19. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald)1
SUBJECT
- Draft NSC Paper on Japan
Attached is the new version of the draft NSC paper on Japan,2 incorporating all the staff comments. You can assure Bob Bowie that I accepted nearly all of those made by Bill Leonhart.3
There is one aspect of the paper in particular which I wish to call to your attention. In this paper we take a stand that efforts to develop Japan’s political stability and economic strength should be given priority in both time and emphasis over efforts to build Japan’s military power. This point of view is reflected in a number of ways in the paper. In nearly every case I have stated the position somewhat more strongly than the actual facts justify. Tactically, this gives us room to bargain with Defense in the discussions at the NSC Planning Board, so I hope that if you accept the basic thesis you will agree to let this somewhat over-stated language stand for the present. In this connection, I refer particularly to paragraphs 6(c)4 and 9(b) and (c).5
[Page 30]I particularly want to be sure that you agree that—even in this first submission to the Planning Board—we should take the position stated in paragraph 9(c) with respect to the withdrawal of United States ground forces from Japan. Defense will probably argue, with a good deal of reason, that there is simply no place else in the Far East to station these forces.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/3–1155. Top Secret. Drafted by McClurkin. A marginal note by Sebald reads: “Handed to Mr. Bowie and discussed with him.”↩
- Prepared in NA, March 11; not printed.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 17.↩
- Subparagraph 6(c) stipulated as a U.S. objective: “To maintain United States air and navy bases in Japan.”↩
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Subparagraphs 9(b) and 9(c) read as follows:
“b. Consult with the Japanese Government about the rate of Japan’s defense buildup and the scope of United States military assistance; agree to progressively increasing reductions in the Japanese contribution to United States forces in Japan, provided that the Japanese devote the sums thus released to the development of their defense forces.
“c. Announce the United States intention to commence a phased withdrawal of United States ground forces from Japan, to be completed by December 31, 1957; transfer responsibilities to Japan’s defense forces as rapidly as consistent with United States security interests.”
The language of subparagraphs 9(b) and 9(c) continued unchanged, although renumbered as paragraphs 56 and 57, in a March 14 draft. (Department of State, Central Files, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Japan, U.S. Policy Toward,NSC 5516 and 5516/1) A memorandum from Lay to the Planning Board, March 21, enclosing a new draft, indicated that the March 14 draft had by then been discussed in the Planning Board. (Ibid.) The March 21 draft revealed conflict among the Departments of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the language quoted above and on other military sections, a conflict more clearly delineated in a draft of March 24. Regarding the March 24 draft, see infra.
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