Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

61. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand¹

Washington, July 14, 1955—6:4[?] p.m.

152. Bangkok 118 repeated Vientiane 25.² British Ambassador³ called on instruction 14th to make following points: UK concerned that if Thais raised issue, which they had right to do, result would probably be to antagonize India, destroy Indian cooperation in ICC and prevent possibility achievement solution in Laos by ICC. Also would encourage Soviets raise Far East issues at Geneva which we both wish avoid. For those reasons UK hoped US would join with them in attempting prevent an action which would bring about such unfortunate results. Said UK Ambassador Bangkok⁴ instructed, first to try to persuade Thais from raising issue, but if unsuccessful, secondly to attempt to have any resultant statement limited to deploring Pathet Lao action and ensuring statement contained two essential points: a) need to uphold provisions of Geneva Agreement in achieving a solution in Laos and b) express confidence in efforts of ICC whose authority constitutes best chance eventual settlement Lao problem. Robertson pointed out we did not believe that consideration this issue by Bangkok Representatives who are not a body authorized to take action, would actually set off dire results predicted. Further the Thais would probably not withdraw their request. Actually the open discussion and public statement along lines suggested might well provide a constructive element in stimulating vigorous action by ICC. Makins did not disagree with this viewpoint.

US position therefore that we would not attempt influence Thai action to withdraw resolution, but use our influence to have public statement include: a) deplore Pathet Lao action; b) affirm that Geneva Agreement, recognizing authority Lao Government should be upheld; c) call on ICC for renewed efforts (but not to express confidence in it) and express view ICC now offered best chance effecting settlement.

We informed Makins would transmit such instructions Bangkok for Peurifoy and that Secretary would be notified in Paris, although time factor probably would not permit Secretary’s comment prior meeting. Makins believed our position would result in helpful statement.

Peurifoy should therefore follow position outlined above as basic instruction. This does not limit or exclude other points for inclusion in a declaration on public statement which he believes useful.

Makins stated that while Foreign Office hoped for no publicity and for withdrawal Thai action, he personally thought events had gone too far for either hope to be realized. Foreign Office also displeased Thai action without prior consultation and feared would try divert consideration problem to UN, which they opposed.

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/7–1355. Secret; Priority. Also sent priority to Paris for the Secretary, Manila, Wellington, Canberra, Karachi, London, Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane.
2. In telegram 118, dated July 13, Ambassador Peurifoy reported that Thailand had requested Council consideration of the Laotian matter, and had mentioned British and French reluctance to hold a Council meeting for this purpose. (Ibid., 790.5/7–1355)
3. Sir Roger Makins.
4. Sir Berkeley Gage.