Office of the Historian

14. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald)1

Washington, February 23, 1955.

SUBJECT

  • Japanese Reaction to Current United States Position on Japanese Defense Measures

Ambassador Allison and General Hull on February 2, 1955, in an effort to forestall further cutting of Japan’s defense budget and to educate the new government on the facts of life, presented a memorandum (Tab A)2 on Japanese defense measures to the Foreign Office. The memorandum reviewed the principles of the Mutual Security Program, the dependence of United States military assistance on Japan’s own defense effort, the fact that contrary to Japanese contentions Japan’s agreed contribution to the support of United States forces in Japan ($155 million) is less than half the expenditures for such forces, and proposed that the United States and Japan share on an equal basis the cost for additional expenses for the Japanese defense forces above a mutually agreeable figure. Specifically, the memorandum proposed a base figure of 90 billion yen ($250 million). For example, if Japan were willing to appropriate the 95.2 billion yen ($264 million) requested by the Defense agency, the United States would accept a 2.6 billion yen ($7 million) reduction in Japan’s contribution to the support of United States forces in Japan.

This memorandum was in response to an aide-mémoire handed to Ambassador Allison by Foreign Minister Shigemitsu on January 18,3 which stated that the Cabinet had decided to hold total defense expenditures including the contribution to the support of United States security forces within the framework of the previous year’s defense budget and, at the same time, to request the United States to agree to a reduction in Japan’s contribution to the support of United States security forces in Japan.

The Japanese press on February 16 (Kyodo article attached as Tab B)4 quotes Finance Minister Ichimada as describing the United States memorandum as “highly regrettable.” It is reported that he had hoped to find some solution to the problem of the joint costs of United States forces in Japan through unhurried negotiations after the elections. The [Page 24] Finance and Foreign Ministries and sources in the Democratic Party are reported as considering the United States action, taken at the height of the election campaign, as incomprehensible and one which may invite criticism as a deliberate American attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of Japan. The Foreign Office is reported to be at odds with the Finance Ministry over the role which the United States should play in determining Japan’s defense expenditures. As for the 90 billion yen figure, the Finance Ministry is reported to consider that this figure is hardly worth attention in future talks with Washington.

This reaction by Japanese officials and its discussion in the press are evidence of a growing tendency on the part of the Japanese to assert an independent course of action and will make negotiations on Japan’s defense budget even more difficult. While the United States position, stated in the memorandum, is consistent with broad instructions given to the Ambassador and CINCFE5 the text of the memorandum, its timing and its specific contents were not cleared back with Washington. It is our understanding that the Embassy was under considerable pressure from the Command as to the substance of the memorandum.

It can be expected that the Embassy and Command will shortly request permission from Washington to negotiate on a lower base figure than the 85 billion yen presently authorized. In view of the developing political and economic situation in Japan, it is believed that the JCS may now be willing to give the field the authority originally requested to go to a base figure as low as 73.8 billion yen. However, it has become public knowledge that the United States position is that the budget for the Japanese defense forces should be at least 90 billion yen before the United States would even agree to match additional Japanese budgetary figures with reductions in their contribution to the United States forces. This appears to the Japanese to be renewed United States pressure on the defense issue, and we believe that it has had a bad effect on United States-Japanese relations.

It is doubtful that Japan will agree to the principle of matching any reduction in its contribution to the support of United States forces with an equivalent increase in its defense budget, even though a more reasonable base figure is eventally authorized. It is more likely that Japan will attempt to reduce, as far as possible, its contribution to the support of United States forces with a view to using some of the reduction for non-defense purposes.6

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/2–2355. Secret.↩
  2. Not printed. Tab A, CINCFE Z42147 from Tokyo, February 8, transmitted the text of the February 2 memorandum mentioned above.↩
  3. The text was relayed to the Department in telegram 1716 from Tokyo, January 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/1–1855)↩
  4. Not printed.↩
  5. See McClurkin’s memorandum to Sebald, December 23, 1954, in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XIV, Part 2, p. 1813.↩
  6. In a letter to H. Struve Hensel, February 28, Sebald urged that the Department of Defense “review its earlier position and agree to give Ambassador Allison and General Hull more negotiating flexibility by authorizing them to endeavor to work out an arrangement within the context of their recommendations of December 15, 1954.” (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/2–2855) Concerning the recommendations of December 15, see telegram 1403 from Tokyo, Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XIV, Part 2, p. 1806.↩