31. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)1

SUBJECT

  • Japan–USSR Relations

Discussion:

1.
Japan and the USSR will probably begin talks soon for the restoration of diplomatic relations. I believe the United States should seek to ensure that United States interests are in no way prejudiced, to help Japan to get as much as possible out of the Soviet Union, and to avoid direct involvement or criticism for interference.
2.
Soviet and Japanese Objectives. Soviet broad objectives are to weaken Japan’s alliance with the United States, to establish a mission and possibly consular offices in Japan, and to get confirmation of their territorial position in the Kuriles and South Sakhalin. Japan’s objectives are to relax tensions with the Soviet Union, to obtain return of the Habomais and Shikotan and possibly part of the Kuriles, and to develop commercial and fishing relations.
3.
United States Estimate. Full settlement of all outstanding problems, especially territorial, between Japan and the Soviet Union will be difficult. Japan, however, is eager to normalize relations with the USSR; the Hatoyama Government is committed to this policy and must appear to make progress toward its realization or risk loss of support to leftist elements. Japan may press for a Soviet declaration of termination of war before substantive talks start. The Soviet Union appears to be under no pressure to reach an early agreement or to terminate the state of war and will probably rely on Japanese internal pressures in order to obtain concessions.
4.
United States Role. The United States is capable of influencing Japan’s position, but not that of the USSR. In general we should refrain from public statements on the negotiations. Where our interests are directly affected, as by a possible conflict with the San Francisco Treaty, we should make our views known to the Japanese and Soviet Governments. In other matters we should be prepared to make our views known to the Japanese Government on its request. It will also be [Page 66] to our advantage to exploit [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] serious differences between Japan and the USSR as showing Soviet intransigence.
5.

Substantive Issues:

(a)

Territory. Japan wants the Habomai and Shikotan Islands on the theory they are not part of the Kuriles. It is unlikely the Soviets will agree to this. If they should agree they may resort to some device giving them control for an indefinite period, perhaps on a theory comparable to our control over the Ryukyus and Bonins. The Japanese also would like to assert control over all or part of the Kurile Islands, probably on the theory that their renunciation of these islands in the San Francisco Treaty does not give any benefits to the Soviet Union, which did not sign the treaty, and that Japan should not be required to give up territories it did not acquire by greed or violence, the test adopted in the Cairo Declaration. Japan will probably also claim that the words “Kurile Islands” in the Peace Treaty refer only to the “northern Kurile Islands” and do not include the two southern islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu, which historically were never under Russian sovereignty.

United States Position. We should continue to support Japan’s claim to the Habomais and Shikotan on the theory that they are not part of the Kuriles and remain part of Japan. It is our view that under the San Francisco Treaty, Japan renounced all claim to the Kuriles and South Sakhalin and that disposition of these territories is pending. The Soviet Union has attempted formally to annex them. There are strong political reasons for encourgaging Japan’s claim to at least part of the Kuriles: the Kuriles are strategically important to the free world; Japan and the Soviet Union are the only two logical contenders for the Kuriles although some form of international control is theoretically possible; continued inaction on the part of Japan and the other free nations may constitute tacit recognition of the Soviet occupation. There are also reasons why we should not seek to change the status quo: any United States action supporting Japan’s claim to the Kuriles might appear to reflect on our position under the San Francisco Treaty in the Ryukyus and might affect the status of Formosa, which Japan also renounced under the treaty; encouragement of Japanese irredentism in the north might also encourage it in the south; the hostile presence of the Soviet Union on Japan’s northern border will serve as a constant irritant in their relations. On balance, however, it would appear desirable that as a minimum we offer no objection to efforts on the part of Japan to get all or part of the Kuriles, either as part of a deal whereby Japan might recognize a valid Soviet claim to South Sakhalin (along the lines of the Japan–Russia treaty of exchange of 1875) or even on the basis of a Soviet recognition of Japan’s residual sovereignty over all or part of the Kuriles, comparable to our position in the Ryukyus and the Bonins. We should also support any proposal by Japan to refer territorial issues to the International Court of Justice.

(b)

Red China. It is possible that the Soviets have an understanding with Red China by which, after the Soviet Union and Japan have reached agreement, they will press for Japan’s recognition of Red China and also for Japan’s agreement to negotiate a treaty with Red China. The Soviets may also propose some form of the “five principles” for adoption by themselves and Japan. Although Japan is eager to expand trade with Red China, it does not appear willing at this time to undertake negotiations for establishment of political relations.

United States Position. We oppose political relations between Japan and Red China, such as a treaty for opening relations or for non-aggression. We believe Japan will insist that there be no impairment of its relations with Nationalist China, a position we fully support. If appropriate, we should suggest to Japan that it attempt to use any Soviet proposal regarding general principles in such a way as to test Communist sincerity in making these protestations and also to obtain assurances that the Soviets will not interfere in Japan’s domestic affairs or in Japan’s relations with Nationalist China.

(c)

UN Membership. Japan would like an unconditional Soviet guarantee to support Japan’s application for UN entry. The Soviets will probably say they will support Japan’s application as part of a package including other nations friendly to the Soviet Union.

United States Position. We support Japan’s entry into the UN but not as part of a package deal.

(d)

Fishing Rights. Japan wants complete freedom to fish up to three miles off Soviet territory. The Soviets adhere to the twelve-mile limit and may wish to keep the Japanese even farther away.

United States Position. We support the three-mile limit of territorial waters and oppose restrictions on high-seas fishing except under conservation arrangements. We support Japan in its oppostion to Soviet seizures of Japanese fishing vessels beyond the three-mile limit.

(e)

Japanese Detainees in the Soviet Union. Japan wants these returned and the Soviets will probably agree, subject possibly to reservations about “war criminals” and “technicians”.

United States Position. We believe the Soviet Union should return all Japanese nationals it now detains.

(f)

USSR Non-intervention in Japan’s Internal Affairs. The Soviets will probably be willing to give some such assurance.

United States Position. The Soviet Union should not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. Japan should be very careful to curb the activities of Soviet representatives in Japan.

(g)

Consular Offices. The Soviet Union may wish to set up consular offices in Japan in places other than Tokyo.

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United States Position. Japan should agree to the setting up of consular offices on the basis of strict reciprocity.

Recommendation:

That you approve the United States role set forth in paragraph 4 and the United States positions set forth in paragraph 5 above. Since Shunichi Matsumoto, Japan’s chief negotiator, has intimated receptiveness to any suggestions we wish to make, I propose to send a telegram to John Allison giving the substance of the above, after you have acted on this memorandum, and suggesting that in his discretion he discuss the views set forth with Matsumoto.2

  1. Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 56 D 679, Japan. Secret. Drafted in NA on April 19.
  2. The source text gives no indication of action taken. However, in a memorandum to Murphy dated April 23, Sebald referred to Murphy’s previous approval of the paper. (Ibid., 661.941/4-2855) The Department, in telegram 2192 to Tokyo, April 22, repeated the substance of these U.S. positions, together with the suggestion that they be taken up with Matsumoto and other Japanese. (Ibid., 661.941/4-1955)

    In telegram 2877 from Tokyo, May 10, Allison reported he had been unable to arrange an appointment with Matsumoto. “Today Embassy officer mentioned to Kase, Shigemitsu’s special assistant, our interest in exchanging views with Matsumoto. Kase replied Matsumoto currently being briefed in Foreign Office and was appreciative have views in reference telegram which I had passed to Tani.” (Ibid., 661.941/5–1055)

    In telegram 3045 from Tokyo, May 25, Allison reported on a conversation held that afternoon with Tani as follows: “According to Tani, Matsumoto’s movements are so closely watched by press that he felt it inadvisable for him personally to see me and therefore hoped I would accept Tani as a substitute. Tani referred to previous conversations in which I had outlined our thinking on these negotiations and he reiterated that Japanese position was substantially in line with U.S. thinking.” (Ibid., 661.941/5–2555)