Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

88. Telegram From the Delegation at the SEATO Council Meeting to the Department of State¹

Karachi, March 7, 1956—7 p.m.

Secto 12. Department pass CINCPAC. Second closed session afternoon March 6 continuation Item 4.

The Foreign Minister of Thailand, Prince Wan, said danger Communist aggression for time being receding but must continue vigilance. He stated Thai relations with Burma were excellent. Minor border troubles had been settled through normal diplomatic procedures. Stated relations between Thailand Malaya “left nothing to be desired” and expressed gratification Malayan independence. Referred to neutralist attitude of Cambodia and said his country’s policy was to maintain friendly relations with Cambodia. He cited threat to Laos by Pathet Laos and expressed gratification that Cambodia and Laos were in UN. He stated Thailand looked with concern on Communist threat to Vietnam and suggested it would be desirable for Council to keep close watch on developments in Vietnam. Remainder his statements almost entirely devoted to thesis that Thailand completely loyal to SEATO and had not been taken in by neutralism. He stated this policy had been stated by Prime Minister Pibul and had been confirmed by Foreign Minister on many occasions. He explored several facets of neutralism and emphasized that such a policy offered no advantages. He said Thailand now receiving military and economic aid and that if more were needed it could be obtained through negotiations with friends. Stated first necessity was speed up present aid programs. Said Thailand’s firm anti-Communist policy had support of all but small number of Thai people.

Philippine Foreign Secretary, Garcia, referred to Communist diplomatic and commercial offensive in Middle East and SEATO area and drew conclusion SEATO must be strengthened militarily and economically. He posed problem of lack adequate resources for both defense and developmental expenditures and said development program would be more effective if aid were committed for periods longer than year to year basis. He viewed loans as most desirable for bulk of assistance. Re military preparation he stated plans had been drafted for collective defense in event of Soviet aggression. He said Philippine armed forces capabilities limited to internal security and revealed Philippine expenditures have been shifted to benefit government’s program for improvement living conditions rural people. He cited need for re-examination military aid programs to underdeveloped countries. Recommended establishment permanent group to make continuous assessment of threat to area. Expressed disappointment over progress made with respect to measures against subversion and stated CCC’s lacked sufficient guidance. Regretted lack of coordination by three civilian committees under Council representatives. He stated his government believed there was urgent need for setting up an integrated effective SEATO counter-subversion group to detect, expose and counteract subversive activities. Endorsed proposals for establishment of public relations office, appointment of cultural relations officer and creation of research service center.²

The chairman of Council meeting, Pakistani Foreign Minister, spoke for Pakistan. He referred to statements of Soviet leaders during recent visit this area³ which he said constituted active Soviet intervention and stated that matter of such gravity necessitated discussion by SEATO powers. After quoting Khrushchev’s threat to Pakistan he stated Afghanistan had tried by all means “to secure the detachment from Pakistan and absorption into Afghanistan of territories to the east of the Durand Line”.⁴ He charged Afghanistanian activities were now creating disorder on frontier through surprise raids, disruption of communications and subversion of loyalty of tribesmen. He stated Afghanistan’s designs on Pakistan territory received open support of Soviet Government. He said the Soviets following Bulganin’s visit announced $100 million aid program to Afghanistan, a large portion for military purposes. A further $15 million was promised to obtain weapons from Czechoslovakia. These developments, he said, were designed to involve Pakistan in long conflict which might follow pattern of Korea or Indonesia. He stated Pakistan might in near future find herself engaged in active defensive operations on her frontier which might appear to be localized to Afghanistan but would in fact be in defense of treaty area against Communist aggression. He said Afghanistan was merely a tool and Paktoonistan [Pushtunistan] only a convenient cover for Russian intention to destroy Pakistan. Said Pakistan does not have the means to sustain operations against such Communist aggression.

The Pakistani Foreign Minister turned to Kashmir and cited from Khrushchev statements. He said these pronouncements have brought Pakistan into East-West cold war with objective of creating dissension, confusion and disruption and fostering a sense of instability and insecurity demoralizing the friends of Western democracy. He stated Khrushchev had invited Prime Minister of Kashmir visit Soviet Union where he would be impressed with Russian might and brain-washed. He said India’s friends publicly supported her and it is time Pakistan’s friends came out into the open. All Pakistan wanted was for people of Kashmir to be allowed to exercise self-determination and through plebiscite decide whether they wish to join India or Pakistan. This he said has been proposed by Security Council and India is committed to it. If Western democracy were reluctant support Pakistan for fear of annoying India, friends of West would be dismayed and demoralized. Failure to support Pakistan would have serious domestic repercussions in Pakistan, strengthening those opposed to government’s policy of alliance with West and strengthening pro-neutralists.

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan cited paragraph II of Article IV of the treaty and stated a serious danger to territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Pakistan had arisen and should be considered by SEATO members. He recommended support of Pakistan to solve the Kashmir dispute (1) SEATO should reaffirm stand accepted by Security Council re fair and impartial plebiscite,⁵

(2) reaffirmation by the SEATO members that the Durand Line is internationally accepted frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan,

(3) urge steps to strengthen defensive capacity of Pakistan and recognize need to furnish Pakistan with requisite resources meet subversion and aggression and discharge its treaty obligations.

Foreign Minister New Zealand, Mr. Macdonald, stated he viewed SEATO as a deterrent to aggression of considerable importance. He viewed coming year as one of decision for Vietnam and cited Article IV paragraph 11 of treaty but did not propose formal consultation. He did suggest a reference be made in final communiqué to elections in Vietnam. In his view situation in Indochina had improved. He believed, however, that Diem’s attitude toward consultation with Viet Minh was giving propaganda advantage to Communists. He suggested Vietnamese Government be encouraged to make public statement of conditions under which it would agree to general elections. He believed that this would place onus of blocking free elections where it belonged and that under these conditions the Communists would back down as they did when offered free elections in Germany. He deplored Vietnamese failure to accept status of ICC which he viewed as a deterrent to Communist aggression. He expressed fear that Laos Government might provoke military action by Viet Minh and stated it was essential to support ICC in order to obtain peaceful settlement. He referred to Soviet campaign to create dissension and foment hatred for selfish and sinister purposes and expressed hope that the Kashmir dispute would be settled by orderly international procedures. He expressed view that Soviets through their statements were guilty of interference in Pakistan’s domestic affairs.

The French Foreign Minister stated his government recognized the necessity for military action against guerrillas but emphasized that main factor necessary was political action and raising standard of living of the people. He said propaganda could be used only with the greatest caution, that most efficient means of action strengthen the area would have to be of economic character. He cited his belief that there would not be an invasion of South Vietnam by Viet Minh but he cautioned of danger of armed guerrillas in Cochin China, several bands of which he said were probably directed by the Viet Minh. In his view stability in Vietnam depended more on political action than on military action to suppress armed guerrillas. He viewed the situation in Cambodia where the government was not threatened by subversion as better than in Vietnam.

The Australian Foreign Minister, Mr. Casey, commended the Secretary’s fine statement re recent switch in Soviet policy. He referred to Soviet proposals in Near East and South and Southeast Asia and suggested the necessity for more complete and detailed account and analysis of Soviet and satellite economic proposals. He commended U.K. and Malaya on the recent independence negotiations. He suggested chairman might provide Council with additional background on Paktoonistan [Pushtunistan] problem. He agreed with Filipinos that little had been accomplished re countersubversion. He suggested need for greater originality and initiative on this problem and said that he did not get a great deal out of report of CCC’s.⁶ Mr. Casey said that the political situation in Indonesia was not stable; that at the last general election the Communists had received five to six million votes. It was his view that the future of Indonesia was “in the lap of the gods” and that the question of the future government of Indonesia was of considerable interest to other governments in the area.

The British Foreign Secretary stated he believed subversion was greatest menace to area but that military threat still existed in Communist China and from the Viet Minh. He said that the Viet Minh now have five or six more divisions than at time of Manila meeting. Since Manila meeting Soviets’ interest in area has changed from indirect to active. He warned that many people in area believe it possible to reach an understanding with Chinese Communists. He expressed apprehension that over-publicized SEATO achievements would give Communists an opportunity for exploitation and that SEATO should not be made to appear as just a propaganda organization. He said it must be remembered that there are still uncommitted states in area and warned that countries not presently ready to join us should not be frightened away. He recalled British diplomatic efforts to obtain cooperation of these states before Manila and recommended strengthening ties with countries outside the treaty.

Selwyn Lloyd viewed situation in Cambodia as more satisfactory and risk of aggression less than in Laos or Vietnam. He commended consolidation of Diem regime. As co-chairman of Geneva meeting, he stated Great Britain would stand by the Geneva agreement and would be guided by a policy of patience. He referred to important roles of ICC and urged that everything be done to help ICC do its work for peace.

U.K. Foreign Minister referred to Malaya as only member country where the Communist pursued policy of violence which is costing Britain 100 million pounds a year. He said this Communist policy of violence had failed. He cited general terms of recent agreement⁷ looking toward Malayan independence but first year of elected government in Singapore was not too satisfactory. Referred to strikes and school trouble attributable to Communists. He said that Marshall as well as British Government were aware of problem and determined to meet it. He also referred to open Communist penetration of treaty area and attempts to exacerbate differences between Asian states. He cited arms deal with Egypt as greatest danger world peace since Korea and Soviet penetration of Afghanistan.

Foreign Secretary said alliances were not only military but also concerned with the battle of ideas and stated that if we had the same access to people behind curtain as we give Communists in free world in the battle of ideas we would have nothing but fear.

The Foreign Minister of France made additional remarks. He said he believed there had been fundamental switch in Soviet policy, the Soviets he said had based their policy on inevitable disintegration of capitalism and have finally discovered their error. They have found that they will have to apply political instead of military means to obtain success. However, Pineau questioned desirability of defense of capitalism as a good propaganda approach in certain parts of world. Real problem he stated was what to do within framework of peaceful co-existence. No matter what action we take Communist ideas are sure to continue spreading while we have always had difficulty in circulating our ideals and principles. He proposed that we undertake to get the largest possible opening of frontiers and the circulation of men and ideas as was suggested at Geneva. This, he stated, is our best chance. However, an ideological campaign must be accompanied by an economic offensive and the psychological aspects of economic problems must not be ignored. Ideas will develop best in an atmosphere of prosperity and welfare. Economic aid must be on the basis of cooperation and not charity.

The chairman read a communiqué for the day’s meeting⁸ which was agreed to by the Council. Session ended.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–KA/3–756. Confidential. Repeated to London, Wellington, Canberra, Manila, Singapore, Bangkok, and Paris.
2. See footnote 2, Document 91.
3. First Secretary Khrushchev and Prime Minister Bulganin were in Kabul December 16–19, 1955, during which time each made statements indicating sympathy toward the Afghan position on the Pushtunistan question.
4. The boundary line between British India and Afghanistan drawn up by a British mission under Sir Henry Mortimer Durand and agreed to by Amir Abdur Rahman, Khan of Afghanistan, on November 12, 1893. For text of the agreement, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 95, 1901–1902, p. 1049; or India, Foreign and Political Department, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries (Calcutta, Government of India Central Publication Branch, 1933), vol. XIII, p. 256.
5. Apparent reference to the Security Council Resolution of April 21, 1948 (S/726), and certain later actions of the Council. For a summary of formal action on the matter by the Council through 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. VI, p. 1699.
6. A report entitled “Estimate of the Threat of Subversion to the Treaty Area”, not printed, was prepared by the Committee to Combat Communist Subversion. It is Appendix II to the document cited in footnote 2, Document 91.
7. Signed February 8 by representatives of the Federation of Malaya and British officials. See the editorial note, vol. XXII, p. 761.
8. Dated March 6, not printed. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 661)