8. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions1
401. Depcirtel 3402 and 351.3 FYI Dept continues to be concerned about implications Afro-Asian Conference. Dept aware (a) Communists will attempt “rig” Conference (b) Main Communist purpose at Conference will be divide free Asian countries from their Western friends (c) Conference will be used by Communists as vehicle for propaganda purposes throughout area (d) Unless non-Communist countries exercise utmost caution and alertness they will find themselves joining in adoption of resolutions suggesting common purposes with Communist bloc and which could only be misunderstood by non-Communist nations not participating in Conference.
Dept has concluded however on basis reports and advice from missions concerned that it would be preferable for friendly Asian countries to accept invitation to Afro-Asian Conference.
Dept has no illusions as to risks inherent in Conference and believes it important these be overcome by clear presentation views that fraternity of peoples must not be divided by arbitrary geographical or racial distinctions.
Dept adopting public position Conference is primarily concern States invited, that US recognizes Communists will attempt exploit Conference to divide these countries from their other free world friends but that other countries should be aware Communists’ designs and will work for reasonable and constructive results. End FYI.
In discussions with local government you may if appropriate set forward US view as follows: 1. Question whether attend is for decision by local government but on balance US believes would be preferable for friendly Asian countries attend. 2. If local government decides attend US believes it would be advantageous common interests that it send ablest possible representation. 3. Local government is of course aware Communists will be well prepared for attempt bend Conference their ends and should be guided accordingly. 4. If non-Communist delegations cooperate effectively Conference might conceivably provide opportunity frustate Communists and achieve constructive results.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 670.901/1–2555. Secret. Sent to Kabul, Phnom Penh, Tehran, Baghdad, Tokyo, Amman, Vientiane, Beirut, Manila, Jidda, Damascus, Bangkok, Ankara, Hanoi, Saigon, Cairo, and Tripoli, and to the Liaison Office in Khartoum; repeated to London, Paris, Colombo, Djakarta, Karachi, New Delhi, Rangoon, Taipei, and Seoul, Hong Kong, and Singapore.↩
- For text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XII, Part 2, p. 1084.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 1.↩