Office of the Historian

156. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1

Washington, May 24, 1957.

SUBJECT

  • Call by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Irwin re Executive Order for Ryukyus2

TIME

  • Friday, May 24, 3:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

  • Department of Defense
    • Mr. John N. Irwin, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs Captain Berton A. Robbins, Jr., Far East Regional Director, International Security Affairs
    • Mr. Jere H. Dykema, Office of the General Counsel, OSD
  • Department of State
    • Colonel John M. Raymond, Acting Legal Adviser
    • Mr. Howard L. Parsons, Director, Northeast Asian Affairs
    • Mr. Harry F. Pfeiffer, Jr., Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

Purpose:

The purpose of the meeting is to attempt to resolve State-Defense differences concerning the content of the Executive Order “Providing for the Administration of the Ryukyu Islands.” Attached are the Department of Defense draft of the Executive Order and draft Press [Page 319] Release (Tab A),3 the State Department re-draft of the Executive Order (Tab B) and a commentary on the recommended Department of State revision of the Defense draft of the Executive Order (Tab C).

The areas of differences between the State and Defense drafts are four in number and, in order of importance, are as follows:

1.
Adequate coordination between the Departments of Defense and State with regard to the administration of the Ryukyus (Sections 3 and 4). Under Section 2 of the Order, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to exercise governmental authority in the Islands, while in Section 3, the Secretary of State is made responsible for the conduct of foreign relations. In the discharge of this responsibility, the Secretary of State is to maintain continuing coordination with the Secretary of Defense, who, in turn, is to keep the Secretary of State currently informed of activities in the Islands “affecting the foreign relations of the Islands and of the United States.” We believe that practically every major aspect of the administration of the Ryukyus may involve our foreign relations and particularly, United States-Japanese relations. It will be necessary, therefore, in dealing with the Ryukyus to weigh continually our actions in the light of possible reaction upon the United States position, not only in Japan but throughout the Far East as a whole. Accordingly, it is of great importance to the overall security of the United States that the closest coordination be maintained between the Secretaries of State and of Defense regarding the administration of the Ryukyus.4 The Executive Order should, therefore, provide for bilateral rather than unilateral coordination.
2.
Preamble to the Executive Order. The Preamble has been limited to reference to the authority upon which the order is based, in accordance with Prime Minister Kishi’s request that the Preamble be changed to avoid the impression of permanency of the arrangements covered in the Executive Order. Ambassador MacArthur strongly recommended that we accede to the Prime Minister’s request.
3.
Publicity to be given to the issuance of the Executive Order. Any publicity given to the issuance of the Executive Order will stimulate reversionist agitation in Japan, which in turn will heighten reversionist sentiment in the Ryukus, thereby decreasing the possibility of achieving our chief objective in the Ryukyus; namely, retaining full control. Accordingly we believe the promulgation of the Order should be handled [Page 320] as a routine matter, without publicity. In view of the forthcoming visit of the Japanese Prime Minister to Washington, it is particularly desirable that every effort be made to avoid arousing a strong Japanese public reaction to the promulgation of the Executive Order.
4.

Relationships between Governor of the Ryukus and the GRI. (Secions 11, 12, 15)

The Order as it stands provides a facade of democracy and self-government for the Ryukyuans which, upon closer examination, becomes a chimera. If the Ryukyuans are to develop a democratic form of Government, they must be allowed sufficient leeway in which to experiment, develop and, as is unavoidable, make mistakes. The system proposed under the Executive Order has the built-in temptation to substitute our judgment for Ryukyuan judgment at every point. To achieve our fundamental purposes it appears highly desirable that intervention take place only when essential to avoid those consequences related to matters concerning United States security interests.

Furthermore, it is likely that the Executive Order may come under attack in Japan on the ground that it is a hypocritical document which pretends to give democratic rights to the Ryukyuans, but in fact does not. Such assertions by the Japanese may well give rise to serious unrest among the Ryukyuans. Therefore, a series of changes are proposed in the draft Executive Order which determine the respective powers of the Ryukyuan Governmental system and of the Civil Administration more precisely than the proposed draft Order. It is recognized that a precise delimitation is not possible and probably not desirable.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794C.0221/5–2457. Confidential. Drafted in NA.↩
  2. No memorandum of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.↩
  3. There are no attachments to the source text. The editors have been unable to identify a text for either the State or Defense drafts of the order as of this date.↩
  4. In a Department of State draft of the order dated April 24, the following sentence appears at the end of Section 3: “In the discharge of their respective responsibilities under the Order, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State shall maintain continuing coordination with each other.” (Attachment to memorandum from Richard D. Kearney, Assistant Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs, to Parsons)

    This language does not appear in the order as adopted; see footnote 4, Document 164.

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