Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

82. Department of State Position Paper¹

KAR D–4/1

Washington, February 24, 1956.

THE KASHMIR AND PUSHTUNISTAN PROBLEMS²

(Will be raised by Pakistan in the SEATO Meetings)

Probable Pakistan Position

1. Recent statements by the Soviet leaders supporting the Indian position on Kashmir and the Afghan position on “Pushtunistan” have sharpened the threat of Soviet aggression against Pakistan. Part of the Soviet offer of $100 million credits to Afghanistan will undoubtedly be used to finance additional arms for the Afghans. The Soviets can be expected to encourage in every way possible the aggressive instincts of the present Afghan Prime Minister³ whose fanatical attachment to the Pushtunistan issue is motivated by his desire to secure a portion of Pakistan’s territory. The strong Communist influence in the government of Indian-held Kashmir makes it a probable base for Communist aggression in South Asia. The Soviets are deeply hostile to Pakistan’s membership in the Baghdad and SEATO pacts and desire to isolate and threaten Pakistan in every way possible. The matter has now reached the stage where Pakistan can appropriately ask its fellow SEATO members to give it their most serious consideration in the light of the security interests of the area as a whole.

2. SEATO should in some manner bring its influence to bear to counter this Soviet offensive evidenced by Soviet support of India and Afghanistan.

Suggested US Position

1. The US realizes that a most difficult problem is presented Pakistan by the recently launched Soviet effort in South Asia. This development has many dangerous implications which make it necessary for the SEATO members to increase their collective security efforts.

2. With regard to the Pushtunistan problem, the US has encouraged both sides to undertake discussions of their differences at a high level and we are hopeful that talks may soon take place.

3. With regard to Kashmir we understand that Pakistan has been seeking to arrange further talks between the two Prime Ministers. We believe this provides the best hope for progress towards a solution.

4. Thus we believe that the prospect of negotiated settlement of these problems would not be improved and would in fact be harmed by any attempt to bring SEATO’s influence to bear.

5. It is doubtful whether SEATO action in either the Kashmir or Pushtunistan problems at this time could successfully counter the Soviet effort to bring the uncommitted countries of South Asia under Soviet influence. It might in fact tend to push them towards the Soviets.

6. Should either of these problems at any time in the future show signs of presenting a threat of aggression against the territory of any treaty member, it would, of course, be a matter for immediate SEATO consideration. (Attached is a suggested statement to be made in the SEATO meetings.)

Discussion

Probable Pakistan Action

The Pakistanis may seek simply to have the Council of Ministers discuss the Soviet leaders’ statements. They may also seek issuance of some public statement indicating SEATO backing for the Pakistan position. Or the Pakistanis may urge that both problems should be considered active questions of Communist subversion to be brought under active review by the SEATO bodies concerned with such matters. Pakistani feelings on this subject were revealed at Council Representatives’ meeting in Bangkok where the Pakistani representative, in urging special notation of the item on the agenda, stated that “lack of interest in matters affecting member countries would only show that members could not expect even moral support from other parties in a defensive alliance”.

US Position

We should in so far as possible leave initiative in replying to the Pakistan proposals to the Commonwealth countries. Since the British have little influence with the Afghans and have tended to favor a “hard” line with them, the British may be somewhat more willing than we would be to support the Pakistan case on Pushtunistan.

[Attachment]

SUGGESTED STATEMENT TO BE MADE IN SEATO MEETINGS RELATIVE TO SOVIET STATEMENTS ON KASHMIR AND PUSHTUNISTAN

The U.S. believes a most difficult problem is presented to Pakistan by the recently launched Soviet effort to extend its influence in South Asia. The dangerous implications of this latest Soviet diplomatic offensive provide additional reason for continuing and intensifying our efforts to strengthen SEATO.

The Soviets have made noticeable progress in extending their influence in Afghanistan. Traditionally, however, Afghanistan has sought to maintain its ties with both its northern and southern neighbors. It is the U.S. view that every effort should be made to take advantage of this Afghan tendency in order to develop and strengthen Afghan connections with the free world. An important requirement for that objective is the development of closer relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and we observe with satisfaction the determined efforts being made by Pakistan for that purpose. Thus while we recognize that the threat posed by the growth of Soviet influence in Afghanistan may well become more acute, the United States believes that at present it can still be met best by a continuation of efforts already under way to improve Afghan ties with the free world.

With regard to Kashmir we understand there is a possibility of renewed bilateral discussions between Pakistan and India. These seem to the United States to provide the most hopeful prospect for progress towards solution of the Kashmir problem. The problem is also still before the United Nations Security Council. Thus avenues for negotiatory effort still remain open.

However, should it appear that possibilities of settling either of these problems through negotiations have been exhausted and should the danger of communist aggression arising from them become more acute, we believe they might then be further considered by the SEATO membership.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 655. Secret. Attached to a memorandum dated February 24 by Roger Kirk, which states it was drafted by Nicholas Thacher, Officer in Charge of Pakistan-Afghanistan Affairs, in preparation for the forthcoming SEATO Council Meeting, held in Karachi March 6–8.
2. For additional documentation on this issue, see vol. VIII, pp. 163 ff.
3. Sardwi Mohammed Daud Khan.