249. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sprague)1
Dear Mannie: The High Commissioner of the Ryukyus recently amended certain ordinances and laws to permit the City Assembly of Naha to remove Mayor Kamejiro Senaga from office and to prevent his re-election.2 The Department of State concurred, in haste, in the necessity and the specific plan for the removal of Mr. Senaga. However, we believe that it could have been accomplished with less repercussion had there been time for adequate groundwork, particularly in Japan.
As you know, serious consideration had been given on at least two occasions since December 25, 1956 to the removal of Mr. Senaga.3 Full reflection in these instances had led to the decision by General Lemnitzer, who was Governor of the Ryukyu Islands, that the Naha City Assembly should be given the opportunity to solve the problem in accordance with their own procedures. Reports which we have received from Naha in recent months had indicated that the City Assembly was having great difficulty in accomplishing its objective of removing Mr. Senaga from office. However, there was no indication in any reports that the High Commissioner was prepared to take action in connection with this problem.
As a result of a request from the Army Psychological Warfare group t. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in Tokyo for information about the Okinawa Peoples Party, the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] group learned that General Moore was seriously contemplating action to oust Senaga. Through the courtesy o. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] my office learned of this possibility late in the afternoon on November 21. I sent an immediate inquiry regarding the matter to the Consul General in Naha4 and instructed him to inform General Moore that the Department of State considered it necessary for the action to be reviewed in full by interested Washington agencies before any action was taken. Unfortunately, this message was received in Naha after General Moore’s action had been taken. Again, late in the afternoon of November 22, [less [Page 545] than 1 line of source text not declassified]received another communication which indicated that General Moore intended to take the action at 9:00 p.m., Washington time, on November 22. The report which we received indicated that Mr. Senaga would be declared ineligible for office as a result of having been convicted of a felony.
With only about three hours remaining before the action was reportedly scheduled, I called Assistant Secretary of the Army Roderick. He, too, had heard nothing about the matter, and his inquiry indicated that the entire Pentagon was uninformed. When he talked to General Lemnitzer, the latter immediately talked to General Moore by telephone. General Moore was agreeable to delaying the action for a few hours to allow the Departments of State and Defense to read and to evaluate his message, number HC 0046,5 then being decoded in the Pentagon, which described the action he proposed to take.
On the morning of Saturday, November 23, I considered with members of my staff the action proposed. Though the time permitted for evaluation was short, I concurred on behalf of the Department on the desirability of accepting the proposal. The need for the speed which General Moore was urging involved the fact that the City Assembly in its final week of meeting was proposing to take an action which the experts judged would not stand up under the test of court review. I recommended that if it were possible to work the matter out with the majority members of the City Assembly so that they would not take action on their own, General Moore delay his action two or three days to permit the United States Government to brief Embassy and USIS posts abroad. This would permit them to provide the necessary background information to interested governments and be prepared for the press inquiries which would inevitably follow the announcement of the action in Naha.
Apparently General Moore was unable to arrange this delay, since his action was taken on Sunday, November 24, and the follow-up action by the City Assembly occurred on Monday, November 25. The expected public reaction, particularly in Japan, occurred. For two or three days stories about the United States action in ousting Mayor Senaga crowded all other news off the front pages of all newspapers in Tokyo. The Japanese press uniformly and vigorously protested the method of effecting the removal of Mayor Senaga. It was called undemocratic and “dictatorial” and was pointed out as an example of the lack of practice of democracy by the United States.
[Page 546]The uproar in Japan might have been avoided had we been informed of the High Commissioner’s plans in time to give the Japanese Government advance briefing and to provide preparatory background material to other interested posts. The Consul General in Naha has informed us that, although he was consulted from the early stages regarding the High Commissioner’s thinking on this subject, he was under injunction not to transmit any separate communications to the Department on the subject. The High Commissioner explained his injunction as follows: The decision to obtain the removal of Senaga by changing the local autonomy laws was his to make; consequently, he was not going to consult the Department of Defense beforehand. Accordingly, news of his proposed action should not reach Washington prematurely through other channels.
Succumbing to such a position on the part of the High Commissioner makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the Department of State to carry out its responsibilities under Section 3 of Executive Order 10713 of June 5, 1957, which states: “The Secretary of State shall be responsible for the conduct of relations with foreign countries and international organizations with respect to the Ryukyu Islands.”
We had thought that there was a clear understanding in the Ryukyus of the Consul General’s responsibility for independent reporting to the Department on development in the Ryukyus and of his need to communicate on such matters to the Department of State. Such reporting is essential for the Department of State to assess the impact of developments and proposed actions in the Ryukyus on the foreign policy of the United States and on United States relations with other countries. I believe it is desirable to remind the High Commissioner of the importance of full reporting, particularly by the Consul General, on all developments and proposed actions which could have implications for or bring reactions on United States foreign policy or international relations.
I am enclosing a proposed joint State–Defense message6 which I hope you will concur should be sent to the High Commissioner and the Consul General.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State,FE Files: Lot 59 D 19, Sprague, Mansfield D. Secret. Drafted in NA.↩
- The removal of Senaga took place on November 23, Washington time.↩
- Circular telegram 472, a joint State–USIA message, drafted in FE/P, provided background information to most Asian and Western European posts. (Department of State, Central Files, 794C.00/11–2757) Additional information on the background of the ouster is ibid., 894.51, 794C.00, and 794C.0221 for late 1956 and for 1957.↩
- Telegram 54 to Naha, November 21, not printed. (Ibid., 894C.51/11–2157)↩
- Dated November 22, not printed. (Repeated to Tokyo as DA 933167 from the Department of the Army, November 25; ibid., Tokyo Post Files: Lot 64 F 106, 350 Ryukyus Islands 1957)↩
- Not found attached.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩