138. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State1
2683. Embtel 2662.2 I met with Kishi afternoon May 20. Ohno, Chiba, Takeuchi, Carpenter also present. Kishi commenced conversation by reading from prepared statement, text of which is as follows:
[Text of Kishi’s statement (1 page of source text) not declassified]
I replied to Kishi that US Government is obliged to issue Executive order in connection with Congressional hearings re budget, forthcoming [garble] changes in FEC command and necessity tie up previous administrative orders in one package. However, despite fact order must be issued, as I had made clear May 18, US desired to consult beforehand with Kishi to get his views on timing having in mind his Washington visit. I realized Kishi was expecting discuss Okinawa problems among others with President and for this reason he might desire postponement issuance Executive order until after visit. If Prime Minister felt it preferable defer issuance Executive order until after his [Page 297] return from Washington, I was prepared make strong recommendation to this effect, which I thought would be accepted. I emphasized however that I did not believe there was possibility cancelling issuance.
In reply Kishi stated he sincerely hoped Executive order would not have to be issued at all but if no possibility of avoiding issuance, he felt it better have it issued prior to his trip to Washington. In his opinion if issuance delayed until after his return, repercussions within Japan would be even greater. It would look as if he had been consulted in Washington and had agreed to issuance. He regretted however that US felt obliged to replace existing arrangements with Executive order. Fact that Executive order was signed by President would attract much attention.
I said to Kishi that I felt he should think about timing of issuance of Executive order not just in light of immediate situation but long term future relationships between Japan and US. With this in mind did he feel effect on our relations, which he had said he desired to do everything to strengthen, would be better by issuing order now rather than following his visit, for example later in July? Kishi reflected and said again that he regretted issuance of order but if we had to issue it, it preferable to do so before his visit.
He was particularly disturbed by wording of first sentence of preamble. He had in mind that this would be interpreted throughout Japan that it was a permanent and new arrangement for Ryukyus. If we had to issue Executive order, and he still hoped we could find some way to avoid doing so, he hoped very much first sentence of preamble would simply make reference to Article 3 of peace treaty with no elaborations or trimmings.3 He added that while he recognized that substance in first sentence of preamble had been used previously by US, in light of present circumstances he felt very strongly it would [should?] be changed to prevent general impression of permanency in arrangements which would be widespread throughout Japan. I said I would of course report his views to Washington but I understood we were obliged to issue Executive order.
My estimate is Kishi believes tremendous hue and cry will break out in Japan when Executive order is issued and therefore wishes to disassociate himself from it. By giving me copy of his statement opposing issuance of Executive order he has placed himself on record that he is against it. I think he understands we must issue order but my own [Page 298] strong recommendation is that because of timing in relation to forthcoming Kishi visit we try to find some simple formula for preamble which simply makes reference to Article 3 of treaty. I am not informed by Department as to what publicity is going to be given to issuance of Executive order, how we intend to play it, or when it will be issued. Certainly anything we can do to slide it through with minimum publicity and make it appear routine thing, perhaps related to change of governorship and need for putting onto one piece of paper the related existing administrative arrangements, will be very important. Would appreciate being kept urgently informed re plans for issuance, publicity, and whether anything can be done re preamble.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794C.0221/5–2057. Secret; Niact. Passed to CINCFE. Received at 10:37 a.m.↩
- In telegram 2662, May 18, MacArthur stated he had seen Kishi that day, given him information on the desire of the United States to issue an Executive order on governance of the Ryukyus, and left with him a summary of the order (see footnote 3 below). MacArthur reported that he had asked for Kishi’s views as to the timing of the proposed order. (Department of State, Central Files, 794C.0221/5–1857)↩
- The summary given Kishi by MacArthur was based on the summary transmitted in telegram 2532 to Tokyo, May 16. As telegraphed, the summary of the preamble reads: “Pending establishment enduring conditions peace and stability Far East it is policy US maintain degree of control and authority now exercised with respect Ryukyu Islands under Article 3 Treaty of Peace in order enable US contribute effectively maintenance security in area. US mindful importance human rights, dignity of human person and striving peoples everywhere govern themselves accordance democratic concepts.” (Ibid., 794C.0221/5–1657)↩