included in any future mutual defense treaty negotiations to replace the present Security Treaty. Mr. Parsons remarked that in any discussions of this problem, the Embassy would like to concentrate on the question of Japanese attitudes and steps that might be taken to improve such attitudes.