Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

57. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Intelligence (Armstrong) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, October 10, 1955.

SUBJECT

• NIE 41–55: Probable Developments in Japan Over the Next Decade²

On September 27, 1955, the Intelligence Advisory Committee approved an estimate on probable developments in Japan over the next decade. The principal conclusions are as follows:

Japan is unlikely within the next ten years to develop sufficient power and prestige to play a major role as a leader or defender of the non-Communist Far East. Given favorable international circumstances, however, it should make gradual progress in overcoming its serious political and economic problems and become a valuable adjunct of free world power in the Far East.

Because of its security and economic needs Japan will remain basically aligned with the US. But in its quest for a more independent position it will become more assertive towards the US and will seek to improve its relations with the Communist bloc and with the countries of free Asia.

The Japanese must expand their economy considerably to sustain a large and growing population at tolerable levels of consumption and employment. The requisite export expansion will depend importantly on factors beyond Japan’s control such as the level of world trade, the reduction of trade barriers, and the rate of economic growth in underdeveloped areas. Because of its imbalance in dollar trade Japan will need US assistance for at least the next few years.

Japan will continue to rely on the US for strategic security but will seek an equal voice in arrangements for the defense of Japan and is unlikely over the long term to agree to the continuation in Japan of bases under exclusive US control. It will strengthen its own defense forces, with emphasis on the air force and navy, but its over-all effort will be limited.

The conservatives will probably remain in office during the next decade except possibly for brief interludes of Socialist control. However, they will probably not provide strong leadership for some time to come.

Prolonged economic distress would weaken moderate political forces, encourage extremist parties of both right and left, and probably lead eventually to an ultra-nationalist resurgence. In the event of an imminent threat of general war, Japan might attempt to assume a neutral position in an effort to avoid nuclear destruction.

PA

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.00/10–1055. Secret. Sent through S/S.
2. Dated September 27, not printed. According to a note on the cover sheet, this NIE was prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff, and was concurred in by members of the IAC, with the exception of the representatives of the AEC and the FBI, who abstained on the ground that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. (Ibid., INR–NIE Files)