Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

150. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, May 22, 1957.

SUBJECT

• The Bonin Islands

Ambassador MacArthur has strongly urged (Tab B)² that the United States permit the return of a few hundred former residents of the Bonins to those islands on which we do not maintain important security installations. In support of his recommendation he points out the inconsistency of refusing to permit the return of a small number of Bonin Islanders for security reasons when there is a large local population in the Ryukyus where we have much more important military installations. He also notes that allowing only those of Caucasian ancestry to return leads to charges of racial discrimination.

Our policy of keeping a relatively small number of Japanese out of the only potentially strategic Bonins for security reasons, when we allow 800,000 “Japanese nationals” in the Ryukyus where we have large and important military installations, seems capricious to the Japanese and tends to undermine their confidence in our intentions and pronouncements concerning the Ryukyus. Moreover, the exclusion of “Japanese” where “Caucasians” have been admitted is reminiscent of our former Oriental exclusion policy and arouses intense resentment.

Prime Minister Kishi is committed to readjust relations with the United States, and both political parties have great expectations of the Washington visit. In my judgment we must somehow accommodate the reviving Japanese nationalism with respect to which the Bonins have become an important symbol. To make our Ryukyu and Bonin policies consistent and to remove causes of resentment by permitting the repatriation of some of the former inhabitants is, I believe, worth considering, and I concur with Ambassador MacArthur’s recommendation that our policy be reviewed. To that end I attach a draft position paper (Tab A), which I would like you to consider for use during your talks with Prime Minister Kishi in June. This paper incorporates Ambassador MacArthur’s suggestions.

Recommendation

That you approve the draft position paper³ (Tab A) and authorize me to seek the concurrence of the interested departments.⁴

[Tab A]

BONIN ISLANDS

Anticipated Japanese Position

1. United States military needs in the Bonins are not incompatible with repatriation of at least a portion of the 7,000 former residents now in Japan.

2. During the next ten years control of the islands exercised by the United States pursuant to Article 3 of the Peace Treaty should be returned to Japan.

3. The United States should honor claims of former residents who are prevented from returning to or making use of their property in the islands because of the United States policy against repatriation.

Recommended United States Position

1. United States willing repatriate a few hundred of the Bonin Islanders to islands on which there are no important military installations.⁵

2. Continuing threat to free world security requires retention of full administrative control over Bonins where United States has important security installations. However, the Bonins will be returned to Japan when there is assurance of peace and stability in the area.⁶

3. The United States is not legally liable to pay claims of former inhabitants. (The claims have been made by Japan on behalf of the islanders because they were not allowed to return to or make use of their property in the islands.)⁷

Discussion

The Japanese were not required in the Peace Treaty to renounce their claims to the Bonin Islands. Secretary Dulles has enunciated Japan’s residual or ultimate sovereignty over the islands and United States official statements have implied that the islands would eventually return to Japanese jurisdiction.

Burgeoning nationalism has helped convince the Japanese that the time has come for the United States to take definite steps in the direction of reversion of control to Japan. This feeling is made all the more potent by the presence in Japan of some 7,000 former Bonin Islands residents who were removed to Japan during and at the end of World War II. The refusal of the United States to permit their return contrasts with the presence on the islands of about 175 mixed bloods (descendants of early Caucasian settlers) whom the US Navy permitted to return shortly after the war. Many of these people have been absorbed into the Japanese economy and are living in conditions of poverty which require that they be given public assistance. As an initial step the Japanese would like to repatriate these people to those portions of the islands which the United States does not require for military purposes.

It is difficult to justify a policy of refusing to allow former residents to return to the Bonins on grounds of security when there is a large native population in the Ryukyu Islands, where the United States has far greater security interests.

The Japanese have presented a note requesting 960 million yen as compensation to former Bonin Islanders for use of their property since the effective date of the Peace Treaty (April 28, 1952). The United States Government does not consider the United States liable to pay compensation to the islanders simply for preventing them from returning to or using their property but stands ready to consider any claim for compensation for property which has actually been used by United States forces.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794C.0221/5–757. Secret. Drafted in NA on May 21.
2. Tab B, telegram 2526 from Tokyo, May 7, was not found attached. (Ibid.)
3. Inserted in Dulles’ handwriting after the word “paper” is: “as possible part of satisfactory over-all understanding”.
4. A marginal notation on another copy of this memorandum attached to Document 165 indicates Dulles approved this memorandum on June 5.
5. Dulles renumbered this paragraph as “3” and edited it by hand to read as follows: “United States willing repatriate some of the Bonin Islanders to islands on which there are no important military installations. The exact number will be determined by the U.S. after making a study as to what number the available areas will support.”
6. Dulles renumbered this paragraph as “1”.
7. Dulles renumbered this paragraph as “2”.