315. Notes of the Secretary’s Staff Meeting, Department of State, Washington, December 9, 1957, 9:15 a.m.1

Intelligence Briefing

1. Mr. Cumming gave the intelligence briefing.2

[Page 536]

Indonesia

2. Extensive discussion of the critical situation in Indonesia. The Secretary felt sure that events should be offering us an opportunity to take useful and constructive steps. With the interruption of inter-island traffic, disruption of the oil production, food shortages and the sabotage of the arsenal, the Secretary thought we could offer to move in with very real assistance if the Indonesians would adjust their present policies in orientation and conversely decline all commie3 assistance and that they not persist in their leftist activities. The Secretary also emphasized that the Russians or the Chinese might well also offer and give assistance and that therefore in this fluid situation we must decide very promptly what direction we want to move, whom we want to back and then move in promptly. In this connection, the Secretary emphasized that our policy was fundamentally to get a right thinking and acting government, not simply to get the present government to go easy on the Dutch.

With respect to the action situation there was some question as to whether there was in fact a rice shortage or simply a failure of distribution.4 There was also considerable discussion whether the New Guinea issue was underlining the basic attitudes of the Indonesians and thus a cause for the current troubles or, alternatively, whether, as Mr. Murphy and the Secretary seem to feel, the New Guinea issue was a facade and an emotional issue in the wake of which Sukarno could seek to achieve his other objectives. In this connection, Mr. Robertson and Ambassador Richards felt that the New Guinea issue was in fact the basic problem. Mr. Robertson also pointed out that it was apparently not foreseen by the Dutch. The Secretary nevertheless felt that there were very real corruptive forces at work in the Indonesian problem which we would need to counter and which were apart from the New Guinea issue.

A reference was also made to the suggestion for joint or several representations to the Indonesians by NATO or NATO Governments.5 Reference was made to the Australian suggestion that the [Page 537] President intercede although this was thought to be far too vague. The fundamental problem according to Messrs. Murphy, Robertson and Richards is that there is nobody whom we can support; and [there] is no group on whom we can center our hopes or seek to develop as a counter balance to Sukarno. The Under Secretary noted that Sumatra may be the key and that we are looking into this further with the Australians and the U.K.

Mr. Robertson said that Gordon Mein has been hastily dispatched to Djakarta and should arrive Wednesday.

The Secretary emphasized again the critical need to move rapidly and to capitalize on the opportunities he saw that were now available to us.

Seventh Fleet Movement

3. Deputy Under Secretary Murphy briefly discussed the Navy instructions with respect to Java Sea movement.6

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

  1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75. Secret. Prepared in the Department of State, but the source text, marked “(Informal Notes—Not Approved)”, does not indicate the drafter.
  2. A memorandum attached to the source text, from an unidentified staff member to Arneson, McAfee, and Moffat, dated December 9, lists the documents on which the briefing was based and includes under “Indonesian Roundup” the notation “Demoralized state of anti-commie elements”.
  3. The word “commie” was added by hand in the margin of the source text.
  4. Telegram 1483 from Djakarta, December 7, reported a severe rice shortage in Djakarta; predicted that if it continued, as seemed likely, there was danger of rice riots, “which could be taken advantage of by Communists to fan flames of anti-foreignism particularly anti-Americanism”; and proposed a U.S. gift of rice to the people of Djakarta. (Department of State, Central Files, 856D.2317/12–757) Telegram 1609 from Djakarta, December 14, reversed the recommendation, concluding that Indonesia possessed sufficient stocks of rice and that the problem was due to faulty distribution, which the Indonesian Government was endeavoring to correct. (Ibid., 856D.2317/12–1457)
  5. Reported in Polto circular 19 from Paris, December 7, not printed. (Ibid., 656.56D13/12–757)
  6. Reference is apparently to telegram 080039Z, Document 312.