205. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State1

408. For Secretary, Robertson and Becker. Ohno discussed informally and confidentially with me method by which “Japanese American Committee on Security” could best implement provision in joint communiqué of June 21, 1957, that: “The Committee will also consult to assure that any action taken under the Security Treaty conforms to the principles of the UN Charter.” He said GOJ is most anxious to reach agreement with US on this matter and publicly announce it before Fujiyama leaves for New York Sept 14. He stressed that in terms of Japanese opinion it tremendously important establish that Committee is real functioning body and that Washington agreements being implemented. He suggested we discuss this in first meeting of Security Committee.

I said before introducing this into Committee I felt it preferable first to have preliminary exchanges of views to properly prepare mutually satisfactory solution. He agreed not to introduce it into Committee at this juncture.

He then said GOJ thinking in terms of an exchange of notes between Embassy and FonOff which would restate pertinent obligations assumed by US and Japan in UN Charter and then state that any hostilities referred to in Article XXIV of Administrative Agreement and all measures taken as result thereof shall be immediately reported to Security Council, etc. As indication of what FonOff had in mind, he gave me informal “piece of paper” (transmitted in immediately following [Page 440] telegram)2 which he said was not official proposal but would convey line of Japanese thinking.

I told Ohno I could not speak for govt but in my personal view exchange of notes seemed appropriate way to deal with problem.

I emphasized precise terms in which notes cast was very important since under our Constitution the Executive Branch could not amend treaties without appropriate Senate action. However if notes reaffirmed existing obligations we had assumed under UN Charter and parallel undertakings in other treaties to report to UN Security Council measures taken to resist aggression, I believe we could find appropriate formula. I said that Executive Branch would probably have to consult privately with Senate leadership and Foreign Relations Committee to explain matter and avoid misunderstanding as to what was contemplated.

I told Ohno I would immediately transmit informal paper he had given me but that if concept approved, precise language would have to be looked at by us very carefully for reasons I had set forth above.

From my talks with you while in Washington, I understood that you believed best way to handle this problem was by exchange of notes as indicated above, which would in effect be restatement of commitments we have already undertaken with Senate approval. If you concur in this approach, I would like to be able to inform Kishi and Fujiyama as soon as possible that:

a.
We agree this matter should be handled by exchange of notes.
b.
We will try to work out arrangements so announcement could be made by Sept 14 but cannot guarantee exact date.
c.
We are examining their paper and will send comments (in form of redraft which I could put before Japanese) just as soon as we can.

Purely as an exercise and without any discussion with Japanese, we are sending in second following telegram3 our own hasty redraft of Japanese paper in form of possible Japanese note to Embassy, to give an idea of what such a note might look like. This draft is only to indicate possible form and not substance since we have simply included substance of Japanese paper with appropriate adaptation to fit form. In US reply to any such Japanese note, the idea would be to include same agreed operative language as in Japanese note.

Passed COMUS Japan and USPOLAD, CINCPAC by other means.

MacArthur
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/8–1257. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
  2. Infra.
  3. Telegram 410 from Tokyo, August 12, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/8–1257)