Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

34. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan¹

Washington, July 1, 1955—6:04 p.m.

6. Your 3385.² Similar questions raised by Japanese Embassy here. Following our views Malik statement and other Soviet contentions London³ for communication Japanese Government:

1. Habomais and Shikotan are geographically, historically and legally integral part Hokkaido and not part Kuriles.

2. Yalta Agreement was statement common purpose arrived at by heads three Great Powers. It not meant be self-executing or final determination purposes expressed therein. Japan in any case not bound by terms Yalta Agreement since not party thereto and Yalta Agreement not mentioned Potsdam Proclamation which Japan accepted. Yalta Agreement could not have been determination referred to para 8 Potsdam Proclamation since it was prior Potsdam Proclamation in point time conclusion.

3. Potsdam Proclamation clearly leaves question Japanese territorial determination for subsequent consideration Parties Proclamation. U.S.S.R. cannot unilaterally make this determination.

4. SCAP General Order No. 1⁴ merely states Japanese troops Karafuto and Kuriles should surrender to Commander Soviet Forces Far East and does not and was not intended touch upon final disposition these islands.

5. SCAPIN 677⁵ was operational directive to Japanese Government tentative in character and specifically states para 6 that it not Allied policy determination of Japanese territory.

6. Under terms San Francisco Peace Treaty Japan relinquished title Kuriles and South Sakhalin but treaty did not transfer these islands to another State. U.S.S.R. recognized treaty as ratified [but?] did not accomplish this since Gromyko proposed amendment Article 2 by which Japan would recognize Soviet sovereignty South Sakhalin and Kuriles. Furthermore Treaty provides no country which has not signed Treaty shall derive benefits from Treaty.

7. Ultimate disposition South Sakhalin and Kuriles has not been determined and is matter to be resolved by future international agreement.

US position regarding foregoing given in detail in claim submitted to ICJ in shooting down B–29 off Hokkaido October 1952. Copy claim⁶ sent Tokyo. Japanese Foreign Office concurred this claim.⁷

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.941/6–3055. Confidential. Drafted in NA; cleared in draft with L, L/FE, and EE; and approved by McClurkin. Repeated to London and Moscow.
2. Telegram 3385 was not declassified. (Ibid., 661.941/6–3055)
3. Meetings between Japanese and Soviet officials began in London on June 1. Telegrams from London and Tokyo containing information on the talks are ibid., 661.941.
4. Issued September 2, 1945. For text, see Government Section, Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948 (Washington: Government Printing Office, n.d.), pp. 442–444.
5. Ibid., p. 477.
6. Not found.
7. In telegram 68 from Tokyo, July 8, the Embassy reported that the views set forth in telegram 6 had been presented to Tani on July 4 in the form of an aide-mémoire, and that the Foreign Office had asked permission to quote from it in a possible public statement. (Department of State, Central Files, 661.941/7–855) In reply, the Department stated in telegram 55 to Tokyo, July 9, that the contents, if used publicly, should not be attributed to the United States. “We are concerned Japanese make and support their own case without possibility shifting on us failure negotiations to U.S. ‘Interface’ in talks.” The United States was, however, prepared to indicate support of a Japanese public position based on the substance of the aide-mémoire. (Ibid.)