Office of the Historian

118. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State1

Tokyo, February 13, 1957—2 p.m.

1759. Embassy telegram 1736.2 Atomic issue still very much alive. On February 11 Communist Kawakami3 took over Diet imterpellations of Kishi and kept him on defensive throughout questioning. Kawakami raised for first time this session questions of 1) introduction into Japan of nuclear weapons rather than atomic task force, 2) stationing atomic task force in Okinawa, and 3) alleged statement by Admiral Ingersol on January 28 that US Seventh Fleet (which Kawakami claimed is based at Yokosuka) is capable of making atomic attacks.

Kishi replied reportedly along following line: 1) Japan could rely on “Allison–Shigemitsu agreement”4 that it would be consulted before US brought atomic weapons to Japan (when Kawakami retorted that people could hardly trust such “private agreement” and demanded written treaty, Kishi added agreement was being observed and US respected it); 2) he is not certain US intended consult Japan on sending atomic unit to Okinawa but, if consulted, he intended express opposition; and 3) denied claim that Seventh Fleet has brought atomic weapons into Japan but promised look into matter further.

Diet debate February 11 indicated Socialists and Communists intend to maintain pressure, in particular to broaden scope of interpellations in effort force government take clear-cut stand on every aspect of atomic weapons issue.

Embassy seeking Foreign Office verification as to precisely what Kishi said on February 11 and will report promptly so that Department can consider whether representations should be made to Kishi.5 Embassy [Page 264] notes with appreciation Defense Department refusal over past few days make further comment on provision of guided missiles to Japan.

Horsey
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/2–1357. Confidential.↩
  2. In telegram 1736, February 9, the Embassy reported that recent publicity from Washington concerning the possible basing of an atomic task force in Japan and provision of guided missiles to Japan had brought about a Cabinet decision to cancel plans to introduce legislation to protect the security of military information. The Embassy commented that the United States by prematurely forcing (either accidentally or intentionally) security issues, was “hardening attitudes, forcing government to take more categorically negative position than would otherwise be necessary and postponing time when really profitable discussions could be held with Japanese leaders on these and related subjects.” (Ibid., 794.5/2–957)↩
  3. Kanichi Kawakami, a Communist member of the Diet.↩
  4. A telegram from Tokyo, June 27, 1955 [1 page of source text], and a Department of State Position Paper, August 22, 1955 [4 pages of source text] regarding this “agreement”, were not declassified. The telegram is in Department of State, Central Files; the Position Paper is ibid.,FE Files: Lot 56 D 679.↩

  5. In telegram 1780, February 15, the Embassy forwarded to the Department an English translation of the two main references Kishi had made on February 11 to the “Allison–Shigemitsu agreement” as reported in the second paragraph of telegram 1759. The translation confirms the accuracy of the reporting in telegram 1759.

    Telegram 1780 concluded as follows: “Yesterday, Kishi stated ‘qualitative’ improvement of Japanese defense forces will not include adoption of atomic weapons nor acceptance of US plans to bring them into Japan. Defense Agency Chief Kodaki, on other hand, although expressing opposition to arming Japanese forces with ‘Offensive’ guided missiles, stated that it might be necessary for Japan to use weapons with atomic warheads in event Japan faced by danger due to change in international situation.” (Ibid., Central Files, 794.5/2–1557)

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