Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

16. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)¹

Washington, March 4, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Embassy Tokyo’s Appraisal of Japanese Election Results

I have summarized for your information Tokyo’s telegram No. 2142 of March 3, 1955, copy attached,² giving a preliminary appraisal of the February 27 elections in Japan.

1. General Policies. The new Hatoyama Cabinet will be a minority government requiring Liberal or Socialist support. It will postpone hard decisions and make palatable those measures it is forced to take. Internally Hatoyama’s Democratic Party suffers from dissensions accentuated by the expected brevity of his political life. Hatoyama is emotional, naive in international affairs, and loves public acclaim. He has, however, some extremely able and politically responsible advisers who, with the business and financial leaders they represent, will have a restraining effect. Unlike Yoshida he is not regarded as “pro-American” or “reactionary.” He is potentially capable of carrying through an “unpopular” but necessary program though it is doubtful that he will.

2. East-West Relations. Continued emphasis on improved relations with the Communist orbit can be expected along with contentions that close relations with the United States will not be affected thereby. Initially the Foreign Office will have considerable latitude to pursue hard bargaining tactics with the Russians in New York, but may be undercut by Hatoyama’s direct dealings in Tokyo. The Government will increase contacts with Communist China, even to the extent of permitting the establishment of an unofficial trade mission in Tokyo, but will not establish full diplomatic relations.

There will be little inclination to increase political ties with the free world, particularly in efforts to combat Communism in Asia.

3. Rearmament. There will be no increase in the defense budget out of Japan’s pocket and any increase will be through reduction of Japan’s contribution to the support of United States forces. Japan’s policy will be justified on the basis of the need for increased appropriations for social livelihood measures and the lack of a firm Diet majority. Hatoyama’s advocacy of increased defense efforts will be for the purpose of hastening United States troop withdrawals. The United States will be expected to pay a high price for any added defense efforts by Japan.

4. Economic Policies. In its pre-election tenure of office Hatoyama’s Government showed an increasingly independent and uncooperative attitude evident in a number of ways. Policies likely to be continued as a result of electoral popularity are expansion of trade with Communist China, expansion of social welfare measures, reduction of taxes and defense expenditures. The new Government will assume that the United States’ need for Japan is overriding.

5. Conclusions. The new Government will trade on Japan’s “indispensability” to the United States to extract maximum concessions for the minimum cooperation. Solution of problems depends on our convincing Japan that its own self-interest requires a change in its basic attitude. In this we can profit by the desire of many leading personalities to consult more frankly and more frequently than was the case with the Yoshida Government.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.00/3–455. Secret.
2. Not printed. (Ibid., 794.00/3–355)
3. During a meeting of the National Security Council on March 3, Allen Dulles gave a review of developments affecting U.S. security. Concerning Japan, the memorandum of discussion reads as follows: “Mr. Dulles then commented that the recently concluded election had produced results almost precisely as had been predicted beforehand. He noted the fact that the two Socialist groups now have over one-third of the seats in the Diet, which would make more difficult the process of revising the Constitution in order to provide the necessary legal basis for Japanese rearmament.” (Memorandum prepared by Gleason on March 4; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)