Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

21. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State¹

Tokyo, March 25, 1955—6 p.m.

2383. Deptels 1898² and 1899.³ Department efforts in new Japan policy paper to give lower priority to defense capacity and greater emphasis to political and economic stability greatly appreciated. In my discussions with Japanese, I have as much as possible adopted attitude consistent with our recommendations. For this reason I have told Japanese only that we hope for some increase in total defense budget in return for reduction support costs and that we unwilling to bear total burden of increase. I have left indefinite amount of increase in hope that our negotiating position will be sufficiently modified to permit quick agreement without acrimonious discussions.

However problem of avoiding heated and public debate on defense budget complicated by two factors. In first place, until it is possible to obtain defense agreement to new negotiating positions, I feel it is necessary not to wander too far from explicit instructions given me and General Hull. FEC equally concerned adhere to Washington position this matter and we are agreed that it is required to make real effort to present clearly our initial negotiation position as instructed. To certain extent, we have managed to soften impact of these positions on Japanese by indicating that we wish to understand their position and to consider it reasonably. We have, in contrast to Japanese, avoided public statements.

However, Japanese are making it increasingly difficult to hold our fire. That is our second basic problem. When Embassy recommendations made last October, we assumed Japanese would agree to at least token increase in defense budget. Japanese are now down to maximum figure of yen 132.7 billion and there are already inspired press stories mentioning defense budget of yen 1.4 billion and yen 20 billion reduction in yen contribution. Their position is that not only should we finance all of any increase they make but a portion of next year’s costs of existing defense forces. Japanese are forcing us to take this stand not to get large increase but just to maintain budget at last year’s level after 4.5 billion reduction.

I hope Department understands Embassy has not initiated drive for greatly increased Japanese defense effort; on contrary it is Japanese who in press and by handling of provisional budget have initiated campaign for decrease in overall defense effort. Defense budget question is unfortunately not isolated instance of such tactics on part of Japanese. If we bow to such tactics in these defense negotiations, how can we expect to defend and promote US objectives in other matters? Hatoyama government has consistently ignored US interest in handling almost all pending US-Japanese problems such as GARIOA, tariff list, etc., and at same time has made continued concessions to Commie orbit such as latest action on visas to China trade mission (Embassy telegram 2360).⁴ Japanese must understand that we are dissatisfied with current attitude toward relations with US. I believe we must therefore adopt firm attitude once we are certain that our positions are equitable and in US interests. What is involved is not question of hard bargaining tactics but effort to convince Japanese our relations must be two-way street and that they, too, have to make concessions. Question as I understand Hensel realized is whether their performance is to be minimum which administration and Congress may be willing to support.

Japanese are far from unconcerned about US attitude. In fact, many top officials are increasingly worried about “Washington” getting the “wrong idea” (see Embtel 2351).⁵ I think it is about time we plucked this sensitive nerve. A few discreet expressions of anxiety from “highly placed” sources might serve to keep the Japanese worried. If Hatoyama government stops taking for granted our good will, they may do a little more than making an occasional statement about the need for good relations with US.

Allison

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5–MSP/3–2555. Secret; Limit Distribution.
2. Dated March 22, not printed. (Ibid., 794.5–MSP/3–2255)
3. In telegram 1899, March 22, the Department stressed that it did not want the differences between the United States and Japan regarding the Japanese defense budget and level of Japanese support of U.S. forces to receive undue publicity, particularly because “in agreement Embassy, Department in current discussions new Japan policy paper has been stressing priority in time and emphasis for developing political stability and economic strength. Defense capacity comes third in point priority.” (Ibid., 794.5–MSP/3–1955)
4. Dated March 23, not printed. (Ibid., 493.9441/3–2355)
5. Apparent misreference; telegram 2351 does not treat this subject. (Ibid., 103–GSA/3–2355)