159. Letter From the Ambassador in Japan (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State1
Dear Mr. Secretary: I am taking the liberty of writing this letter to you and Walter Robertson about the Kishi visit because some of the thoughts which I have been turning over in my mind do not translate themselves readily into any one of the series “U.S. Position Papers” which are being developed in Washington.
In terms of our vital interests, Japan occupies in Asia a position similar to that of Germany in Western Europe. Just as the course that Germany follows in Western Europe will vitally affect where Western Europe goes, so the course that Japan chooses to follow will vitally influence the road that the free nations of the Far East and Asia follow. Japan has the only great industrial complex in Asia which in a sense is comparable to the Ruhr-Western Europe complex. If it were ever harnessed to Communist power, we would be in a desperate situation. It is every bit as important to us as Germany.
So, our basic objective with respect to Japan is exactly the same objective we have been facing for the past seven years with respect to Germany. This is, how to at least firmly align and, if possible, to knit Japan so thoroughly into the fabric of the free world nations that it will not in the next few years be easily tempted to take an independent course [Page 326] leading either to non-alignment or neutralism (at best of the Swiss-Swedish type or at worst of the Nehru brand) or worst of all some form of accommodation with the Communist bloc. While our fundamental objective with Japan and Germany is the same, the circumstances are entirely different and the Japanese problem is infinitely more complicated and difficult.
In Germany we had a country with the same basic Christian religion, culture and civilization as its European neighbors and the United States. This gave us an important common denominator to start with. We were able, through a number of complex but sound devices such as NATO, WEU, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Common Market, to all of which you made such a great contribution, to weave Germany into a fabric of free world inter-locking arrangements to an extent that will make it difficult for Germany to unweave the fabric, even should the government of the Federal Republic change. I do not mean that Germany will be unable to break away, but its own interests in the vitally important economic and security fields are now so directly enmeshed with those of its European neighbors and indirectly with ours, that it can’t be done easily.
In Japan we do not have the same favorable factors we had in Germany. Geography is against it. There are no common ties of religion, culture, philosophy or civilization with the United States, nor with some of Japan’s free Asian neighbors. Because of historical experience, most of Japan’s neighbors in the Far East and Southeast Asia are still deeply suspicious of Japan. There are at this time none of Japan’s free Asian neighbors that wish to join with Japan in either collective security or regional economic organizational arrangements looking eventually to some form of integration. Japan’s two closest free world neighbors are Korea and Taiwan. Yet, at present, collective security arrangements with Korea seem out of the question because of Korean suspicions, and Japan itself would not wish to enter into a collective security arrangement with Taiwan for fear of being dragged into a war which might develop because of hostilities breaking out between Taiwan and Communist China. SEATO, for reasons which you know so well, does not at this time present an opportunity for tying Japan into an Asian collective security arrangement. The neutralist countries of Southeast Asia are opposed to collective security arrangements, and like other SEATO Asian neighbors fear Japan’s economic domination.
Therefore, as contrasted with Germany where we could use the NATO umbrella and European collective devices in the economic and security fields to tie Germany with the free world, we do not have those possibilities here. As I see it, the task of aligning a resurgent Japan—and it is resurgent—with the free world structure, if it is to be [Page 327] done at all, will have to be accomplished primarily by United States initiative. Japan has come back so quickly and so far in these last eighteen months that some former Japanese attitudes are beginning to be visible again. Japan has had neither the leavening influence of close association with dependable free world neighbors which Germany has had nor Germany’s first hand exposure to Soviet brutality. The Japanese people have in fact been living largely in semi-isolation since 1941 and most are quite unaware of the nature of the world in which we live.
It is against this back-drop that attitudes in Japan are beginning to crystalize. As the political situation becomes consolidated we are apt to see the Japanese move with unity and speed once they believe they have found the pattern they wish to follow. So we must ourselves move with dispatch to influence that pattern in a manner best designed to align Japan with us. I cannot produce any evidence but I feel that Japan may in the coming period, unless other prospects which she considers more in her own self interest are devised, be instinctively tempted to work toward some such objective as the Swiss-Swedish non-alignment formula.
So the challenge is very great, and will require all the imagination and wisdom at our disposal. In particular, Mr. Secretary, we are going to have to draw heavily upon your wisdom and imagination to meet the challenge we face with respect to Japan.
Alignment of Japan with the free world—and I use the word alignment because I do not at the present time see any fabric that we can knit her into as we did Germany—will, I believe, depend primarily on what we do in a) the security and defense field and b) what we do in the field of economic cooperation. I would like first to set out some thoughts about the security and defense field.
What are basically the formal ties which presently bind Japan to the free world? The Peace Treaty, but primarily the Security Treaty and the related Administrative Agreement. These agreements were very imaginative, very sound, and were absolutely essential under the conditions prevailing when they were drawn up. We could not have done without them and they have served their purpose well. At the same time the Security Treaty was wisely framed as a provisional arrangement, looking toward the time when other dispositions would provide for the maintenance of peace in this area.
Major changes have occurred during the last five years and it would be a mistake to weigh those changes merely in military terms. Japan has moved only moderately forward militarily, but has done brilliantly in her economic recovery, and in the international political field Japan has re-established relations with most countries and is in the United Nations. These two developments have given rise to a strong urge for Japan to act independently. And now at last her political [Page 328] leadership holds the prospect of becoming effective, both at home and abroad. I venture to suggest that the time is ripe for you to complete the great work you began, and create a new security arrangement with Japan that will replace the provisional treaty with a permanent one which will give scope for the years of further evolution that lie ahead. Kishi’s visit affords a unique opportunity to lay the ground work for such a development.
I, best of all, realize how heavy the burdens are which you are shouldering and know that you cannot give as much time to this task as you would wish. But if you can spare the time to reflect on the great challenge which emerging conditions bring, I am sure that you, and perhaps you alone, could come up with a creative solution which the evolution of events requires.
Just to tempt your thoughts, I would like to sketch some ideas that strike me as having possibilities.
In Kishi we have at last an able leader of Japan. He indicates he wants to make a bold new start with us because he feels his people growing restive under the old arrangements. Other things being equal, we will fare much better in the long run if we can move constructively forward with him following his visit, rather than awaiting for pressures to develop which may get out of hand.
He has indicated that his basic views on the world situation, the Communist threat in the Far East, and Japan as a major Communist target, are the same as ours. He has also told me that keeping Korea, Formosa and Southeast Asia out of Communist hands are matters of vital importance for Japan. He has acknowledged to me Japan’s dependence on the U.S. nuclear deterrent to prevent general war. He shares our concept of mobile striking forces held in readiness against aggression. He has in the last week had the National Defense Council approve a defense policy for Japan which frankly and publicly states its purpose “to cope with aggression with recourse to the joint security system with the United States of America.” I think we can do business with him but we won’t really know until we sit down with him and really explore the various possibilities and ways to make the necessary readjustments in the relations between the two countries.
Kishi has proposed modifying the Security Treaty in a manner which he says is necessary if he is to swing public opinion squarely behind him which in turn will enable him to win elections and then revise the constitution so that Japan can play its proper role in defense matters. In effect he has suggested tinkering with the existing Security Treaty but his basic proposal is that the disposition and use of U.S. forces be effected through mutual agreement and that we place a five year limitation on its duration following which it can be terminated on one year’s notice. He has not said what his long-term objective is. Is it a mutual security treaty? If it is in fact a mutual security treaty he [Page 329] wants, wouldn’t it be better to start working toward that end now? Certainly I would hate to have the job of trying to get the Senate to ratify changes in the existing Treaty only to have to return shortly thereafter with a new treaty. Before we can decide how best we can move rapidly ahead to readjust existing arrangements we must know what kind of treaty Mr. Kishi wants eventually.
This leads to the central problem I want to bring to your attention. If Kishi says that his objective is a mutal security treaty, may it not after all be possible following the Kishi visit to start to work out a mutual defense treaty that would be not only acceptable but appealing to both sides, and which you could therefore reasonably hope to get through the Senate? A mutual security treaty would, of course, involve modification in the existing Administrative Agreement.
The Japanese have already in effect modified their constitution by interpretation without waiting for amendment when they organized their Self Defense Forces. These forces are now accepted as not violating Article IX of the constitution. Why is it necessary to wait for formal revision then? Might it not be possible to adopt the SEATO formula for mutual defense, whereby each country will act to meet aggression in the Treaty area “in accordance with its constitutional processes”? Furthermore Japan has now joined the United Nations which reinforces their right to individual or collective self defense.
The Treaty area would have to be de-limited but it might be “the Japan area”, a term already found in Article IV of the Security Treaty and in Article XXIV of the Administrative Agreement. In such case we would wish to have some provision, perhaps in a separate agreement, so that if we become involved in hostilities elsewhere we could have a good prospect of using our logistical base in Japan as we did during the Korean war. There could also be the usual type of clause calling for consultation in the event of any situation elsewhere affecting the security of the Japan area.
If something along these lines were feasible, Kishi might be tempted. In my talks with him he has never supported nor opposed the concept of a mutual defense treaty. He has said it “is not contemplated.” He is perhaps reluctant to propose it now because of Japanese domestic political considerations, and perhaps more importantly because he thinks our terms might involve Japanese troops having to be deployed elsewhere in Asia or even defending the U.S. continent or its territories. This would not be politically possible for him. I do not think we need such a commitment of this character from Japan. What we do want is a durable and as dependable arrangement as is possible in the security field based on the principle of equality and partnership.
Japanese security against overt aggression cannot be assured by Japan alone. The latest approved Japanese national defense policy indicates that Japan’s security against aggression is dependent on a [Page 330] joint system of security with the United States. I think Kishi fully realizes this. What we need to do is to readjust the existing security arrangements so that they are not vulnerable to the charge of being “unequal” in political terms, and to get Kishi then to take leadership in instilling in Japanese minds the fact that such a treaty is by far their best guarantee against aggression. This would serve to identify Japanese security interests firmly with ours.
In any case, I hope you will take the opportunity really to smoke Kishi out on whether he wants a mutual defense treaty. He may not be able to commit himself to a mutual security treaty during the Washington talks but we may be able to get his mind started working in this direction and we could further explore such a possibility in subsequent private talks through diplomatic channels. At least we would know better where we stand and how we can go about readjusting the existing arrangements. If Kishi does say he wants a mutual security treaty you could lay the groundwork for moving quietly ahead on it during the following months, provided—and this is the main theme to which I return—that you believe some such new concept is needed for the new situation we face.
The other aspect of aligning Japan with us and the free world lies in the economic field, which is of vital—indeed, life and death—importance to Japan given the nature of its economy, which is so largely dependent on external factors which it cannot control. Identification in Japanese minds that their future economic viability depends on the closest cooperation and alignment with the United States will more than anything else serve to tie Japan to the West.
I feel we must bring to bear on this problem the best and most imaginative brains we have in the United States. This is the field where the Soviets and Chinese Communists are concentrating their energies. We must show imagination and not be bound too strictly by past concepts, because in the long term, alignment of Japanese economic interests with us is more fundamental in its appeal and in the long run much more dependable than any agreements we can devise in the security and defense field and will serve to strengthen such agreements.
This letter is much too long, for which I apologize. But, I frankly did not know how else to present some thoughts, such as they are, that I have been turning over in my mind about the critically important period on which we are about to enter in our relations with Japan. I will be giving more thought to this whole question between now and my arrival in Washington on June 10, following which I would like to talk to you and Walter about all these matters.
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.00/5–2557. Secret. A brief attached note, dated May 30, from Eugene V. McAuliffe, Chief of the Reports and Operations Staff, to Murphy and C. Douglas Dillon indicates that MacArthur sent a copy of this letter directly to Robertson, and that Murphy and Dillon were receiving copies at Dulles’ request. A copy was also circulated to Bowie.↩