168. Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting Between the Secretary of State and the President’s Special Consultant (Nash), Washington, June 5, 19571
At the outset of the meeting Mr. Dulles said that he felt we were at the point of having to make a “Big Bet” with respect to “putting our money on” Mr. Kishi for the leadership in Japan. He asked me to give him my views, as a result of my recent visit in Japan,2 as to whether or not the “bet” was a “good one.”
I told the Secretary that on the basis of the information I had received from Ambassador MacArthur and his Staff in Tokyo, I had the impression that Mr. Kishi was not only the “best bet”, but the “only bet” we had in Japan for the foreseeable future, and therefore we should make the “real pitch” to line him up on our side.
I went on to discuss the so-called doctrine or principle of mutuality between the United States and Japan. I suggested to the Secretary that during the forthcoming Kishi talks in Washington it might be desirable for the Secertary to enunciate the principles he laid down in Berlin in February 1954, concerning the status of United States forces abroad during a time short of hot war. In this connection, I suggested that Mr. Kishi was very much in need of a down-to-earth briefing on what Japan as a vacuum, in terms of security protection, might mean with respect to the Soviet threat. I said I was very much impressed [Page 340] with the emphasis given by Ambassador MacArthur and his Staff to the “Alice-in-Wonderland Dream World” frame of mind in which the Japanese were now existing with respect to their position under the Soviet threat. In this connection, I suggested that it would be highly desirable to have the ablest person on our side give Mr. Kishi the “ungarbled word.” Secretary Dulles asked me for a suggestion as to whom this individual might be and I replied that in my view, Admiral Radford was the logical man. Secretary Dulles left it to me and Mr. Reinhardt3 to work out arrangements for me to ascertain whether or not Admiral Radford would be available and willing to take on the job.
I spoke of the necessity of impressing Mr. Kishi with the exposed position which Japan would occupy if United States forces were to be entirely withdrawn at this time, leaving Japan a complete vacuum as far as military security were concerned. I spoke further of the necessity of indoctrinating Mr. Kishi on the strategic position which Japan should occupy as a world power, and how to be a world power Japan had to develop for herself a proper security force, noting that even such neutral countries as Switzerland and Sweden have very well developed security forces. I noted that Japan had excellent potential in the way of an industrial backup (ship building, air frame, electronics production) for a substantial Japanese Defense Force. I stressed the importance that had been laid in my discussions with our political and military people in Japan on the present gap between the Japanese Military and the Japanese Civilian leaders, and the tendency of shoving the activities of the former “under the rug.” I said I felt Mr. Kishi should be impressed with the principle of civilian control, which necessarily involves civilian responsibilities. I stressed to the Secretary the emphasis put on this point by General Lemnitzer and his assistants, and the handicap our military were under in Japan, making comparatively slow progress with the Japanese military because the latter were lacking the necessary backup and support from their own civilian political leaders.
Related to the foregoing, I outlined the relationship of the withdrawal of United States forces to the building up of Japanese forces. I reiterated the necessity of indoctrinating not only Mr. Kishi, but other Japanese civilian and military leaders on the strategic situation and the relation of modern weaponry thereto. I stated, as a personal point of view, that there should be no indication from the United States side of the level of Japanese defense forces or the composition thereof. I stated further that there should be no insistence, as there has been in the past, on the amendment of the Japanese Constitution to permit the buildup of their defense forces. I said I felt we should leave the constitutional [Page 341] question to them to work out as they might deem best, and we would offer whatever advice they might desire with respect to the most appropriate buildup of their forces which we think would be useful for them to have to play the role they have ahead of them. I noted the impression that the British White Paper4 seemed to have had a considerable influence on their thinking in this regard.
With respect to phasing out of United States forces from Japan, I told the Secretary that General Lemnitzer had expressed the view that the Japanese would be happy for us to continue to maintain the bases and facilities we have in Japan because of the employment and dollar income derived therefrom. I expressed some concern that the ground force facilities being turned back to Japan were so fully absorbed in the civilian economy that they would have no future military utility for the Japan Defense Force. I compared the policy of the Air Force, as outlined to me by General Todd in Honolulu, under which the Air Force is turning over air base facilities to the Japanese as they are able to take them over and utilize them for Japan Air Force purposes.
With respect to Mr. Kishi’s intention of reviewing, in the course of his Washington talks, the status of the current security agreement with Japan, I expressed the view to the Secretary, that, as I saw it, it would be exceedingly difficult to work out any piecemeal adjustment of the agreement under present circumstances, recognizing that the agreement, as presently worded, is quite one sided. I suggested that the expected proposal Mr. Kishi will make to limit the agreement to a five year duration could be better met by having his Government work out with us a “Mutual Defense Agreement” which would involve no particular deadline, and which could, in all probability, be accomplished in much less than the five year period which he seems to be preoccupied with. I said I felt there was great danger in tackling the present security agreement on a piecemeal basis. In addition, I noted that the Japanese would probably raise not only the termination question, but also such points as the necessity of consultation for the use of bases in Japan for operation outside of Japan, a ban on atomic weapons, etc., not to mention the difficulty of going to the U.S. Senate at this time for the ratification of amendments while furor is rife over the Girard case.
I moved on to the question of jurisdiction over U.S. forces in Japan and suggested that if the turnover of Girard to the Japanese is finally accomplished, the good will engendered thereby in Japan, might well be utilized by asking the Japanese to agree to present an out-on-the-table formula like the NATO-Netherlands agreement. I [Page 342] said this would help us greatly in the Philippines and could further the uniformity of our agreements with respect to jurisdiction for U.S. forces abroad.
I told the Secretary I had flown over the Bonins and had landed at Iwo Jima and I told him that the issue of the return of the Bonin islanders was one I felt could be worked out, given a little time, but it would not be desirable (as I saw it) to push this issue in terms of the Kishi visit. Okinawa, I felt, had to remain in the United States’ hands in its present status for an indefinite term and I felt Mr. Kishi should be so advised.
Finally, with respect to the current survey, I expressed the hope that the Secretary, if queried in any further press conferences, would emphasize that the survey is not being carried on by any outside group, but by the best informed people at State and Defense. It is a continuing project and it will require some time before the survey can be completed. Accordingly, it would be premature to draw inferences therefrom at this time with respect to the outcome of the study.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.9411/6–557. Secret. Drafted by Nash.↩
- Nash was in Japan in May as part of a tour of several Asian countries.↩
- G. Frederick Reinhardt, Counselor of the Department of State since March 17, 1957.↩
- Reference is to the British defense program announced April 4, 1957.↩