471. Despatch From the Embassy in Thailand
to the Department of State1
No. 496
Bangkok, April 22,
1955.
REF
- Department’s Circular Telegram 559, March 23, 19552
SUBJECT
- U.S. Assistance in the Development of Forces Adequate to Provide
Internal Security in Countries Vulnerable to Communist
Subversion
There is attached as Enclosure No. 1 a paper prepared for the Operations
Coordinating Board in accordance with the outline contained in the
reference instruction. The paper was drafted by … , JUSMAG and the Embassy in consultation
with USIS and USOM.
It will be noted that the recommendations of the paper are for
continuation of current efforts to improve administration, personnel and
training in the Thai security forces rather than for any basic changes
at this time in the present force basis and programs of military
equipment. In contrast to the situation in a number of other countries
vulnerable to Communist subversion, there has been underway in Thailand
for some time a … program designed to create Thai police-type forces
capable of dealing with subversive activity. It is recognized, of
course, that changes in the program may prove to be desirable in the
light of further experience with and improvements in the capabilities of
the Thai security forces.
[Page 817]
[Enclosure]
U.S. ASSISTANCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF FORCES ADEQUATE TO PROVIDE
INTERNAL SECURITY IN COUNTRIES VULNERABLE TO COMMUNIST
SUBVERSION
Thailand
I. State of Development of Threat
of Subversion.
- A.
- It is difficult to ascertain the exact extent of subversive
activity in Thailand. It has been expected that, following the
Communist achievements in Indo-China, they would undertake a
large-scale subversive program against Thailand, but it appears
that this has not yet been launched. Nevertheless, the threat of
subversion is a very real one and represents a potential danger
to Thailand.
- B.
- Principal sources of potential danger are:
- (1)
- The Chinese minority throughout Thailand principally
concentrated in the urban areas. (The Thai security
service claims to have identified over 2,500 members of
the CPT and CCPT.)
- (2)
- The Viet Minh minority in the Northeast Provinces3
- (3)
- Infiltration from Communist China, including the Thai
Nationality Autonomous area in Yunnan.4
- (4)
- Chinese Communist terrorist forces from Malaya
supported by elements of the Min Yuen living in the
Southern border area of Thailand.5
- (5)
- Disaffected Thai elements in Thailand, particularly
those in the Northeast, and those abroad, some of which
are under Communist control.
- C.
- The Communists have the capability of:
- (1)
- Infiltrating agents to indoctrinate, organize and
train indigenous forces.
- (2)
- In conjunction with the above, of infiltrating small
organized units from Communist China, Laos or Malaya to
conduct small-scale guerrilla operations.
[Page 818]
II. Adequacy of Indigenous
Counter-Measures.
- A.
-
Recognition of the threat and will-to-act on the part of
the local Government:
The Communist threat is recognized by Thai Government leaders
and many educated Thais, and counter-measures are being
taken. The will to act exists in some quarters but,
especially at higher levels, is usually subordinated to
personal considerations. Any action is largely predicated on
continued support and guidance by the U.S. In addition,
action is handicapped by the ignorance and lack of ability
of many highly placed officials.
- B.
- Capabilities of indigenous forces:
- (1)
- For police type preventive activities:
- a.
- The various sections of the C.I.D. responsible
for the detection and identification of the
Communist apparatus and other subversive elements
are staffed by relatively capable and experienced
police rather than intelligence officers. These
sections are further hampered by over
compartmentation and a lack of central file system
or any method of cross referencing the vast body
of accumulated but uncarded information now on
hand. Much duplication of effort ensues and seldom
can or do operational leads get the kind of
cooperative attention from the various responsible
division heads that such matters require.
- b.
- The police are fully capable of rounding up
and detaining all presently known Communist
personalities and groups, including the
approximately 40,000 Viet Minh sympathizers among
the Vietnamese refugees in the Northeastern
Provinces in the event that these became an open
threat to Thailand. (Rounding up the Vietnamese
would probably require the use of armed force.)
However, it is generally agreed that many Chinese
Communist leaders are not known to the security
services and that private and business connections
between Communist-inclined Chinese businessmen and
police officers tend to vitiate the effectiveness
of vigorous action.
- c.
- Thai legal system appears to provide adequate
means for the arrest, prosecution and enforcement
of measures against persons engaged in Communist
and other forms of subversion and sedition. The
weaknesses lie in the actual operation of the
legal system, particularly in the inefficiency and
venality of officials and cumbersome, protracted
trial procedures. However, despite any
shortcomings of the legal system, the top Thai
military-political leaders have always found means
to deal with persons they consider a threat to
their positions.
- d.
- The Thai National Police which includes the
Gendarmérie Patrol Force (border patrol) is by
statute responsible for border security as well as
internal security. The present organization of the
Municipal Police, Provincial Police and the
Gendarmérie Patrol Force (GPF) has the capability of handling all
but major internal uprisings in which case the
Army would step in. The GPF is not yet capable of directing and
supporting a sustained action against border
infiltration by
[Page 819]
well organized guerrilla forces.
The VDC (Volunteer
Defense Corps), which is expected to have a
strength of 18,000 by 1956, is still in the
organization and training stage and has little if
any present military capability.
- (2)
-
For military type action:
With present organization and dispositions the Army
is believed capable of suppressing any spontaneous
uprising, particularly in the urban areas. In the
conduct of field operations against organized
guerrilla forces the Army has at present only a
limited capability.
- C.
-
Support of counter-measures by local population:
The Thai population is generally apathetic regarding the
Communist threat. Their apathy is in part due to the
debilitating influence of the climate and to the passivity
engendered by Buddhism, but more importantly it is due to
the lack of adequate information regarding Communist
techniques and purposes. This lack of understanding can be
attributed in part to the low level of education and the
lack of contact with the outside world among rural Thais.
However, the situation has been improving somewhat as a
result of an indoctrination program undertaken by the Thai
Government with USIS
initiative and support. Although the Thai people would
probably volunteer little support for counter-measures, most
Thais would probably obey the instruction of local
representatives of the central government in supporting
counter-measures, except in limited areas in which popular
local leaders, disaffected with the central government
succeeded in alienating the local population. The VDC recruited at the village
level throughout Thailand can with continued indoctrination
be expected to help to create an increasing awareness among
the local population of the nature of the Communist
threat.
The Viet Minh sympathizers among the Vietnamese refugees in
the northeast would probably support Communist guerrilla
operations in their area and would furnish a source of
recruits if there were any indications of Communist success.
Some Chinese would assist the Thai Government in its efforts
to combat Chinese Communist subversive elements, although
the majority would attempt to remain uncommitted. The hill
tribes in Thailand, who have no political loyalties or
awareness, would provide a limited amount of intelligence to
whichever side could gain their friendship or pay them. Hill
tribe areas might provide a base for guerrilla
operations.
III. Analysis of Local U.S.
Programs of Assistance Which Support or Could be Adjusted to
Support Indigenous Counter-Measures Outlined in II
Above.
- A.
-
The present JCS troop basis
is designed to:
- (1)
- Preserve internal security.
- (2)
- Deter external aggression.
It is believed that the present force units are adequate in
organization and equipment if properly trained, led and
supported. Weaknesses are lack of an honest and competent
administration, training
[Page 820]
deficiencies, a large number of
incompetent and unqualified higher officers and officials,
and the inability of the high command to plan, execute or
support military operations.
- B.
-
The present GPF and VDC training programs are
designed to:
- (1)
- Increase the internal security potential of the
police.
- (2)
- Provide forces to maintain border security.
- (3)
- Provide forces able to combat infiltration and to
conduct successful anti-guerrilla action in the
event infiltration is accomplished.
- (4)
- Provide forces (VDC) to act as a reserve for the regular
Army and Police forces.
- (5)
- To provide an indoctrination channel from the
government to the local populace and a channel for
information flow from isolated areas to the
government.
As with the Army, it is believed that the present force units
are adequate in organization and equipment if properly
trained, led and supported. Present weaknesses are lack of
competent administration, lack of adequate staff and command
structure and, in high places, a lack of understanding of
the need for same, training deficiencies, and inadequate
communications personnel.
- C.
- The psychological offensive being undertaken by the Thai
Government with the assistance of USIS is designed to indoctrinate government
officials, Buddhist monks, teachers, members of the armed
services and the general public with the evils of Communism and
the dangers of Communist subversion, and at the same time to
arouse in the people a greater awareness and appreciation of
Thailand’s national heritage as an independent nation, the
efforts of the Thai Government to promote the well-being of the
people, and the important role Thailand is playing as a member
of the Free World. This indoctrination is necessarily a slow
educational process.
IV. Recommendations.
- A.
- That no major change in the present force basis be
made.
- B.
- That efforts be continued to vitalize the command and staff of
the military and police forces.
- C.
- That junior officer and specialist training (commo, intell,
etc.) be emphasized in the GPF
and in the Thai military services.
- D.
- That “defense orientation” courses be continued as an integral
part of the training cycle of the GPF, VDC and
military forces.
- E.
- That the Thais be encouraged to continue the psychological
offensive program over a period of years in order to achieve a
basic appreciation of the Communist threat.
- F.
- That when the state of training and administration warrants
it, a program to cache stacks of specialized arms and equipment
for unconventional warfare be instituted.
