Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

126. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State¹

Tokyo, April 17, 1957—4 p.m.

2336. Ref: Embtels 2305² and 2306.³ Kishi has given me his views on only first two items (of agenda for our preliminary talks)⁴ and subsequent talks may bring to light important new elements in his position as whole. But security and territorial issues which he raised under agenda item 2 are so basic and require such urgent attention that I believe following preliminary comments should be made now.

1. We have reached the turning point in our relations with Japan. By this I do not mean that is [if we?] brush off Kishi’s proposals there will be any sudden and dramatic breakdown of our relations in next few months. What I do mean is that direction of the current in Japan is clearly evident and if we do not try by our basic stance toward fundamental issues, to direct the current into constructive channels, we will find our whole position here gradually eroding away in next several years. And the erosion will take place in an atmosphere of acrimony and mounting hostility that will impair for the foreseeable future the possibility of any real and dependable cooperation between Japan and the US in the vital security field.

2. In Kishi we have an able, very ambitious, and skilled politician. He has yet to show the quality of statesmanship, but he is determined to consolidate the “national sentiment” behind him and lead it forward.

I believe he would prefer to lead it in the direction of enduring cooperation with US. But only his future actions will tell. But I also believe he will try to lead his country in some other direction if he believes we are resorting to evasive or delaying tactics instead of coming to grips with the problem of a new relationship.

3. What Kishi calls “national sentiment” is really not public opinion in the Western sense but the collective judgment of Jap leaders, often totally illogical from Western viewpoint, which gradually crystallizes and on which national policy then becomes based. In his two papers on security and territorial problems he has, I believe, laid out, with unusual candor, his present estimate of the basic objectives of Japanese for the coming decade.

4. The general content of Kishi’s proposals is not a surprise. We have seen sentiment forming gradually during last two years, and in recent months the press has been full of such ideas. While many of them stem from Socialist or neutralist elements, many have been planted in the press by members of the govt or its supporters. What is novel is not the proposals but the sudden authority and completeness with which they have now emerged at the highest level of the Jap Govt. They call for the most searching analysis and considered response on our side.

5. The problem we face is that the time is drawing to a close when we can assume Japan is inevitably tied to the US by economic and security needs. There is a strong view of neutralism in Japanese “national sentiment” and Kishi could easily get the country, most Socialists included, solidly behind him if he chose to lead in that direction. Japan’s membership in the UN means that moving away from the US no longer entails ostracism from world society. Thus Jap leaders will have alternatives in their own minds if they believe we are unable to recognize the relationship between Japan and US has undergone major change which in turn requires major readjustments.

7. [sic] Kishi’s proposals are in many respects one-sided and have not yet touched upon many fundamental aspects of the future relationship between Japan and the US nor upon the role that Japan intends to play in the world; nor on the burdens and responsibilities Japan is willing to assume in its new position in terms of making its contribution to peace with justice in the world. We need to draw him out on these and on his long-term concept of partnership between the US and Japan. I would appreciate Dept’s views on questions I might put to him to draw him out.

8. I do not believe Kishi can reasonably expect us to to buy his proposals out of hand, because he must realize their fundamental and long-term implications, which go far beyond the question of just relations between Japan and the US. I also believe he is prepared to consider modifications or alternatives to the proposals he has made. Talks here and in Washington should explore such possibilities thoroughly, testing the basis, soundness, and firmness of his position on the different points. I will comment later on some of his specific proposals.

9. Meanwhile, I urge that Kishi’s approach be taken with utmost seriousness and that US Govt make a basic and fundamental review of our policy re Japan. I believe that if as a result of Washington talks we cannot lay the foundation for some fundamental readjustments looking ahead to true partnership in our relations with Japan, decisions will gradually be taken here which will be against our interests and which we will be unable to reverse. What is required of course is to put our relations with Japan as rapidly as possible on the same basis of equal partnership that we have with other allies. This cannot of course be done overnight nor without Japan assuming responsibilities. But, if we are unable to lay solid groundwork with Kishi when he visits Washington with constructive suggestions for achieving readjustment in our relationships, I am not optimistic about the future in terms of our long-term interest in Japan. My fear is that we would see Japan drift progressively into neutralism. On other hand, if we can give Kishi sense of conviction that we intend to move promptly to place relationships between Japan and the US in the security and economic fields on really equal basis I think we have a good prospect of identifying Kishi’s and Japan’s interest with our own, thus providing a basis for durable and dependable relations. I am passing copies of this to CINCFE and CINCPAC for their own information.

MacArthur

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/4–1757. Secret; Limit Distribution.
2. In telegram 2305, April 13, the Embassy transmitted the text of a paper received by MacArthur from Kishi during a talk held that day. In it Japan proposed: 1) a joint reaffirmation of the purpose of bilateral security, in which it would be emphasized that the United States did not intend to utilize its armed forces stationed in Japan and other Far Eastern areas unless overt aggression occurred in those areas; 2) inclusion in the basic principles of revision of the security treaty of mutual agreement on disposition and use of U.S. forces under the treaty, clarification of the relationship between the treaty and the U.N. Charter, amendment of the provision for expiration of the treaty so that it would be in effect for 5 years from date of revision and terminable thereafter upon 1 year’s notice by either party; and 3) a continuing buildup of Japanese defense forces accompanied by withdrawal of U.S. forces to the maximum possible extent, including a complete pullout of ground forces and the release of some U.S. bases to Japan. (Ibid., 611.94/4–1357)
3. Also dated April 13, telegram 2306 contained the text of a paper on territorial problems (given MacArthur at the meeting mentioned in footnote 2 above) in which Japan proposed that the United States agree to relinquish the Ryukyus and the Bonins after 10 years, and that, in the interim, various Japanese Government agencies be permitted to exercise their functions in the Ryukyus and former inhabitants of the Bonins be allowed “progressively” to return to them. (Ibid.)
4. For a summary of the agenda, see footnote 4, Document 124. On April 10, Kishi presented a talking paper to MacArthur on the first item of the agenda, the problems between the two countries. In general, the analysis centered around reasons for the distrust of and ambivalence toward the United States found in some segments of Japanese opinion. The analysis stressed Japanese aversion to war, U.S. military policy toward Japan, resentment against Japan’s subordinate position under the security treaty, antipathy arising from territorial problems, disappointment over restrictive U.S. trade measures, and dissatisfaction over the embargo against the People’s Republic of China. According to the paper, many Japanese had come to believe that the United States ultimately wanted a war aimed at overthrowing the Communist bloc powers by force. (Telegrams 2255, 2256, 2257, and 2258 from Tokyo, all dated April 10; all in Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/4–1057)